Posted by: Elmer Brabante | November 23, 2016

REVISED REMEDIAL LAW REVIEWER 2016


Please click the link below (in red) to generate the PDF file.

updated-remedial-law-reviewer-2016

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

 This humble work is a compilation of review materials the author had used and preserved during his long journey towards becoming a worthy member of the legal profession.
      Profound gratitude specifically goes to the following esteemed authors for their respective work:
  1. Albano, Ed Vincent, Remedial Law Reviewer, 2007 Edition, Rex Printing Co., Inc.
  2. Agpalo, Ruben E., Handbook on Criminal Procedure, 2004 Edition, Rex Printing Co., Inc.
  3. Francisco, Ricardo J., Evidence Rules, Third Edition.
  4. Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, Vol. III-A, 2005 Edition, Rex Printing Co., Inc.(Notes).
  5. Inovejas, Philger Noel, Remedial Law Jurisprudence 2015
  6. Paras, Edgardo L., Rules of Court Annotated, Rex Printing Co., Inc.
  7. Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Ninth Printing Edition, Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc.
  8. Reyes, Leonardo P., The People’s Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 2000 Edition, National Book Store.
  9. Riano, Willard B., Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar), 2007 Edition, Rex Printing Co., Inc.
  10. Riano, Willard B., Evidence (A Restatement for the Bar), 2006 Edition, Rex Printing Co., Inc.
  11. Villasis, Christian, Notes and Pointers in Remedial Law 2012-2015
  12. Philippine Association of Law Schools
  13. University of the Philippines Law Center

 

TO GOD BE ALL THE HONOR AND GLORY!

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 3, 2016

List of 2015 Bar Exams Passers


Total Number of Bar Finishers: 6,608

Total Number of Bar Passers: 1,731 (26.21%)

TOP TEN:

1 Rachel Angeli Miranda University Of the Philippines 87.40
2 Athena Plaza University of San Carlos 87.25
3 Jayson Aguilar University of the Philippines 86.75
4 Reginald Arceo Ateneo de Manila University 86.70
5 Mandy Therese Anderson Ateneo de Manila University 86.15
6 Giselle Hernandez University of the Philippines 86.10
7 Daniel Bustamante San Beda College 85.90
8 Jecca Jacildo University of San Carlos 85.85
8 Soraya Laut Xavier University 85.85
8 Jericho Tiu Ateneo de Manila University 85.85
9 Jedd Brian Hernandez University of the Philippines 85.80
10 Ronel Buenaventura Bulacan State University 85.15
10 Lara Carmela Fernando San Beda College 85.15

COMPLETE LIST OF PASSERS:

1. ABAD, Leslie Glenne C
2. ABAD, Rachel Ann Katrina P
3. ABEL, Jhoanna Marie M
4. ABELARDO, Mark Joseph B
5. ABELLA, Sonny Xavier S
6. ABELLANA, Lutche V
7. ABELLON, Mary May A
8. ABIAD, Shirley Ann N
9. ABIERA, Jose Sandino B
10. ABIERA, Rose Anne L
11. ABIOG, Ro Megan Lea B
12. ABOLAIS, Nurhainie S
13. ABREGANA, Dhetty Joy B
14. ABRIL, Donn Ed Martin A
15. ABRUGENA, Ma. Ann Klaudine C
16. ABSIN, Patrick Bryan E
17. ABU, Arik Aaron C
18. ABUBAKAR, III, Ismael G
19. ACASIO, Michael T
20. ACAYLAR, Cattleya B
21. ACEBEDO, Rafael Antonio M
22. ACEDILLA, Salvador V
23. ACORDA, Rosechelan Charity G
24. ACOSTA, Julius Patrick C
25. ADALEM, Jay Paolo C
26. ADAMI, Cherryl S
27. ADAO, Mica Maurinne M
28. ADIA, Iris Jazelle P
29. ADORDIONICIO, Shaira P
30. ADRALES, Judessa Mae D
31. AG-AGWA, Rassel Leah A
32. AGA, Greg Mari M
33. AGADER, Charisse Ann C
34. AGADIER, Ickey Rod T
35. AGANAP, Elizabeth Anne Y
36. AGAS, III, Felicisimo F
37. AGATEP, Christopher Lauren R
38. AGBAYANI, Juan Paolo C
39. AGDAMAG, Joseph Giancarlo C
40. AGOOT, Ryan D
41. AGOR, Ariel L
42. AGSAULIO, Janette I
43. AGUHOB, Rachiene C
44. AGUILAR, Jayson C
45. AGUILERA, Kim Angerie B
46. AGUS, Yehlen C
47. AGUSTIN, Rona Rikka Angel G
48. AIDA, Akemi B
49. ALABAT-TORRALBA, Joan B
50. ALAGBAN, Aiken G
51. ALARILLA, Francesca Camille L
52. ALBA, Jhony Martin J
53. ALBA, Jonathan S
54. ALBOR, Raphaela G
55. ALCANTARA, Kriseth M
56. ALCANTARA, Raymond P
57. ALCARAZ-FRANCISCO, Romie Rose T
58. ALDUESO, Hyacinth B
59. ALEJO, Jeffry A
60. ALENTON, III, Gregrio R
61. ALFONSO, Maria Josefina R
62. ALICANDO, Krister Shaun Prinz M
63. ALIGORA, Cecille S
64. ALIM, Mohammad Fyzee P
65. ALIMODIAN, Cherryl B
66. ALIVIO, Hanes Louise M
67. ALIX, Keeshia Alyanna H
68. ALIÑO, Jacqueline Leoncia M
69. ALLAS, Aira Kristina M
70. ALLAS, Lyra Cecille V
71. ALMADRO, Mary Katherine C
72. ALMARIO, Carlo Inocencio F
73. ALMEIDA-YAP, Kaye I
74. ALOJADO, James Patrick O
75. ALON, Veronica O
76. ALONZO, Fernando B
77. ALTURA-FERNANDEZ, Felylou A
78. ALVAREZ, Ma. Jessa M
79. ALYASA, Nadjera A
80. AMADOR, Ronald S
81. AMANTILLO, Anne Marie Joy B
82. AMEDA, Kenjie C
83. AMON, Paul Elbert E
84. AMOROSO, Love G
85. AMPONG, Alpha Grace P
86. AMWAO, Glory Pearl D
87. ANASTACIO, Dave Oliver P
88. ANDERSON, Mandy Therese M
89. ANDRES, Robert Joseph M
90. ANG, Jenica S
91. ANG, Marilen R
92. ANGUB, Tani M
93. ANSALAN, Ma. Pamela Aloha C
94. ANTONIO, Mona Liza D
95. ANTONIO, Robinson G
96. ANUGOT-MELO, Joan F
97. ANUNCIO, Rosalyn Ruth S
98. ANZO, JR., Nilo M
99. ANZURES, Jacquelyn Ann Marie G
100. APAD, Rachell C
101. APIGO, Reshel Amor D
102. APODERADO, JR., Ernesto A
103. APOLONIO, Julie Belle A
104. APOSTOL, Danielle D
105. AQUINO, Alexis Ann V
106. AQUINO, Andrei Laurence V
107. AQUINO, Gil Anthony E
108. AQUINO, Shiena Angela DR
109. ARAFAG, Karen B
110. ARANAS, Agnes B
111. ARANETA, Alfrederick C
112. ARBOLADO, Jan Michael V
113. ARBOLADURA, Mary Grace S
114. ARCEGA, Baby Perian R
115. ARCEO, Reginald M
116. ARCILLAS, Rosela N
117. AREJOLA, Ralph Raymond P
118. AREJOLA, JR., Romeo P
119. ARELLANO, Loriejay D
120. ARELLANO, Raysun R
121. ARIETE, Richard A
122. ARIÑAS, JR., Marianito B
123. ARNADO, Sedfrey Jay M
124. ARQUILLO, Buena G
125. ARRIESGADO, Ranier O
126. ARROYO, Laarni Gay C
127. ARTAIZ, Luis Alfonso E
128. ARUGAY, Glory Grace J
129. ASAMA, Jennifer T
130. ASCAÑO, Bon Gerard D
131. ASISTIDO, Andrei T
132. ASLOR, Gilbert P
133. ASORIO, Shiela Mae S
134. ASPILAN, William, Jr. P
135. ASUNCION, Mark Anthony A
136. ASUNCION, Ria Vanessa DS
137. ASUNCION, JR., Dionicio R
138. ATIBAGOS, II, Jose A
139. ATIENZA, Elaine A
140. ATILLO, Maria Olivia Ana R
141. ATRILLANO, Ervin Shaun S
142. AUSTRIA, Jessa F
143. AVELLANO, Jenny Rose G
144. AWATIN, Meliza Ann R
145. AYAP, Manuel C
146. AZARCON, Jerome T
147. AZIS, Jauhari C
148. AZURIN, Paula Beatriz L
149. BABATE, Gerard D
150. BABOR, Mark Christopher A
151. BACANI, Bianca Mae Y
152. BACANI, Luigi A
153. BACULI, Adolf Kissenger P
154. BACULO, Tyron Kim D
155. BADILLO, JR., IV, Avelino C
156. BADUA, Kristine F
157. BADUA, Ma. Jhunelle A
158. BAER, Rizsa Rose S
159. BAGALACSA, Omar V
160. BAGGAY, Joefer B
161. BAGUL, Sharmila R
162. BAKER, Kathlyn A
163. BALABA, Jean Charity C
164. BALADBAD, Mayer B
165. BALAGOT, Jessie C
166. BALAGTAS, Carl Edison M
167. BALAGTAS, Nest Deo L
168. BALAHADIA, Arrabelle Anne Carlene E
169. BALAIS, Ryan E
170. BALARES, Her Lynn F
171. BALAUAG, Kim L
172. BALBERAN, Germarie I
173. BALBOA, Donna Ann T
174. BALBON, Cretchen B
175. BALBUENA, Julius Ceasar M
176. BALDONADO, Kathy Florence M
177. BALDONADO, Nelson Kevin G
178. BALDUEZA, Ma. Luz Concepcion M
179. BALINGIT, Ana Ria G
180. BALINGIT, Jessica Marie S
181. BALITE, Paul Heherson M
182. BALJON, Al Whilan A
183. BALLEDO, Brando T
184. BALLESTA, Ma. Norma S
185. BALLESTEROS, Chelsea Joyce C
186. BALMEDIANO, JR., Jimmy N
187. BALTAZAR, Kimberly C
188. BALUGO, Percival M
189. BALUYUT, Maria Corazon O
190. BANAKEN, Jula A
191. BANASEN, JR., Robert V
192. BANATAO, April Rose Y
193. BANGANAN, Kristen Gay M
194. BANIQUED, Astrid Arielle I
195. BANIQUED, Janet D
196. BANTIGUE, Mark Aldrin Josel D
197. BANTUG, Maria Teresa Margarita Beatriz D
198. BANZON, Kris Marian D
199. BARATETA, Franco David B
200. BARCENA, Hanna H
201. BARCENA, Mike Joseph V
202. BARCENAS, Karl Rainier R
203. BARILLO, Frederick R
204. BARO, Gerald Dick B
205. BARONA, Hera Aiza Marie A
206. BARRAMEDA, Jener B
207. BARREDA, Marie Ronette Salve E
208. BARREDO, Edward B
209. BARRETTO, Eloisa R
210. BARRETTO, Miguel Angelo T
211. BARRIDO, Noliver F
212. BARRON, Anna Lea A
213. BARROZO, Shiela Joanne T
214. BARSAGA, Delbert John Z
215. BAS, Marc Arthur I
216. BASA, Heaven Leigh P
217. BASAN, Emelita C
218. BASCARA, Liselle Angela I
219. BASCO, Lisa C
220. BASUNGIT, Antonio, Jr. L
221. BATAC, Catherine L
222. BATICADOS, Paul Ivan R
223. BATONGHINOG, JR., Minrado DG
224. BATULA, Vanessa D
225. BAUTISTA, Bjorn Jorrell A
226. BAUTISTA, Cecille Catherine A
227. BAUTISTA, Justa Aurea G
228. BAUTISTA, Khersien Y
229. BAUTISTA, Marian Wilma H
230. BAUTISTA, Rodmel L
231. BAUTISTA, Sherlyn Lourdes T
232. BAUTISTA, Sid Angelo M
233. BAY-AN, Jayran Lowen D
234. BAYA, Hanie Lou A
235. BAYALAS, Brendale S
236. BAYON, Paula Bianca C
237. BAÑEZ, Laarni E
238. BEBELONE, Diana Mae R
239. BEBLANIAS-PILI, Retchie B
240. BECINA, Garret Neil A
241. BEDRIO, Julie Ann A
242. BEJER, Jomarie Christie G
243. BELARMINO, II, Jose Amelito S
244. BELDEROL, John Alexander S
245. BELDUA, Kenneth Vincent P
246. BELEN-GARRO, Liddy Jane C
247. BELLEN, Erwin B
248. BELLINGAN, Gracelyn E
249. BELTRAN, Rochezka Bianca R
250. BENITEZ, Paolo M
251. BERGANTIN, Kenneth Yves C
252. BERMAS, Joanalen G
253. BERMUDEZ, Dominic O
254. BERMUDO, Johanna Marie B
255. BERNARDO, John Michael A
256. BERNARDO, Paolo Miguel Q
257. BEROS, Madelyn C
258. BEÑAS, Frediswenda B
259. BIAG, Luigi L
260. BIALA, Dan Paul C
261. BIAS, Marcos E
262. BIAY, Kristian A
263. BIDES, Reden B
264. BIGAY, Daryl Jacob F
265. BINALLA, Jeremy Kay D
266. BISCAYDA, Kristel Joy P
267. BISNAR, Ryan Ric B
268. BITON, Johnbee R
269. BLANCO, Paul Danico C
270. BOAGING, Anthonette A
271. BODIONGAN, Glein Mark L
272. BOHOL, Dennis S
273. BOLA, Lorelei P
274. BOLANTE, Jose Roberto D
275. BONAOBRA, Ma. Evanor B
276. BONAVENTE, Arianne Q
277. BONGALON, Hendrix C
278. BONIFACIO, JR., Romeo E
279. BONTO, Renato R
280. BONTUYAN, Alvin G
281. BORBE, Magdalena A
282. BORILE, Ronald S
283. BORINAGA, Joey M
284. BORLASA, Renato B
285. BORRES, Abegail Mari F
286. BOÑAGA, Juliet V
287. BRAGADO, Cassandra I
288. BRIEVA, Rickee Gerald D
289. BRIONES, Keith Francis R
290. BRIONES, Lorenzo Jared J
291. BRISTOL, Murli Manohar Das E
292. BUAN, Noelle Jenina Francesca E
293. BUAN, Princess L
294. BUCA, Julie Merriam L
295. BUCCAT, JR., Honorio G
296. BUELA, Krisha Marie T
297. BUENAVENTURA, Aiza B
298. BUENAVENTURA, Ronel U
299. BUENCONSEJO, Lee Ann P
300. BUENO, Karen Ann S
301. BUESER, Jan-michael C
302. BUGAYONG, Monica G
303. BULAC, Katherine Grace C
304. BUNA CRUZ, Greta M
305. BUSAL, Hail O
306. BUSTAMANTE, Darniel R
307. BUSTONERA, Maria Carmela D
308. BUSWAY, Julius A
309. BUTED, Mabel L
310. CABADING, Maria Corazon V
311. CABALLERO, Cliford C
312. CABALLERO, Krisna Samantha T
313. CABALZA-NAPOLES, Maria Annely I
314. CABANLAS, Melanie Mae C
315. CABARRUBIAS, Donna Marie P
316. CABATU, Ricky Boy V
317. CABBUAG, Karla A
318. CABERGAS, Mary Anne S
319. CABILE, Kiarra Nastazsa Adrienne A
320. CABILI, Karl T
321. CABRAL, David Rence R
322. CABRALES, Diana May V
323. CABUNOC, Pearl Joan M
324. CAC, Corina P
325. CADAG, Maria Donnabelle M
326. CADIATAN, Jonah Liz A
327. CADIZ, Jethro Jed S
328. CADWISING, Rachanne C
329. CAGUIOA, Leon Maria Angel P
330. CAGURANGAN, JR., Tranquilino R
331. CAHILOG, Kent Joel T
332. CAINDAY, Jennebeth Kae B
333. CALALO, Mara Erna Azalea F
334. CALDINO, Hannah V
335. CALITIS, Niño Jandy P
336. CALIZO, Ruby Ann D
337. CALLUENG, Rene A
338. CALMARES, Ian J
339. CALO, Ma. Lorena L
340. CALUGAS, Ronelo C
341. CAMACHO, Christopher Renier C
342. CAMAT, Rocel Ann Dolores M
343. CAMBRI, Romar B
344. CAMINADE, Richard Rey T
345. CAMINO, Marie Louise N
346. CAMIÑA, Gerard Martin S
347. CAMPILLA, Adrian B
348. CAMPOS, Martin Rosendo L
349. CANCIO, James Francis M
350. CANDAO, Fahd A
351. CANONCE, Katrina B
352. CAPILI, Amorie Carla B
353. CAPINPIN, Jaymie D
354. CAPOCYAN, Genesis D
355. CAPON, Donn Serpico C
356. CAPUCHINO, II, Hermenegildo C
357. CAPUNO, Raegan L
358. CAPUYAN, Kevin Kaizer Dave K
359. CARAIG, Jane Donna C
360. CARANDANG, Airene P
361. CARANDANG, Nina Herschelica L
362. CARBONELL, Zhanika Marie O
363. CARDINES, Alvin P
364. CARIAGA, JR., Constancio P
365. CARILLO, Palma Clarissa V
366. CARINGAL, Kristia Lorraine V
367. CARIÑO, Charlotte M
368. CARIÑO, Marianne M
369. CARPENTERO, William G
370. CARRILLO, JR., Crisanto C
371. CARROLLO, JR., Clemente L
372. CARUÑGAY, Joy Samantha G
373. CASABAR, Ryan Armand L
374. CASADOR, Althea Mae P
375. CASIAO, Nanet S
376. CASIHAN, Ma. Isabelita R
377. CASIMPAN, Cybele Arianne Lee J
378. CASTILLO, Leah Francesca M
379. CASTILLO, Sherryl Joy N
380. CASTILLONES, Pacifico Ismael M
381. CASTRO, Jennifer Marie G
382. CATACUTAN, Darlene J
383. CATALUÑA, Lesly Ann J
384. CATANI, Ritchel S
385. CATAPANG, Kaye Danica H
386. CATARMAN, Piña Luz P
387. CATIPON, Ivy O
388. CAÑADA, Kaitlin Mary Cor L
389. CEMINE, Vivienne Jonnah R
390. CENGCA, Ma. Kristine Gay M
391. CEPIDA, Ericson T
392. CERO, Iris Fatima V
393. CEZAR, Karen Bianca Angeli S
394. CEZAR, Mark Jacinto D
395. CEÑIDOZA, Kriszanne Cerrise P
396. CHAN, Christian Philip B
397. CHAN, Hannah Isabella P
398. CHAN, Hobart H
399. CHAN, Jan Franz Norbert Joselito A
400. CHAN, Luigine Christi C
401. CHATTO, Ruby Jean G
402. CHAVEZ, Abigael R
403. CHAVEZ, Charlemagne Rae P
404. CHAVEZ, Cheysson A
405. CHAVEZ, Jino Karlo M
406. CHAVEZ, Marian Camille E
407. CHING, Maria Adela C
408. CHIONG, Darwin V
409. CHUA, Angelica A
410. CHUA, Gladys Kaye L
411. CHUA, James Michael T
412. CHUA, Jantzen Joe C
413. CHUA, Jeremy Ryan C
414. CHUA, Kara Mae Aurora R
415. CIMATU, Maria Faiva S
416. CIRUELOS, Mary Grace B
417. CIRUNAY, Sonny Paul R
418. CLAREZA, Kathleen May O
419. CLEOFAS, Benz G
420. CO, Anna Margarita K
421. CO, Jessica Anne G
422. CO, Jon Eric G
423. COBANKIAT, Camille N
424. COBARRUBIAS, Maria Graciela C
425. COKALIONG, Chesna Y
426. COLIS, Roselette Ann A
427. COLLADO, JR., Manolyn A
428. COLLE, Kristine Keith N
429. COMACASAR, Farhanisah D
430. COMAGUL, Aliah M
431. COMENDADOR, Jona Mae C
432. COMIA, Antonette T
433. COMIA, Trixy L
434. CONALES, Zulikha Marie S
435. CONCEPCION, Alain Kris C
436. CONCEPCION, Halie C
437. CONCEPCION, Warren B
438. CONCORDIA, Carlo Miguel SP
439. CONEJOS, Rafael Lorenzo G
440. CONSIGNADO, Mailyn P
441. CONTRERAS, Florence N
442. CORALES, Francis Paul T
443. CORDOVA, William B
444. CORRALES, Marlon M
445. CORREA, Ma. Criselda B
446. CORRIGE, Rency Y
447. COSICO, Michiko V
448. CRON, Clarizza D
449. CRUZ, Christine Bernadette U
450. CRUZ, Giancarlo A
451. CRUZ, Novy Marie S
452. CRUZ, Rheena Lyn L
453. CRUZ, Roxanne Marie Q
454. CRUZ, Tzeitel Christine DG
455. CRUZ, Xinia Carmela B
456. CRUZ, JR., Romeo B
457. CUA, Michael Pio V
458. CUANAN, Arjay Louie Eu B
459. CUDIA, Jane Victoria A
460. CUERDO, Winnie Anne S
461. CUEVAS, Julius N
462. CUEVAS, Leslie Joy L
463. CUISON, Melvin John Q
464. CUNANAN, Marco Polo E
465. CUPIN, Rosemarie Louise C
466. DABALOS, Kristina P
467. DACANAY, Ma. Cecilia Y
468. DACAY, Ernie Jerome Q
469. DAGBAY, Stacykitz J
470. DAING, Paul Patrick D
471. DALANAO, Gretchen Joy G
472. DANAO, Vic Darryl A
473. DANTES, Edmond V
474. DAPAING, Emman Rey F
475. DATU, Sabrina C
476. DATUDACULA-GURO, Farhana G
477. DAVID, Dennice Erica L
478. DAVID, Mike Gerald C
479. DAYAG, Richard G
480. DAYTO, Mary Grace S
481. DE ALBAN, Marlon Joseph M
482. DE BORJA, Esperanza Angela A
483. DE CASTRO, April P
484. DE CASTRO, Ian Julius S
485. DE CHAVEZ, Karren Mae C
486. DE DIOS, Kennex P
487. DE GUZMAN, Christopher Tom C
488. DE GUZMAN, Daisy Joy R
489. DE GUZMAN, Errica Marie N
490. DE GUZMAN, Jarren Neil D
491. DE GUZMAN, Kathleen Kay A
492. DE GUZMAN, Maria Corazon Y
493. DE GUZMAN, Sabrina Louise M
494. DE GUZMAN, Sheila O
495. DE JESUS, Charisma Michelle L
496. DE JESUS, Ramil F
497. DE LA CRUZ, Fatima Nica Q
498. DE LA CRUZ, Rhodalyn P
499. DE LA FUENTE, Dyan Angela A
500. DE LA PAZ, Anna Cristina B
501. DE LA SERNA, Christian Borg J
502. DE LEON, Diwata DR
503. DE LEON, Jenny Marie T
504. DE LOS SANTOS, Luciliza L
505. DE LOS SANTOS, Marifel B
506. DE LOS SANTOS, Robnette Mae C
507. DE LUMEN, Ramonchito L
508. DE MATIAS, Evelyn B
509. DE MESA, Jean Phebie G
510. DE VEYRA, Vanessa Gaye A
511. DE VILLA, Cipriana D
512. DEHAYCO, Don A
513. DEL CASTILLO, David I
514. DEL ROSARIO, Aaron John D
515. DEL ROSARIO, Elijah B
516. DEL ROSARIO, JR., Rodolfo B
517. DELA CRUZ, Flordeliza A
518. DELA CRUZ, Karen F
519. DELA CRUZ, Kevin Albert T
520. DELA CRUZ, Ma. Gesileth C
521. DELA CRUZ-BELTRAN, Brenda G
522. DELA MERCED, Blenda Czarinne R
523. DELA MERCED, Nicu L
524. DELAMBACA, Francis Erick D
525. DELDIO, Manuel F
526. DELGADO, Alvin G
527. DELLOSA, Mark Kevin U
528. DENTE, Kim D
529. DEOCAMPO, Randeil D
530. DERIJE, John Frederick E
531. DESCALLAR, Hannah Percival B
532. DESOACIDO, James Mareck M
533. DESTURA, Kristina Bianca D
534. DEVESA, Van Lee Roy C
535. DIAO, Jan Claude A
536. DIAZ, Carlo Artemus V
537. DIAZ, Ragesan M
538. DIAZ, Veronica B
539. DICDICAN, Oliver Y
540. DIEZ, Samantha C
541. DILIG-CARANDANG, Hazel G
542. DIMAANO, Mae Anne R
543. DIMALANTA, Angelica Rose C
544. DIMAPILIS, Jomarc Philip E
545. DIMAYUGA, Leoncia Ma. Cecilia M
546. DIONIO, Jose Mari Angelo A
547. DIRON, Al Hamid P
548. DISAMBURUN, Moh’d Hussein Jaded A
549. DISONGLO, Rose Lyn A
550. DITCHON, Irelan B
551. DIVINO, Lauren Gail D
552. DIZON, Raphael James F
553. DIZON-CATBAGAN, Ma. Liberty Rio P
554. DOMADALUG, Moumina Sheryne L
555. DOMINGO, Julius Caesar G
556. DOMINGO, Maria Czabrina O
557. DOMINGO, Rodalyn P
558. DOMINGUITA, Aladdin P
559. DORADO, Cheryl T
560. DUKA, Gian Jaime A
561. DULAY, Armand Louis T
562. DULDULAO, Christian T
563. DUMA, Stephen John M
564. DUMALANTA, Kristine Draei V
565. DUMASI, Charles A
566. DUP-ET, Carol S
567. DUREZA, Christy Theresa Bernadette A
568. DY, Dranreb U
569. DY, Erik Lawrence S
570. DY, Zara Marie
571. DYOCO, Maria Gracia D
572. ECAL, Erly Z
573. ECO, Christian G
574. EDIZA-ROSALES, Clairol Sienna Marie M
575. EDOS, Jumie Ann O
576. ELAURIA, Erla Rhysa R
577. ELNAS, Karen T
578. EMPAYNADO, Karen G
579. ENAJE, Albert L
580. ENDRINAL, Alvin P
581. ENRILE, April V
582. ENRIQUEZ, Ra Solomon A
583. ERACHO, Marian Kamille F
584. ERFE, Nazi Jester U
585. ERIGA, Ronald Fredric H
586. ESCABARTE, Regant C
587. ESCALA, JR., Vicente V
588. ESCANER, Michael Joseph L
589. ESCOBER, Paulo A
590. ESCUDERO, Allen Michael B
591. ESCUREL, Albert John L
592. ESGUERRA, Dondie Q
593. ESPARAGOZA, Michael Jorge T
594. ESPAÑOLA, JR., Leopoldo D
595. ESPINA-ABELLANA, Christina Angeli C
596. ESPINOSA, Aida Raissa T
597. ESPIRITU, Enrico A
598. ESPIRITU, France Leonor R
599. ESPIRITU, Marie Dainne V
600. ESPIRITU, Peter Guan S
601. ESPLANA, Maria Carla A
602. ESPLANADA-LLANES, Maria Czarina T
603. ESTANIEL, Leo Antoni C
604. ESTANISLAO, William George L
605. ESTEBAN, Fidel L
606. ESTELEYDES, James Bryan V
607. ESTEVEZ, Lara Victoria O
608. ESTILLES, JR., Ronald G
609. ESTIPONA, Joshua Psalm R
610. ESTRADA, Lovely C
611. ESTRADA, Nestonel F
612. ESTRADA-BANIQUED, Rona B
613. ESTRELLA, Jeziel H
614. ESTREMADURA, Joan Janneth M
615. EUGENIO, Bernadette A
616. EUSTAQUIO, Jesse Neil C
617. EXCHAURE, Iris Katrine M
618. FABIAN, Jessielle Ann C
619. FAISAL, Abdul Nassif M
620. FAJARDO, Renee Mark Q
621. FAJARDO, Vincent James V
622. FANGAYEN, Visitacion S
623. FANTILANAN, Chary Lou R
624. FELICIANO, Ma. Priscilla Olivia C
625. FELICIANO, Redentor A
626. FERANDO, Arlene B
627. FERMIN, III, Jann Victor D
628. FERNANDEZ, Jessa Mariz R
629. FERNANDEZ, Maximillian King Z
630. FERNANDEZ, Milagros Katarina A
631. FERNANDEZ, Myra May R
632. FERNANDO, Eunika Raiza V
633. FERNANDO, Jemima B
634. FERNANDO, Lara Carmela G
635. FERNANDO, Mervin Jay R
636. FERRER, Arianne Dominique T
637. FERRER, Euvic M
638. FERRER, Jeanne Carla T
639. FERRER, John Vincent S
640. FERRER, Josephine L
641. FILIPINO, Arturo C
642. FIRMALO, Rebecca M
643. FLORANDA, Geraiza Joy M
644. FLORENDO, Stephanie S
645. FLORES, Donna Marie C
646. FLORETE, Mary Christine Salome C
647. FONTANILLA-LUCINARIO, Marian R
648. FOOKSON, Clement Bryce B
649. FORMALEJO, Wilfried P
650. FORTUNO, Marienell G
651. FRANCISCO, Caesar Jose F
652. FRANCISCO, Francis G
653. FRANCISCO, Ma. Lani Laurette P
654. FRANCISCO, Marie Denise R
655. FRIAS, Kristina Paola P
656. FUELLAS, Vincent Raymond G
657. FUGGAN, Mariah-janina M
658. FULGENCIO, Alex R
659. GABALES, Gemco C
660. GABAT, Elvis B
661. GACAYAN, Joseph S
662. GALAMGAM, Ariel C
663. GALANTO, Diric V
664. GALAPATE, Erika Krizia M
665. GALLARDO, Enrique A
666. GALLEGO, Arthur Gabriel L
667. GALLEGO, Rajane R
668. GALLEON, Darcee Lois B
669. GALON, Jeric Angelo B
670. GALURA, Ivan Mark C
671. GALVEZ, Genaro N
672. GALVEZ, Kenneth Beneri A
673. GAMBET, Elynur H
674. GAMMAD, Vivien Gay T
675. GAN, Jorella P
676. GAN, Ruby Charmaine U
677. GANAN, Ramon Christopher
678. GANTUANGCO, Gilianne Kathryn L
679. GAPUZ, Golda Julia S
680. GARAY, Florentine T
681. GARAY, Franz Liz R
682. GARCES, Reena Joy G
683. GARCIA, Anne Loraine C
684. GARCIA, Hanna Keila H
685. GARCIA, Jenric Y
686. GARCIA, Karmela Trisha P
687. GARCIA, Kenneth C
688. GARCIA, Maria Jessica Erlinda Angela M
689. GARCIA, Nikki A
690. GARCIA, Patricia Anne E
691. GARONG, Daisy Mae P
692. GARRIDO, Mark Isaak S
693. GASPAR, Maria Paula D
694. GASTARDO, Emildan M
695. GATCHALIAN, Bernard Jonathan L
696. GATDULA, Ann Kathleen C
697. GAUD, Ma. Charisse E
698. GAYAS, Issa G
699. GEMANIL-ADRIANO, Loujean S
700. GENCIANEO, Ian Dj D
701. GENERAL, Carol Anne A
702. GENOTA, Mell Anthony L
703. GEONANGA, Ian Michel G
704. GERALDEZ, JR., Norberto P
705. GERODIAS, Beverly Flair G
706. GERONA, Allen Jeil L
707. GERONG, Dael Churchill T
708. GERSALIA, Lawrence Earl Roy A
709. GILBUENA, Darlene D
710. GIPULLA, Leigh Angeli C
711. GIRAO, Christia Sheine E
712. GIVERO, Katrina Kris Gabrielle S
713. GLINDO, Aggy Christine F
714. GLORIA, Carlo Cris V
715. GLORIA, Nadine Alessandra S
716. GO, Jason Edward G
717. GO, Kristine S
718. GOGO, Forcrissa S
719. GOGO, Lee Arvin D
720. GOINGO, Francis Josef T
721. GOJUNCO, Trina Donabelle R
722. GOMEZ, Rameses DT
723. GONZAGA, Leonette Marie L
724. GONZALES, Abbygaile T
725. GONZALES, Aizza L
726. GONZALES, Ariel D
727. GONZALES, Athanasia Zoe A
728. GONZALES, Cler Thea C
729. GONZALES, Jose Ma. Ronaldo D
730. GONZALES, Rionald J
731. GONZALGO, Azenith P
732. GONZALODO, Arnold M
733. GOPICO, III, Aventino S
734. GOZUN, Robicka Mae C
735. GOÑO, Cielo Marjorie A
736. GRAFILO, Sarah Jeanne H
737. GRANADILLOS, Dennis L
738. GRANADO, Lorelee Margaret T
739. GRANTOZA, Charles Joseph L
740. GRANTOZA, Jerilee H
741. GRATELA, Alexxis Monique O
742. GREGORIO, Alvin Clyde O
743. GREGORIO, Barbie Jan V
744. GREGORIO, Emmanuelle Hendrix C
745. GUANGKO, Keisha Trina M
746. GUANSING, Hazel Ritz D
747. GUARINO, Maria Victoria G
748. GUARINO, Michell B
749. GUIFAYA, Florence Kathleen L
750. GUILLEN, Maria Lourdes P
751. GUILLERMO, Marvic Vonn B
752. GUIMBARDA, JR., Rodolfo M
753. GUINTO, Aleli R
754. GUMABAO, Reiland G
755. GUMPAL, Angeli Anne L
756. GURO, JR., Manggay G
757. GUTIERREZ, Katrina Francesca Martha G
758. HABANA, Janeth G
759. HADAP, Nancy R
760. HADJIUSMAN, Jamalodin L
761. HAGAD, Imelda Maira H
762. HALOS, Aeron Aldrich B
763. HATOL, Martin Michael U
764. HAUTEA, Maria Carmela D
765. HERNANDEZ, Divina Gracia A
766. HERNANDEZ, Gertrude Feliz A
767. HERNANDEZ, Giselle P
768. HERNANDEZ, Jedd Brian R
769. HERNANDEZ, Jovelyn R
770. HERNANDEZ, Kym Leiner C
771. HERNANDEZ, Richard A
772. HERNANDEZ-ORONICO, Fe Editha M
773. HERRERA, Karla Margarita L
774. HERRERA, III, Ernesto C
775. HILAO, Denise C
776. HIPOLITO, Egm Anmar F
777. HIPOLITO, Kathleen Kirby P
778. HIÑOLA, Vincent P
779. HONGCO, Junnie Vee D
780. HORMILLOSA, Hazel Faith J
781. HUI, Aldrich Ransleigh M
782. IBARRA-SAGAY, Ann Cristine S
783. IBAÑEZ, John Eddu V
784. IBERA, Gerald T
785. IGNACIO, Gabriel Lorenzo L
786. IJIN, Mohammad Ijin E
787. ILAGAN, Kerstin Kaye L
788. ILAGAN, Maria Charis Kay S
789. ILAGAN, Robee Marie M
790. ILAO, JR., Moreno M
791. ILLESCAS, Noel Kris E
792. IMBAT, Oswald P
793. INDINO, Ofelia M
794. INOT, Roneil L
795. INTON, Ferdinand P
796. ISRAEL, Roxan Gracielle D
797. ITUTUD, Judeus B
798. JACILDO, Jecca B
799. JADAP, Daughnilen S
800. JAMILA, Ricci A
801. JAMONER, Paul James T
802. JAMORA, Norman Jay F
803. JANOLO, Celine-maria B
804. JARO, Jan-michael P
805. JAVELOSA, III, Narciso F
806. JAVELOSA, III, Ranulfo J
807. JAVIER, Gemma Andrea C
808. JAVIER, Mary Grace L
809. JAVIER, Ryan Joseph N
810. JHOCSON, Anna Patricia T
811. JIMENEZ, Jason S
812. JOEL, Alvin Divino R
813. JOLITO, Joenifer S
814. JOSE, JR., Andres S
815. JOSOL, John Daryl D
816. JOVEN, Eric Samuel P
817. JUAN, II, Virginio C
818. JULIAN, Nicole Alora G
819. JUMAMIL, Devona H
820. JUNCO, Michelle P
821. JUNTILLA, Edryne Jeth F
822. JUSAY, Maria Christina M
823. KADIL, Kal Kausar S
824. KAGAOAN, Anna Maria D
825. KAHULUGAN, Auda Bea P
826. KALAW, Katrina L
827. KAPAWEN, Aubrey Macnee A
828. KAPUNAN, Ceasario Rex P
829. KARIM, Sittie Nadia M
830. KASILAG-SANCHEZ, Lucrecia Cecilia C
831. KHO, Rhacq B
832. KING, Charlotte Y
833. KING, Clarizel L
834. KING, Kathleen Anne S
835. KING, Keith Elbert C
836. KING, Maximilian P
837. KINTANAR, Paula Carissa V
838. KREBS, Kyle Malachy S
839. LABAJANAN, Michelle C
840. LABISIG, Hansard G
841. LABRO, Jerueh L
842. LABTIC, Clint Octavius E
843. LABUGUEN, Peter Jhon O
844. LACABA, Harold B
845. LACAS, Jose Mari Carlo D
846. LACAS, JR., Pascual A
847. LACSINA, Conrad Smith C
848. LADESMA, Gean Yvish R
849. LADINES, Giovanni Christian D
850. LADOT, Delight B
851. LADRINGAN, Maranatha Praise D
852. LAGASON, Paula Grace C
853. LAGMAN, Kathleen Halley M
854. LAGOS, Marita P
855. LAGROSAS, Sheryl Christine V
856. LAGURA-GAYONGORSA, Bronwen May A
857. LAIZ, III, Francisco C
858. LAJA, Lanoel S
859. LAMBINO, Meryllainne Rhacquel DG
860. LAMEN-LEGANO, Florence Gay C
861. LAMPA-MANALO, Nina Luisa S
862. LANTAJO, Czarina Rose T
863. LANZADERAS, Joy S
864. LAO, Niniveh B
865. LAPIÑA, Carmichael C
866. LAPUT, Rena Mae A
867. LAROSA, Raynan A
868. LASERNA, Lorielle R
869. LAUBAN, Norhussien U
870. LAURAYA, Jedidiah Martin M
871. LAURENCIANA, Jackelyn B
872. LAUT, Soraya S
873. LAWAGAN, Roy P
874. LAWAGAN, JR., Guillermo F
875. LAYGO, Annie Grace A
876. LAYSON, Avegail P
877. LAZARO, Jacquelyn D
878. LAZARO, Loralyn Anne R
879. LEAÑO, Maria Ofelia S
880. LEDESMA, Lloyd Paul C
881. LEE, Jeanelle C
882. LEE, Kathleen Sherry U
883. LEGASPI, Aaron Jeric M
884. LEGASPI, Maricris G
885. LEGASPI, Marjorie C
886. LEGURPA, Marlon D
887. LEONAR, April Joy B
888. LEQUIGAN, Kaye Hazel C
889. LESTERIO, Nizza P
890. LEVANZA, Ernest P
891. LIANKO, Kathreen Jessica M
892. LIAO, Kirby Bryan M
893. LIBA, Maria Celirina S
894. LIBERATO, Nathaniel P
895. LIBONGCO, Karl Francis A
896. LIM, Arl P
897. LIM, Debbie Anne Y
898. LIM, Paolo Carlo O
899. LIM, Richard Allan A
900. LIM, Robert Jay T
901. LIMCUMPAO, Benigno Russ M
902. LIMFUECO, Shiella Jane R
903. LIMJAP, Michelle F
904. LINA, Niño Don L
905. LINDAIN, Homer V
906. LITUAÑAS, Mary Rose C
907. LIU, Kristine Jane R
908. LIWANAG, Angeline A
909. LLANES, Chaz Angelo Joshua P
910. LOMBOY, Ana Marie C
911. LOMIOAN, Galao G
912. LONGAQUIT, Daniel P
913. LOPA, Maria Caterina Cristina R
914. LOPEZ, Ma. Carina G
915. LOR, Remfel G
916. LORAYES, Kristel Dominique A
917. LORENZO, Frances Adelaide C
918. LORICA, Juan Paolo D
919. LOZANO, Mark V
920. LU, Rochelle Rea A
921. LUBANTE, Jessica B
922. LUCAYLUCAY, Maicha M
923. LUCENARIO, Domingo Iii A
924. LUCILO, Ivy Suzieline E
925. LUGLUG, Jeremy B
926. LUGOD, Cherry Mae D
927. LUKBAN, Ken Xavier T
928. LUKBAN, Ma. Carmela L
929. LULU, John Albert B
930. LUMAPAS, Nestor Crispin Miguel B
931. LUNAR, Lorena Lerma M
932. LUSICA, Richard P
933. LUSUNG, JR., Augusto C
934. MABALOT, Mc Rhondolf Louie V
935. MABAZZA, Jason C
936. MACABABBAD, John Paul D
937. MACABAGDAL, Joanne O
938. MACABALES, John Gilbert F
939. MACABULOS, Eduardo Danilo F
940. MACALALAD, Cresta Amor R
941. MACALANDA, Marion Camille G
942. MACAPAGAL-MANALO, Cheryl Mae A
943. MACARAEG, Maureen Z
944. MACASA, Joseph Paul A
945. MACATUNO, Honey Leth T
946. MACOD, Sittie Rainnie G
947. MACROHON, Jenielyn A
948. MADARANG, Jo Ann Frances D
949. MADIO, Joel L
950. MADRILEÑO, Lowell Fredrick A
951. MAGA, Bryan John G
952. MAGALONG, Kristina Louise S
953. MAGBUHOS, Denise Dianne A
954. MAGLAQUE, Lorrielaine A
955. MAGLAYA, Cara Mariel S
956. MAGNO, Ian Alfredo T
957. MAGNO, Pacifico Angelo S
958. MAGPANTAY, Fe B
959. MAGPUSAO, Chris-jerome J
960. MAGSAYSAY, Margarita Lourdes F
961. MAGSUCI, Jelina Maree D
962. MAGTAGÑOB, Rosanne Jeli G
963. MAGTIBAY, Ma. Lia Karen S
964. MAGULTA, Lara Angela F
965. MALACAS, Ma. Regina O
966. MALANG, William Russel S
967. MALASAGA, Jay P
968. MALIONES, Karen Mae M
969. MAMACLAY, Rosecellini T
970. MAMURI, Jessica Maria M
971. MANAHAN, Lalaine M
972. MANAHAN, II, Zoilo M
973. MANALO, Jonas Anton M
974. MANALO, Mary Joanne M
975. MANALO, Patrick Austin R
976. MANANQUIL, Unica Amor R
977. MANANTAN, Jenny Flor T
978. MANATA, Lita A
979. MANAUIS, Arjay C
980. MANDANTES, Ivo M
981. MANDAP, Joanna Rizza B
982. MANGACOP, Fahad D
983. MANGAHAS, Rosalina T
984. MANGALINDAN, Carmina M
985. MANGALINDAN, Shalom Joy L
986. MANGONDAYA, Aslimah S
987. MANGROBANG, Cristina Elaine D
988. MANGUBAT, Jan G
989. MANGUBAT, Kristine B
990. MANGUNAY, Ann Margaret Q
991. MANIBOG, Korina Ana T
992. MANIQUIS, Maria Estella M
993. MANRIQUE, Ali Loraine V
994. MANTARING, Jeffrey S
995. MANUEL, Maria Theresa Amor C
996. MANUEL, Mark Anthony N
997. MANUEL, Maxine Victor E
998. MANUTA, Michael Jan G
999. MANZANO, Arnold R
1000. MAPANDI-PACASUM, Juhana A
1001. MARALLAG-AVE, Kristine R
1002. MARAMAG, Jeremy Jones B
1003. MARANAN, Maica Maris D
1004. MARAVILLA, Mark Brian B
1005. MARIANO, Paul Webster M
1006. MARIANO, Sharmaine Reza B
1007. MARQUEZ, Vincent Mc Eduard M
1008. MARTIN, II, Lito Paolo T
1009. MARTINEZ, Anna Katrina M
1010. MARTINEZ, Emil Angelo C
1011. MARTINEZ, Krys Valen O
1012. MASCENON, Ana Graciella S
1013. MASONGSONG, Christian Leonard V
1014. MATABAN, Vincent C
1015. MATEN, Lene M
1016. MATEO, Jemen A
1017. MATEO, Maria Angelica M
1018. MATEO, Maygenica A
1019. MATIAS, Monchito N
1020. MATIBAG, Ramon Antonio L
1021. MATIVO, Kathleen A
1022. MATOTE, Sofia E
1023. MAULION, Rynbert Anthony L
1024. MAURICIO, Maria Luisa Dominique D
1025. MAURO, Sharilee Angela G
1026. MAUTANTE, Mariam G
1027. MAUYAG, Rishzmin P
1028. MAWIS, Sara Mae D
1029. MAXINO, Izzy Martin R
1030. MAYO, Carlo Magno K
1031. MAYOL, III, Alfredo L
1032. MAÑEGO, Julius Eleazar N
1033. MEDALLE, Mat Eric M
1034. MEDEQUISO, Gwendolyn P
1035. MEDINA, Angiereen D
1036. MEER, Jose Luis Francisco P
1037. MEJIA, Daryll Margaret V
1038. MELEGRITO, Mark John C
1039. MELOTE, Mark Paolo M
1040. MENCHAVEZ, JR., Eric M
1041. MENDEZ, Arvi Gale C
1042. MENDIOLA, Bella Mercedes G
1043. MENDOZA, Angelique M
1044. MENDOZA, Dionne Mae A
1045. MENDOZA, Frances Margarette A
1046. MENDOZA, Jeffrey G
1047. MENDOZA, Jona Christinelli C
1048. MENDOZA, Kristine M
1049. MENDOZA, JR., Manuel T
1050. MENESES, Kristine Grace P
1051. MERCADO, Jeffrey M
1052. MERCADO, Maria Emma Gille A
1053. MERCADO, Paul Joseph V
1054. MERCADO, Roxanne Joyce L
1055. MERIS, Madelaine Anne M
1056. MERIS, Mary Angela M
1057. MESINA, Karla Eunice T
1058. MEÑEZ, Emmanuel Joseph F
1059. MIGRIÑO, Dexter C
1060. MIGRIÑO, Erika Paola M
1061. MILA, Kathlynn B
1062. MILAN, Joel D
1063. MILITANTE, III, Jose Constantino C
1064. MINA, Madeline P
1065. MINA, Matthew Ryan R
1066. MIRAFLOR, Russel C
1067. MIRANDA, Rachel Angeli B
1068. MIRANDO, Margie B
1069. MOHAMMADALI, Sittie Aisah M
1070. MOHAMMADSALI, Al-azree J
1071. MOLETA, Karen H
1072. MOLINA, Dominico Vitto SE
1073. MONATO, III, Marceliano P
1074. MONTALVO, Henson M
1075. MONTAYRE, Maria Gabriela O
1076. MONTENEGRO, Ryan C
1077. MORADA, Marlon D
1078. MORALES, Monique B
1079. MORALES, Waren J
1080. MORDENO, Katrina G
1081. MORELOS, Michelle Ann L
1082. MORENO, Ericson R
1083. MORENO, Lucille Gaye A
1084. MORTEL, Ana Margarita A
1085. MOSQUERA, Florenz Ross S
1086. MOVIDO, Romeo Manuel Joshua R
1087. MUELA, Carl Rupert C
1088. MUIN, Alkhadri H
1089. MUPAS, Janelle C
1090. MURCIA, Carlo Paolo P
1091. MURILLO, Angelo L
1092. MURLA, JR., Wilfred A
1093. MUSNI, Megan Daphne D
1094. MUTI, Jorhany S
1095. MUTIA, Kristine Mae A
1096. MUTIANGPILI-MARQUEZ, Jomelle P
1097. MUYUELA, Fatima Mae A
1098. MUÑEZ, Ramon Alfonso T
1099. MUÑEZ, Stephen Don Q
1100. MUÑOZ, Lirio R
1101. NACU, Mary Grace M
1102. NAGA, Michael Demph D
1103. NAGASAN, Leo Kirby B
1104. NAGASE, Chieri B
1105. NAGTALON, Eryl Royce R
1106. NALZARO, Dalton Dave M
1107. NAPALA, Jessica E
1108. NARCA, Anacelle L
1109. NARDO, Gamaliel E
1110. NARTATES, Grace R
1111. NARVASA, Carlo Joaquin T
1112. NAS, Jessamine Jared S
1113. NATIVIDAD, Al B
1114. NAVAL-NAGA, Ma. Katrina M
1115. NAVARRA, Christine Mae P
1116. NAVARRETE, Anne Katherine P
1117. NAVARRO, Jimmy D
1118. NENGASCA, Sarah Jane A
1119. NERI, Jorgianna V
1120. NEYRA, Prince Arthur M
1121. NICOLASORA, Maria Joy Rosario S
1122. NITURA, Enrique F
1123. NITURA, Karla Izavella A
1124. NOMBRES, Josa Mary M
1125. NOSCAL, Geoffrey Angelo V
1126. NOVEDA, Kara Mae M
1127. NUÑEZA, Rosalie A
1128. OCBA, Dejeh O
1129. OCHOA, Randy C
1130. OCLARIT, Eunice Grace R
1131. ODOSIS, Derek J
1132. ODUCADO, Nathaniel M
1133. OFILAS, Cathleen Lezette S
1134. OGATIS, Nimrod V
1135. OLA, Jille Audrey F
1136. OLALIA, Mary Ann P
1137. OLID, Shiella P
1138. OLIQUINO, Lea M
1139. OLITA-CABARLES, Mary Lyka M
1140. OLONAN, Virson Tillich G
1141. OLVIS, Olive Corrine N
1142. OMELDA, Nizza U
1143. ONDANGAN, Jandel V
1144. ONG, Astrid Sheevette P
1145. ONG, Hanica Rachael Arshia J
1146. ONG, Mae Lane R
1147. ONG, Ruth Ann Q
1148. ONGCHUAN, Mary Felicci B
1149. OPAY, Jeff Mikol A
1150. OPERIANO, Lord F
1151. OPEÑA, Alexander F
1152. OPEÑA, Edda A
1153. OPLE, Felix Francis B
1154. OPLE, Mildred F
1155. ORALLO, Joana Marie C
1156. ORDANEZA, Mary Joy M
1157. ORDILLO, Sabra Rachel P
1158. ORIÑO, Ian Dominic M
1159. ORPILLA, Richelle H
1160. ORSUA, Reynold L
1161. ORTEZUELA, Daphne Angela L
1162. ORTIZ, Jaypee B
1163. ORTIZ LUIS, Nastasha Dominique G
1164. OSO, Dominic Paul C
1165. OSTIA-ALBURO, Rizzle May R
1166. OYOS, Gerlyn Fe G
1167. PABICO, Kristine D
1168. PABILANE, Frances L
1169. PABLICO, Rizajane B
1170. PABUSTAN, Sheena Marie P
1171. PACLIBAR, Jeena P
1172. PADILLA, Nastasia Anne C
1173. PADILLA, Ysabel Jean B
1174. PAGADUAN, Daryl C
1175. PAGARAN, Rhyan John C
1176. PAGAYANAN, Renz J
1177. PAGTOLON-AN, Rolando B
1178. PAGUIDOPON, Joanne M
1179. PAGURAYAN, Joana May C
1180. PAJE, Rosalie E
1181. PALAC, Fritzgerald Ace S
1182. PALACIO, Aldrin S
1183. PALACIO, Francis Bernard A
1184. PALAD, Eddie Bouy B
1185. PALATTAO, Rose Angeli T
1186. PALENCIA, Maycee D
1187. PALGAN, Arlene P
1188. PALILEO, JR., Fernando C
1189. PALINGPINGAN, Jordan P
1190. PALLADO, Danny L
1191. PALMA, Isabella Gianna P
1192. PALMERA, Roxannie S
1193. PALMONES, Eloisa C
1194. PAMA, III, Edilberto E
1195. PAMATIAN, Reggie Anne D
1196. PAMINIANO, Mary Cris N
1197. PAMINTER, Angela S
1198. PANAO, Rogelio Alicor L
1199. PANDI, Romdell L
1200. PANGAN, Kevin Averell A
1201. PANGANIBAN, Francis Immanuel DC
1202. PANGANIBAN, Muriel Ielaine B
1203. PANGUBAN, Katherine A
1204. PANOTES, Raymond A
1205. PARACAD, John Mark N
1206. PARAÑOS, Roddel R
1207. PAREL, Prince Ever C
1208. PARILLA, Janice M
1209. PARPAN, Camille Ross G
1210. PARTOSA-AGUILAR, Sheridyll M
1211. PARUNGAO, Edwardo D
1212. PASATIEMPO, Eunice Christine Anne T
1213. PASCASIO, Jarmae Z
1214. PASCASIO, Kristina Karen O
1215. PASCUA, Marvin P
1216. PASCUAL, Honey Vanessa S
1217. PASIA, Laurence L
1218. PASICOLAN, Alvin P
1219. PASTOR, Ann Marie Loren R
1220. PASTORAL, Ma. Lourdes Zendy D
1221. PATDU, Lovely Strawberry N
1222. PATIGDAS, Maria Girly V
1223. PATRIARCA, George Franz Nico F
1224. PAULIN, Ivy Steve M
1225. PAULINO, JR., Rolen C
1226. PAÑO, Maria Janina Rosario L
1227. PECASIO-GATCHALIAN, Shiela T
1228. PEDREGOSA, Ana Mae P
1229. PEKAS, Bryan G
1230. PEPITO, Althea Marie B
1231. PERALTA, Julien F
1232. PERALTA, Rhegine T
1233. PEREZ, Barbie Kaye B
1234. PEREZ, Bryan Alphonso E
1235. PEREZ, Gretchen M
1236. PEREZ, Marjorie B
1237. PEREZ DE TAGLE, Gaston Franco V
1238. PERUCHO, Jeralph G
1239. PESTAÑO, Glenn Allen O
1240. PEYRA-VISITACION, Angelyn A
1241. PEÑA, Francis Nico F
1242. PEÑALBER, Amirah L
1243. PIA, Madeleine Andrea T
1244. PIGAO, I, John Socrates G
1245. PILA, Garriz P
1246. PILAR, Gilbert H
1247. PINEDA, Glorie Anne
1248. PINEDA, Roger Arpee P
1249. PINILI, Francis David B
1250. PIO-MEDEZ, Josie L
1251. PITALCORIN, Feona Ivana D
1252. PIÑERA, Eleonor E
1253. PIÑERA, Rene Raffy T
1254. PLAZA, Athena C
1255. PLAZA, Lady Love Y
1256. PLAZA, Rafaelita L
1257. POCULAN, Goldie Love I
1258. POLESTICO, Anthony
1259. POLINGA, Julius S
1260. PONCE, Eumel E
1261. PONGAS, Mike Burton M
1262. POON, Jan Jordan L
1263. POTINGAN, Kate C
1264. POZON, Iris M
1265. PRANGA, Rytchum M
1266. PRUDENCIADO, JR., Reynaldo M
1267. PRUDENTE, Francesco Micael N
1268. PUGONG, Gertrude M
1269. PULIDO, Jerano Paulo B
1270. PULIDO-SADIAN, Mary Grace V
1271. PULMA, Rodel James R
1272. PUNO, Jasmine A
1273. PURACAN, Kristine Joy N
1274. PURINO, Mary Rose A
1275. PUSA, Rommel P
1276. PUSAY, Mary Agnes S
1277. PUTUNGAN, Maria Theresa Minda P
1278. QUERIDA, Rosalyn Mary L
1279. QUERUBIN, Jovy Anne V
1280. QUERUBIN, Reiner O
1281. QUIBIR-MAGBIRAY, Maria Ana Zenaida D
1282. QUIBOD, Kristine Mae M
1283. QUIJANO-BENEDICTO, Anna Marie M
1284. QUIMPO, Naomi Charmaine D
1285. QUINIVISTA, Kristine Mae B
1286. QUINSAYAS, Joseph P
1287. QUINTANA, Retzelyn Mae G
1288. QUINTOS, Hailin DG
1289. QUIROZ, Bernardine V
1290. QUITORIANO, Bernadette M
1291. QUIÑO, Robie P
1292. QUIÑONES, Nathalie B
1293. RABANG, Joahnna Guia E
1294. RAFANAN, Frodina Mafoxci J
1295. RAMACHO, Nathan Joseph P
1296. RAMIREZ, Angelito Emmanuel V
1297. RAMIREZ, Javierose M
1298. RAMOS, Fidel C
1299. RAMOS, Kathleen Teresa M
1300. RAMOS, Ronald A
1301. RAMOS, Ryan Jay R
1302. RAMOS, Theresa D
1303. RAMOS, JR., Conrado O
1304. RASUMAN, Anisa Hafiza L
1305. RAZON, Loubelle L
1306. REAL, Tara Angelique T
1307. REBALDO, Jude Isidro A
1308. RECALDE, JR., Alberto D
1309. RECAMARA, Julienne Marie C
1310. REFUERZO, Esther Katherine R
1311. REGACHO, Erness Faith J
1312. REGALARIO, Jaime Sandino C
1313. REGAÑON, Kenneth E
1314. REGIDOR, Romylyn O
1315. REGIS, Alain Bert G
1316. REGUA, Steve Russel P
1317. REGUCERA, Rexbelli B
1318. REMIGIO, Kristalyn Karen B
1319. REMINAJES-REYES, Jeri Jacqueline T
1320. REMOLACIO, Noel A
1321. REMOLAR, Joanna Kaye B
1322. REMOLLO, Jo Margarette W
1323. REPOSO, John Philipps M
1324. RESPICIO, Jeryll Harold P
1325. RETUYA, Lawrence L
1326. REVILLA, Dinna Lynn P
1327. REVILLA-MARAVILLA, Gleen A
1328. REVILLOZA, Loyd Greg P
1329. REVOTE, Allan G
1330. REYES, Ana Victoria B
1331. REYES, Carmina C
1332. REYES, Danya T
1333. REYES, Ernest Anthony L
1334. REYES, Ezra Maica R
1335. REYES, Jonathan A
1336. REYES, Joseph Michael C
1337. REYES, Joshua James R
1338. REYES, Lorenzo Marvin S
1339. REYES, Mattheu Jericho A
1340. REYES, Mervin M
1341. REYES, Odessa H
1342. REYES, JR., Conrado DO
1343. REYES, JR., Narciso G
1344. REYES-PATAG, Lesley Anne Y
1345. RILLERA, Denmark M
1346. RILLON, Ruth Maureen C
1347. RIMAS, Melissa M
1348. RIOFLORIDO, Ivy M
1349. RIVERA, Ferdinand E
1350. RIVERA, Katrina G
1351. RIVERA, Michelle C
1352. RIVERA, Paula Elise R
1353. ROBENIOL, Gabriel Antonio D
1354. ROBIÑO, Nile April P
1355. ROBLES, Basilito M
1356. ROBLES, Prince Rayner D
1357. ROCERO, George D
1358. ROCHA, IV, Ramon I
1359. ROCO, Jose-mari H
1360. RODRIGUEZ, Ella Racquel N
1361. ROJAS, Angelica T
1362. ROJAS, Chelissa Mae N
1363. ROJAS, Ralph Anderson A
1364. ROJAS-CALLAO, Annie C
1365. ROJO, Mark Anthony R
1366. ROMA, II, Alfonso L
1367. ROMANO, Edwin E
1368. ROMANO, Ryan Ceazar P
1369. ROMARATE, Geralyn T
1370. ROMERO, Angeli Patricia C
1371. ROMERO, Ralph Christian B
1372. ROMUAR, Ma. Cherie Bambi R
1373. ROMULO, Carlos Celestino F
1374. RONCESVALLES, Iris L
1375. ROSALES, Giness Marie G
1376. ROSALES, Regina Patricia C
1377. ROSALES, Richard M
1378. ROSALES, Ronn Robby D
1379. ROSARIO, Earl Caezar N
1380. ROSAS, Reeld Holly D
1381. ROXAS, Rochelle Marie C
1382. ROXAS, Roxan O
1383. ROXAS TAN, Vincent S
1384. RUAYA, Ronald S
1385. RUBICA-SABORDO, Charade Circe C
1386. RUBIO, Darwin Perry B
1387. RUBIO-AGUINALDO, Mishelle Anne R
1388. RUGA, Hana Chrisna C
1389. RUIZ, Ma. Buena Magdalena R
1390. RUTOR, Lyndon W
1391. RUYERAS, William Angelo B
1392. SABA, Kayzer Aldrin Z
1393. SABALO, Brian B
1394. SABELLANO, Kenny C
1395. SABELO, Marte M
1396. SABILALA, Dan Bernard S
1397. SACLOT, Jeffrey C
1398. SACOTE, Lilaben A
1399. SACRAMENTO, Patrick D
1400. SACRO, Marielle Kriza T
1401. SADAIN, Jameela S
1402. SADICON, Marianne Faith B
1403. SADONGDONG, Jerome B
1404. SAGPAEY, Jenny A
1405. SAGUIN, JR., Rogelio H
1406. SAGUINSIN, Loraine D
1407. SAGUN, Ruelan L
1408. SALAMATIN, April Michelle D
1409. SALANGA, Rowena Angela C
1410. SALANGUIT, Marian B
1411. SALANGUIT, Maritoni B
1412. SALAPANG, Annie Sheila C
1413. SALAS, Athena M
1414. SALAS, Pearl Joy M
1415. SALAS, JR., Alexander G
1416. SALAYOG, Kyra Vernice G
1417. SALCEDO, Michelle B
1418. SALDON, Christ Shaney C
1419. SALIG, Hyacinth Marie T
1420. SALINAS, Alicia P
1421. SALINDO, Elvin S
1422. SALIOT, Riona Vince S
1423. SALISE, Mary Christine Anthonette M
1424. SALIZON, Benedic G
1425. SALLY, Ferdinand T
1426. SALON, Ephraim D
1427. SALUNAT, Early Joy L
1428. SAMEDRA, Arvy Chris D
1429. SAN AGUSTIN, Geoff Lyn D
1430. SAN JOSE, Riza Kristina E
1431. SAN PEDRO, Jose Maria Ceasar C
1432. SANCHEZ, Alfie Sonia Q
1433. SANCHEZ, Carlo Gabriel P
1434. SANCHEZ, Marie Alexis Denise S
1435. SANCHEZ, Ralph J
1436. SANCHO, Alona Margaret B
1437. SANDIGAN, Ronald Ryan A
1438. SANDOVAL, Anna Kristina B
1439. SANIEL, Jose Ruel A
1440. SANTAMINA, Angelie B
1441. SANTIAGO, Joanna Elvira L
1442. SANTIAGO, Katrina Gynne F
1443. SANTIAGO, Miguel Antonio P
1444. SANTILLAN, Phoebe Samantha A
1445. SANTOS, Aaron Bailey G
1446. SANTOS, Al Marvin W
1447. SANTOS, Christian Lloyd S
1448. SANTOS, Hyacinth B
1449. SANTOS, Jim Joel N
1450. SANTOS, John Terry H
1451. SANTOS, Jose Antonio Rafael G
1452. SANTOS, Jose Manuel S
1453. SANTOS, Karen Anne G
1454. SANTOS, Louie L
1455. SANTOS, Louie Ernest B
1456. SANTOS, Marc Mikhaele J
1457. SANTOS, Maria Irene I
1458. SANTOS, Maricar Jan M
1459. SANTOS, Mario D
1460. SANTOS, Roselee B
1461. SANTOS, Ryan G
1462. SANTOS, III, Lamberto L
1463. SAPORNE, Maria Cecilia T
1464. SARANDI, Abigail Moffait P
1465. SARITA, Cecille Angela T
1466. SARMIENTO, Maria Kristel B
1467. SASPA, Dianah Jee U
1468. SAYO, Patricia Anne S
1469. SAYSON, James Allan C
1470. SEBASTIAN, Bobby Johnson O
1471. SEGOVIA, Maria Cielito B
1472. SEGUBRE, Paolo M
1473. SEGUI, Adrian Donald L
1474. SEGUNDO, Karissa Inez A
1475. SEIT, Jade Q
1476. SEMILLANO, Mipps Mardie
1477. SENAJON, Cristyl Mae B
1478. SENTILLAS, Kenneth Roy E
1479. SENUPE, Ma. Juanna Ester D
1480. SERASPI, Chinky Dane C
1481. SERRANO, Erika Sheena C
1482. SERRANO, Lennard Constantine C
1483. SERZO, Aiken Larisa O
1484. SESE, Rens Gener P
1485. SEVA, Jose Pio J
1486. SEVILLA, Prince Junel G
1487. SEVILLA, Toni Lou S
1488. SIA, Rowneylin SJ
1489. SIAZON, Leigh Nicole TC
1490. SICCUAN, Don Mikhail A
1491. SILANG, Valery Ann P
1492. SILAO, Coravirna D
1493. SILONGAN, JR., Ibrahim K
1494. SILVA, Angelo Joseph C
1495. SILVA, Merlo Vinia C
1496. SILVA, Nikko Emmanuel D
1497. SIMON, Simon L
1498. SINCO, Noel Y
1499. SING, Anthony L
1500. SINGCOL, Anna Katrina T
1501. SINGZON, Anthony U
1502. SINOCRUZ, Fay Kristina P
1503. SINSONA, JR., Norberto J
1504. SIRON, Rafaela P
1505. SISON, Charm D
1506. SISON, John Michael O
1507. SISON, Kimberly Rae A
1508. SOL, JR., Rodolfo A
1509. SOLIMAN, Rhea-ann J
1510. SOLINAP, John Leo D
1511. SOLLANO, Ma. Mikhaella Rosario Z
1512. SOLLESTRE, Sheryl M
1513. SOMES, Erwin A
1514. SORIANO, Cassioppea Jerose V
1515. SORIAO, Howell Ivan Ritche B
1516. SOTTO, Darwin C
1517. SQUILLANTINI, Claudia Gabriella R
1518. STA. CRUZ, Juan Antonio D
1519. STA. MARIA, Patricia Anne D
1520. STO. TOMAS, Jefferson H
1521. SUAREZ-DELOS SANTOS, Michelle C
1522. SUBA, Nasrifa S
1523. SUGGUIYAO, Amirozelle Katya G
1524. SULIT, Juzzelyx B
1525. SUMAYOD, JR., Alejandro S
1526. SUMBILLA, JR., Vedasto B
1527. SUMERGIDO, Katty Khee G
1528. SUMINGUIT, Ramel C
1529. SUMOGBA, JR., Enrique T
1530. SUN, Jason Oliver C
1531. SUPATAN, Lorena M
1532. SUPE, Mary Hariette B
1533. SUPERABLE, Nonalyn S
1534. SUPNET, Winly Joy L
1535. SURUIZ, Jonar M
1536. SUSVILLA, Ivy B
1537. SY, Jacklyn Kim L
1538. SY, John Habib J
1539. SY, Kenneth Elvin C
1540. SYDIONGCO, Jacqueline Carlotta B
1541. SYSON, Patricia Leticia R
1542. SZE, Maria Lourdes G
1543. TABBU, Ruby Joyce S
1544. TABILISMA, Marlon P
1545. TABOADA, Giovanne C
1546. TADE, Chelsea Raye N
1547. TADLAS, Jed Libby B
1548. TAGANAS, Iris Pauline G
1549. TAGUINOD-MAGGAY, Tshaine B
1550. TALAHIBAN-HIPONIA, Zennia V
1551. TALAN, Glady Mae S
1552. TALAO, Vincent Paul R
1553. TALDE, Jay-b L
1554. TALINGTING, Avril Reina O
1555. TAM, Leoni Mae Rubi L
1556. TAMAYO, Karen Rose C
1557. TAMAYO, Vixid Role T
1558. TAMBAOAN, Joan Carmel S
1559. TAMBOR, Jennidy S
1560. TAMPIS, Doris Moriel B
1561. TAMPUS, Shane May B
1562. TAN, Deo Virgil R
1563. TAN, Jeffrey Rod Y
1564. TAN, Jose Lorenzo C
1565. TAN, Mahrra Anna P
1566. TAN, Nico Bryan P
1567. TAN, Suzette H
1568. TAN-ESTANDARTE, Marene Rose F
1569. TANDOC, Mark Haddison P
1570. TANTUAN, Edhona C
1571. TAPIA, JR., Judito H
1572. TAQUIO, Maria Cristina B
1573. TARIGA, Marc Eico C
1574. TARUC, Rhyzzi Celine S
1575. TATCO, Kevin Christopher C
1576. TAWARAN, Jennifer M
1577. TAYLO, III, Jose Herminio D
1578. TE, Jill Angeline R
1579. TECSON, Katherine Michel V
1580. TEJADA, Dan Tristan T
1581. TEMBLOR, Vilmalen M
1582. TENGCO, Sheenalyn R
1583. TEODORO, Pascual Agusto Carlo P
1584. TEOPE, JR., Mario R
1585. TEVES, Maria Althea M
1586. TICZON, Maria Kristelle A
1587. TIGSON, John Benedict T
1588. TILOS, Fenna Marie A
1589. TIMBOL, Rodney C
1590. TINAGAN, Ingrid T
1591. TIU, Jericho R
1592. TIU, Sean Carlo C
1593. TOCAO, Zehan Loren E
1594. TOLEDO, Eleonor U
1595. TOLENTINO, Julie Ann B
1596. TOLENTINO, Lyka Leigh M
1597. TOLENTINO, Rose Ann O
1598. TOLENTINO, Sonby Adam A
1599. TOMBOC, Paul Angelo F
1600. TONGSON, Tristan Jason R
1601. TONOG, Franco Archie N
1602. TOPACIO, Alexandria J
1603. TORALBA, Marty Franz F
1604. TORNO, Jesa Kristi R
1605. TORRALBA, Connie Beb A
1606. TORRE, John Lerrie I
1607. TORRES, Aljeane F
1608. TORRES, Lameriza M
1609. TORRIZO, JR., Romeo S
1610. TOVERA, Marilyn Sharina R
1611. TRAYA, Rex Julius A
1612. TRIA, Dani Lynne P
1613. TRIESTE, JR., Gerome M
1614. TRINIDAD, Peter Neil E
1615. TRINIDAD, Ysabel Fatima N
1616. TRINIDAD, JR., Mario P
1617. TRONQUED, Marlon Iñigo T
1618. TUAZON, Diana Jean M
1619. TUAZON, Jolina Pauline T
1620. TUAZON, Lara Karina S
1621. TUBIERA, Hana Marita H
1622. TUGUIC, Joshua B
1623. TUMALIUAN, Bong Richard M
1624. TUMAMAO, Ramse A
1625. TUMAMAO-ANDRADA, Dyan P
1626. TUMAMBING-MARQUEZ, Melodie C
1627. TUMARU, Bernard Joseph V
1628. TUMARU, Karla Mae V
1629. TUNGPALAN-LUGOD, Lorna A
1630. TUÑACAO, Tiffany L
1631. UBOD, Camille Therese L
1632. UGSAD, Francis Bon C
1633. UMALI, Francis Rainier B
1634. URBANOZO, Laird Dionel N
1635. URBINA, Jamila R
1636. URSAL, Ernesto (junjun) L
1637. UY, Josie Antonette M
1638. UY, Martin Juris V
1639. UY, Michael Vincent M
1640. UY, Nathaniel Andrew Y
1641. UY, Paul Angelo R
1642. UY, Philip Michael C
1643. UY, Rona Gail V
1644. UY, Sittie Fahanie S
1645. VALDEZ, Alexis Janet J
1646. VALDEZ, Katrina Grace A
1647. VALE, Dianne C
1648. VALENCIA, Celine Blesilda A
1649. VALENCIA, Charlon Reinier O
1650. VALENZUELA, Cherrie Rose C
1651. VALENZUELA, Chery Sheil T
1652. VALERIANO, Victor Napoleon D
1653. VALLECER-PATCHO, Vanessa Marie C
1654. VALLINAS, Lorraine Jean V
1655. VALMONTE, Leorae D
1656. VARIAS, Varbra Ann A
1657. VARON, Roy M
1658. VASQUEZ, Jimmy E
1659. VEJANO, Marcus Julius D
1660. VELARDE, Jessa Ela L
1661. VELASCO, Andrew O
1662. VELASCO, Gerald M
1663. VELASCO, Paul Dominic R
1664. VELASCO, Ric John F
1665. VELASCO, Richard Andrew P
1666. VELASCO, Venus C
1667. VELASQUEZ, Jed Erickson M
1668. VELO, JR., Rosendo S
1669. VERANA, Ileen Mae V
1670. VERONILLA, Leni Fae P
1671. VERZOSA, Francisco Miguel T
1672. VERZOSA, Patricia Ester R
1673. VEVA, Ryan C
1674. VICENCIO, Jared Cecillo C
1675. VIDAURRETA, Irene D
1676. VIERNES, Cherry Anne D
1677. VILCHES, Gian Frances Nicole C
1678. VILIRAN, Christian DC
1679. VILLACORTE, Ginnie T
1680. VILLAFUERTE, Abygail June R
1681. VILLALUZ, Almera J
1682. VILLALVA, Maria Andrea C
1683. VILLAMAR, Lawrence P
1684. VILLAMOR, Anthony V
1685. VILLANUEVA, Franz Marie L
1686. VILLANUEVA, Joeyfer S
1687. VILLANUEVA, Matt Jayson S
1688. VILLANUEVA, Victor Lorenzo L
1689. VILLANUEVA-ARABIS, Maria Cristina A
1690. VILLAPANDO, Simon Peter D
1691. VILLARIN, Donnie Wayne M
1692. VILLAROJO, Sunny Ray
1693. VILLAROMAN, Gerald Tristan D
1694. VILLARUBIA, Grethel V
1695. VILLARUEL, Rita Odessa A
1696. VILLASANTA, Rosarie Raysalyn Z
1697. VILLATUYA, Luigi Miguel P
1698. VILLEGAS, Levie C
1699. VILLEGAS, Mara Angeli T
1700. VILLEGAS, Mary Louise S
1701. VILLENA, John Mark C
1702. VILLEZA, Lorraine B
1703. VILLORDON, Barwin Scott P
1704. VILLORDON, Vinci B
1705. VINARAO, Jonathan C
1706. VIOLA, Hannah May R
1707. VISCA-MARTINO, Khemle Jane T
1708. VITO, Ma. Fionna B
1709. WATANABE, Yoko Carolyn C
1710. WENCESLAO, Ma. Paula Michelle M
1711. YAMBAO, Juan Miguel G
1712. YANG, Avon Merick J
1713. YANTO, Jennifer Kristine B
1714. YAO, Aislyn Janelle L
1715. YARANON, Andrea Nikka A
1716. YBAS, Randilou S
1717. YEE, Jedd Aldrich C
1718. YEE, Ruddy Allen N
1719. YOUNG, Wesley Jefferson C
1720. YU, Nyera Hyssene O
1721. YU, Ralph Martin C
1722. YUCHONGTIAN, Annelli Jade S
1723. YULO, Judy Anne Y
1724. YUMUL, Maria Carmela C
1725. ZABALA, Raymond Rainier L
1726. ZAMBO, Bryan Anthony P
1727. ZAMORA-REY, Maria Fatima I
1728. ZAPATA, Don Jan C
1729. ZARAGOZA, Israel Jacob R
1730. ZORILLA, Ritchelle R
1731. ZULUETA-PLAMERAS, Jasmin Angeli Grace R

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | April 6, 2016

A Brief Review on the Theories of Punishment


THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

Throughout the long history and development of societies and the institutionalization of states, and as states enact laws to ensure justice and equality in their respective territories, the question arises as to whether the social institution of punishment is justifiable. Why do states enact laws that define specified conduct as criminal or immoral and impose punishment for violation of those laws? Whom or what do these punishments protect? What are the parameters that would make punishments effective? What are the competing philosophies of punishment that have been advanced in response to crimes? Are recidivists, habitual delinquents, terrorists, and drug traffickers capable of reformation? Since punishment involves pain or deprivation that people wish to avoid, when is the intentional imposition by the state of extreme punishments such as the death penalty justified?  Is a just society without punishments possible? These are some of the central questions that this paper aims to address.

Before going directly to the responses to these questions, one essential question need be raised first: What is the definition of Punishment, and can a definition be proposed that meets the test of neutrality?

Punishment may be defined as the authorized imposition of deprivations of freedoms or other goods to which the person has a right or the imposition of special burdens because the person has been found guilty of criminal violation, typically involving harm to the innocent.[1]

A definition of Punishment cannot be neutral, considering that it has the following elements or properties: (1) It is an act by a political authority having jurisdiction over the community, not an incidental accidental harm; (2) it is an objectively judged loss or burden; (3) it is a social institution, not a natural event outside human purposes, intentions and acts; and (4) it is an imposition following a determination of guilt.

Is the social institution of punishment warranted? Why do states enact laws that define specified conduct as criminal or immoral and impose punishment for violation of those laws? Whom or what do punishments protect? What are the parameters that would make punishments effective? What are the competing philosophies of punishment that have been advanced in response to crimes?

All principles of justice focus on sustaining a society where people shall be encouraged to do cooperative and useful actions and dissuaded from harming social institutions, where all things are ordered fairly and where relationships are supported by social sanctions, both positive and negative (rewards and punishments). According to Rawls,[2] even in a well-ordered society, the coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation. The role of authorized collective sanctions, of the social institution of punishment, is warranted precisely to overcome instability; the existence of effective penal machinery serves as men’s security to one another. The principles justifying these sanctions can be derived from the principles of liberty and responsibility.

All societies and social groups develop ways to control behavior that violates norms. Social control is also achieved directly through external sources that compel individuals to conform through the threat of social reaction. Regardless of whether conformity results from personal desires or external compulsion, conformity is ultimately achieved through the use and threat of punishments.[3]

In a just society, undeserved victimization is understood to violate individual rights and social institutions and is therefore prohibited and punishable by law. The justification of punishment will depend upon more general political and moral theory, consistent with the responsibilities for legal protection afforded by a just society. The central instrument for the protection of individual rights and social institutions is the penal sanction attached to the law that defines certain harmful acts as crimes, following the maxim, nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (There is no crime nor punishment except in accordance with law). 

Even in a just society, not every person will comply with the law, and not everyone who does comply will do so out of respect for the rights of others. Hence, the fundamental rights-protecting principle on which the system of punishment is built: It is better to increase law compliance by liability to sanctions of those who would otherwise violate the law than it is to permit them to act on their perverse autonomy without any socially imposed cost to themselves, since that would require us to tolerate the victimization of the innocent. For that reason, rational self-interested persons acting behind the veil of ignorance would choose to impose on themselves and on others a liability to criminal sanctions for certain law violations. Thus, the establishment of punishments as social institution is warranted.

If the punitive sanction is to function effectively as a preventive of noncompliance, then it must be perceived not only as a legitimate threat but also as a credible threat. Its legitimacy is established by its protection of individual and collective rights, its authorization by constitutional procedures, and its administration through due process and equal protection of the law. Its credibility is established by its being generally perceived to be both reasonably severe and effectively enforced.

Generally, the theories of justification of punishment may be broadly classified as utilitarian and non-utilitarian. What distinguishes these theories is their focus and goals: utilitarian theories are forward-looking concerned with the future consequence of punishment; non-utilitarian theories are backward-looking, interested in the past acts and mental states; and mixed theories are both forward- and backward-looking.

  1. Non-Utilitarian Theory of Punishment

 Retributive theory of punishment. One of the oldest and most basic justification for punishment involves the principles of revenge and retribution. Neither constrained by questions of offender culpability nor directed at preventing future wrongdoing, offenders under a retributive philosophy simply get what they deserve. Punishment is justified on its own grounds. Concepts of desert and justice occupy a central place in most retributive theories: in accordance with the demands of justice, wrongdoers are thought to deserve to suffer, so punishment is justified on the grounds that it gives to wrongdoers what they deserve. Applying Kant’s “principle of equality,”[4] if a wrongful act is committed, then the person who has committed it has upset the balance of the scale of justice; he has inflicted suffering on another and therefore rendered himself deserving of suffering. So in order to balance the scale of justice, it is necessary to inflict the deserved suffering on him.” For Kant, the justification of retributive punishment is derived from the principle of retaliation (lex talionis), which is grounded in the principle of equality.

Consistent with retributive philosophy, punishment focuses mainly on the gravity and characteristics of the criminal act rather than the offender. Retributivists argue that more serious offenses should be punished more severely because offenders who commit more serious crimes deserve harsher punishment than those who commit less serious crimes. Many contemporary retributivists hold that the “principle of proportionality” should be used in order to determine the amount of punishment, in that, “the amount of punishment should be proportionate to the moral seriousness or moral gravity of offenses. Hence, the centerpiece of most argument in favor of capital punishment is retributive: Murderers, those who deliberately cause an innocent person’s death, have rendered themselves deserving of death.

The retributivists rely on the assumption that the criminal laws whose violation makes one eligible for punishment protect genuine individual rights. Were this not so, the retributivists could not claim that justice requires punishment for the violation of the law. Retribution is not cruel because it treats a criminal with dignity. Kant categorically rejected punishment as means to end because it amounts to use of man for others, which is against the principle of human dignity. The doctrine of desert, fairness, and proportionality rejects cruel, barbaric, and uncivilized punishment of vengeance theory (lex talionis).

The primary merit of the retributive justification of punishment is that it aims to punish only voluntary acts and excludes involuntary acts, unlike the utilitarian punishment which applies to all acts, intended or unintended, voluntary or involuntary. However, while retributive punishments like the death penalty is proper for heinous crimes (especially those committed against persons such as murder, homicide, or rape), is the imposition of death penalty or even of reclusion perpetua (imprisonment for 20 years and one day to 40 years) justified for commission of crimes against national security (treason[5]), against public order (rebellion, insurrection, coup d’etat[6]), or those committed by public officers (qualified bribery[7])?

2. Utilitarian Theories of Punishment

 Utilitarianism is the moral theory that holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action is determined by the balance between good and evil that is produced by that action. When attempting to determine whether a punishment is justifiable, utilitarians will attempt to anticipate the likely consequences of carrying out the punishment. if punishing the offender would most likely produce the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness compared with other available options, then the punishment is justified.

Utilitarianism is concerned mainly with the balance of happiness over unhappiness produced by an action. When attempting to determine the amount of punishment that ought to be permitted for a given offense, it is necessary to weigh the unhappiness that would be caused by the offense against the unhappiness caused by various punishments. The greater the unhappiness caused by a given offense, the greater the amount of punishment that may be inflicted for that offense in order to reduce its occurrence before the unhappiness caused by the punishment outweighs the unhappiness caused by the offense.

Bentham’s utilitarian theory holds that punishment is a means to an end and seeks to punish the offenders to discourage or deter future wrongful acts.  Utilitarian theories can be categorized as Reformative, Restorative, and Compensatory.

Rehabilitative and restorative theories of punishment look at sanctions as instrument of rehabilitation and attempts to mold the behavior of the criminal on the premise that human acts are affected by social environment and psychological factors; therefore, it is the duty of society to reform him by adopting certain mechanisms of reintegration. Less frequent use of imprisonment, abandonment of short incapacitation, the use of prisons for training, and greater employment of probation, parole and suspended sentences are evidence of reformative trends of punishments. These trends reject the deterrent and retributive justifications of punishment.

Although it may seem contradictory or at least odd to assert that we punish for the treatment and reform of offenders, this basic principle underlies the rehabilitation purpose of punishment. The ultimate goal of rehabilitation is to restore the convicted offender to a constructive place in society through some combination of treatment, education, and training. In contrast to retribution that emphasizes uniform punishments based on the gravity of misconduct, rehabilitation focuses on the particular characteristics of individual offenders that require treatment and intervention.

Restorative justice literally involves the process of returning to their previous condition all parties involved in or affected by the original misconduct, including victims, offenders, the community, and even possibly the government. Under this punishment philosophy, the offender takes full responsibility for the wrongdoing and initiates restitution to the victim. Community mediation groups, neighborhood councils, local support groups, and victim-offender conferences are the primary means of achieving these restorative efforts.

The aims of the rehabilitative punishment may be noble, but the success of its aims depends on the capacity and willingness of the government to provide adequate infrastructure and prison facilities. Is society willing to invest on the convicted criminals? Is reformation possible to prisoners who committed most heinous crimes such as murder, rape, drug and human trafficking, terrorism…?  Reformative theories of rehabilitation and restoration may apply and can be effective only on certain non-severe crimes but not to all crimes.

Compensatory theory of punishment rests primarily on the ground that an offender  who inflicted injury against persons or property must compensate for the loss of the victim. Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, actual or compensatory damages are awarded to the one entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him and he has duly proved. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.[8]

Other forms of damages such as moral, exemplary, nominal, temperate, actual, and liquidated forms of damages are applications of the compensatory theory of punishment. Under the Civil Code, an award of moral damages is premised on the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury suffered by the victim.[9]

Exemplary or corrective damages[10] are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In quasi-delicts (those committed without criminal intent), exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted with wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[11]

 3. Mixed or Compromise Theories of Punishment

 Many theorists have attempted to take features of utilitarianism and retributivism and combine them into a theory that retains the strengths of both while overcoming their weaknesses. This theory holds the idea that punishment should promote good consequences, such as reduction of crime, and that justice and the desert of the offender should play a central role in a justification of punishment even when nobody’s welfare would be promoted.

In response to the challenge of whether combination of retributivist and utilitarianist punishment is possible, Hart states that the question of “What justifies the general practice of punishment is a question of “General Justifying Aim” and ought to be answered by citing utilitarian concerns. The second question “To whom may punishment be applied” is a question of “Distribution” and ought to be answered by citing retributive concerns. Hart holds that we may not apply punishment indiscriminately, but only punish an offender for an offense.

Deterrent theory of punishment, according to most scholars of criminal law and legal philosophy, should be categorized under the utilitarian theory of punishment. However, a thorough scrutiny of its nature and functions will suggest that it should be treated as a mixture of the retributive and utilitarian theories or justification of punishment, especially when the subject is death penalty as the ultimate deterrent punishment and as a just punishment for a gravest offense.  The theory holds that temporary to permanent relief is afforded to the victims and the society for as long as the criminal is incapacitated in prison or terminally removed from the circles of society.

A combination of utilitarian and retributive considerations are usually invoked in an effort to justify the execution of murderers. The centerpiece of most arguments in favor of capital punishment is retributive: Murderers deserve to be put to death, an argument along Kantian lines. Utilitarians generally argue that capital punishment can deter potential murderers – Since many human beings’ greatest fear is death, the intuitive plausibility of this claim is clear.

Is a just society without punishments possible?

The question begs itself insofar as the subject of society is first of all qualified to be just. If that society has attained the quality of being just, insofar as all its members have attained goodness and happiness without evil and unhappiness, then the institution of punishments is no longer warranted. All theories adhere to its possibility; they differ only in the proximity of that possibility.

  • – – – – –

[1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[2] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 1991, 211-212.

[3] Miethe, Terence and Hong Lu, Punishment A Comparative Historical Perspective.  Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[4] Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals: Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members, the last murder remaining in the prison must be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of justice.

[5] Art. 114, RPC. Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not exceeding 100,000 pesos.

[6] Arts. 134, 134-A, and 135, RPC. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The crime of coup d’etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.

Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua…. Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup d’etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

[7] Art. 211-A, RPC. If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.  If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death.

[8] Art. 2199, Civil Code of the Philippines, which is a faithful translation from the Codigo Civil of Spain that adopted the Judeo-Christian tradition of punishment.

[9] Art. 2217, ibid.

[10] Arts. 2229, 2230, 2231, and 2232, ibid.

[11] Art. 2221, ibid.


The independent survey research I conducted on March 10-18 with 6,011 students of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (Sta. Mesa) as respondents yielded the following results:

SUMMARY

A. As to the preferred President should the elections be held during the period of the survey

1. Rodrigo Duterte – 2,370 (39.4%)
2. Miriam Defensor-Santiago – 2,137 (35.6%)
3. Grace Poe-Llamanzares – 687 (11.4%)
4. Jejomar Binay – 337 (5.6%)
5. Manuel Roxas III – 292 (4.9%)
6. No Choice – 188 (3.1%)

B. As to the preferred Vice President should the elections be held during the period of the survey

1. Ferdinand R. Marcos – 2,411 (40.1%)
2. Allan Peter Cayetano – 1,138 (19.0%
3. Francis Escudero – 1,068 (17.8%)
4. Leni Robredo – 670 (11.1%)
5. Antonio Trillanes IV – 416 (6.9%)
6. Gregorio Honasan – 171 (2.8%)
7. No Choice – 137 (2.3%)

C. As to the preferred Senators should the elections be held during the period of the survey

Rank Candidates F=58,284 Percentage
1 Franklin Drilon 3,456 59.30
2 Richard Gordon 3,446 59.12
3 Leila De Lima 3,342 57.34
4 Risa Hontiveros 3,337 57.25
5 Win Gatchalian 3,312 56.82
6 Ralp Recto 3,146 53.97
7 Juan Miguel Zubiri 2,953 50.68
8 Panfilo Lacson 2,889 49.57
9 Sergio Osmeña III 2,790 47.87
10 Vicente Sotto 2,742 47.04
11 Francis Pangilinan 2,729 46.82
12 Joel Villanueva 2,020 34.66
13 Martin Romualdez 1,738 29.82
14 Teofisto TG Guingona 1,710 29.33
15 Manuel Pacquiao 1,606 27.55
16 Isko Moreno Domagoso 1,348 23.13
17 Neri Comenares 1,265 21.70
18 Francis Tolentino 1,257 21.56
19 Roman Romulo 1,141 19.58
20 Mark Lapid 1,071 18.38
21 Edu Manzano 1,020 17.50
22 Mel Chavez 584 10.01
23 Greco Belgica 550 9.43
24 Lorna Kapunan 539 9.24
25 Susan Ople 537 9.21
26 Dionisio Santiago 531 9.11
27 Jericho Petilla 491 8.42
28 Alma Moreno Lacsamana 469 4.68
29 Rey Langit 462 7.93
30 Mr. Coop Paez 361 6.19
31 Allan Montano 339 5.81
32 Walden Bello 317 5.43
33 Mon Montaño 315 5.40
34 Jovito Palparan 302 5.18
35 Getulio Napenas 292 5.00
36 Larry Gadon 281 4.82
37 Princess Jacel Kiram 254 4.35
38 Diosdado Valeroso 253 4.34
39 Dante Liban 242 4.15
40 Romeo Maganto 225 3.86
41 Godofredo Arquiza 217 3.72
42 Shariff Albani 198 3.40
43 Samuel Pagdilao 189 3.24
44 Sandra Cam 175 3.00
45 Eid Kabalu 159 2.72
46 Levito Baligod 158 2.71
47 Aldin Ali 140 2.40
48 Ray Dorona 139 2.38
49 Ina Ambolodto 125 2.14
50 Rafael Alunan 102 1.75

D. As to the factors or qualities of the candidates that motivate the respondents to choose a particular candidate

 

Rank Factors or Qualities Frequency F/N
1 LEADERSHIP STYLE 17,489 2.90
2 Advocacy 18,616 3.09
3 Education 22,954 3.18
4 Character 25,533 4.24
5 Personality 27,244 4.53
6 Work Experience 29,645 4.93
7 Age and Health 37,683 6.26
8 Family Background 41,492 6.90
9 Political Party Affiliation 45,583 7.58
10 Civil Status 46,902 7.80
11 Wealth/Financial Status 50,105 8.33
12 Religion 50,734 8.44
13 Regional Origin 51,022 8.48
14 Popularity 54,169 9.01
15 Sex / Gender 61,317 10.20

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | February 18, 2015

Questionnaire for the Research


Please click the link below to generate the PDF file of the Survey Form for our research study.

Please be reminded that the deadline for the data-gathering is the fourth week of February 2015.

 

SURVEY

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | November 20, 2014

Reference Materials in Argumentation and Debate


Please click the link below to generate the PDF files.

ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE BY FREELEY AND STEINBERG:

argumentation-and-debate 

WINNING DEBATES BY STEVEN JOHNSON:

Steven_Johnson_Winning_Debates_2009

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | November 6, 2014

2014 BAR EXAMS: MY ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS IN CRIMINAL LAW


MY ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO THE 2014 BAR EXAMS IN CRIMINAL LAW

I.

 Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10 years. Since their marriage, Mr. B had been jobless and a drunkard, preferring to stay with his “barkadas” until the wee hours of the morning. Ms. A was the breadwinner and attended to the needs of their three (3) growing children. Many times, when Mr. B was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their three (3) children, and shout invectives against them. In fact, in one of the beating incidents, Ms. A suffered a deep stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged stay in the hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal abuses committed against her, she consulted a psychologist several times, as she was slowly beginning to lose her mind. One night, when Mr. B arrived dead drunk, he suddenly stabbed Ms. A several times while shouting invectives against her.  Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A grappled for the possession of a knife and she succeeded. She then stabbed Mr. B several times which caused his instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed that the husband suffered three (3) stab wounds. Can Ms. A validly put up a defense? Explain. (5%)

 Yes, Ms. A can validly put up the defense of battered woman syndrome.

 Under RA 9262, the battered woman syndrome can be invoked as a defense by a woman who killed her husband or a man with whom she had a dating relationship after having been a victim of a series of physical or psychological violence inflicted against her or her child by the man.

 Here, Ms. A was a victim of a series of physical and psychological violence by her husband Mr. B. Hence, Ms. A can validly put up the defense of battered woman syndrome.

  

II.

 Macho married Ganda, a transgender. Macho was not then aware that Ganda was a transgender. On their first night, after their marriage, Macho discovered that Ganda was a transgender. Macho confronted Ganda and a heated argument ensued. In the course of the heated argument, a fight took place wherein Ganda got hold of a knife to stab Macho. Macho ran away from the stabbing thrusts and got his gun which he pointed at Ganda just to frighten and stop Ganda from continuing with the attack. Macho had no intention at all to kill Ganda. Unfamiliar with guns, Macho accidentally pulled the trigger and hit Ganda that caused the latter’s death. What was the crime committed? (4%)

 Macho had committed the crime of Homicide, mitigated by no intent to commit so grave a wrong.

Under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), Homicide is committed when, without the qualifying circumstances for Murder, a person inflicts a mortal wound upon another and the latter dies, the intent to kill being presumed. This is because under the RPC, he is liable for the resulting felony although it be different from that which he intended. However, the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intent to commit so grave a wrong.

 Here, Macho caused the death of Ganda although he did not intend to kill the latter. Hence, Macho is criminally liable for Homicide mitigated by no intent to commit so grave a wrong.

  

III.

 City Engr. A, is the city engineer and the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the City of Kawawa. In 2009, the City of Kawawa, through an ordinance, allotted the amount of P100 million for the construction of a road leading to the poblacion. City Engr. A instead, diverted the construction of the road leading to his farm. Investigation further showed that he accepted money in the amount of P10 million each from three (3) contending bidders, who eventually lost in the bidding.

 Audit report likewise showed that service vehicles valued at P2 million could not be accounted for although reports showed that these were lent to City Engr. A’s authorized drivers but the same were never returned. Further, there were funds under City Engr. A’s custody amounting to P10 million which were found to be missing and could not be accounted for. In another project, he was instrumental in awarding a contract for the construction of a city school building costing P10 million to a close relative, although the lowest bid was P8 million. Investigation also revealed that City Engr. A has a net worth of more than P50 million, which was way beyond his legitimate income. (8%)

 (A) If you are the Ombudsman, what charge or charges will you file against City Engr. A?

 I will charge City Engr. A with Plunder.

 Under the Anti-Plunder Law, any person who acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt acts of receiving directly or indirectly kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the position of the public officer, in the aggregate amount of P50 million pesos shall be guilty of the crime of Plunder.

 Here, City Engr. A is a public officer who has acquired an aggregate amount of P50 million pesos which is deemed to be ill-gotten wealth. Hence, City Engr. A should be charged with the crime of Plunder before the Office of the Ombudsman.

 (B) Suppose the discovered net worth of City Engr. A is less than P50 million, will your answer still be the same?

 No, the answer will not be the same. City Engr. A will be charged with Malversation and violation of RA 3019 (Graft and Corruption).

Under the Revised Penal Code, Malversation is committed when a public officer, by reason of the duties of his office, appropriates, misappropriates, or takes public funds of not more than P12,000. In addition to such crime, the public officer shall be criminally liable under RA 3019 for unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

 Here, City Engr. A is a public officer who appropriated or took public funds of more than P12,000, as well as acquired unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. Hence, City Engr. A should be charged with malversation and violation of RA 3019.

 

IV.

 Madam X, a bank teller, received from depositor Madam Y a check payable to cash in the amount of P1 million, to be deposited to the account of Madam Y. Because the check was not a crossed check, Madam X credited the amount to the account of her good friend, Madam W, by accomplishing a deposit slip. Seven (7) days after, Madam X contacted her good friend, Madam W and told her that the amount of P1 million was wrongfully credited to Madam W, thus, Madam X urged Madam W to withdraw the amount of P1 million from her account and to turn over the same to Madam X. As a dutiful friend, Madam W readily acceded. She was gifted by Madam X with an expensive Hermes bag after the withdrawal of the amount. What crime/s, if any, did Madam X and Madam W commit? Explain. (5%)

 Madam X did commit the crime of Estafa, while Madam W did not commit any crime.

 Under the Revised Penal Code, any person who defrauds another by misappropriating or converting money received in trust is guilty of the crime of Estafa. On the other hand, Fencing is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, buys, sells, receives of possesses any item which he knows or should have known to have been derived  from robbery or theft.

 Here, Madam X defrauded Madam Y when Madam X misappropriated or converted the money she received in trust from Madam Y. Hence, Madam X did commit the crime of Estafa. On the other hand, Madam W did not commit the crime of Fencing since neither did she have the intent to gain nor was the bag derived from robbery or theft.

 

V.

 Congress passed a law reviving the Anti-Subversion Law, making it a criminal offense again for a person to join the Communist Party of the Philippines. Reporma, a former high-ranking member of the Communist Party, was charged under the new law for his membership in the Communist Party when he was a student in the 80’s. He now challenges the charge against him. What objections may he raise? (3%)

Reporma may raise the objection of violation of the doctrine of irretrospectivity of penal laws.

Well-settled is the doctrine of irretrospectivity in Criminal Law which states that no felonious act shall be punished by any penalty prescribed by law when it was committed prior to its enactment. Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

 Here, the felonious act imputed was committed prior to the revival of the Anti-Subversion Law. Hence, Reporma can object to the charge on the ground of irretrospectivity of penal laws.

VI.

 A was caught peeping through a small hole in the bathroom door while a young 16-year-old lady was taking a bath. A is liable for: (1%)

 (A) Violation of R.A. 9262 or Violence Against Women and their Children

(B) Violation of R.A. 7610 – Child Abuse Law

(C) Light coercion

(D) Acts of lasciviousness

 A

 

VII.

 Filthy, a very rich businessman, convinced Loko, a clerk of court, to issue an order of release for Takas, Filthy’s cousin, who was in jail for a drug charge. After receiving P500,000.00, Loko forged the signature of the judge on the order of release and accompanied Filthy to the detention center. At the jail, Loko gave the guard P10,000.00 to open the gate and let Takas out.

 What crime or crimes did Filthy, Loko, and the guard commit? (4%)

 Filthy, Loko, and the guard did commit the crimes of Corruption of Public Official, Direct Bribery and Falsification, and Delivering Prisoner from Jail, respectively.

 Under the Revised Penal Code, Corruption of Public Officials (Art. 212) is committed by any person who offers or gives gift to a public officer in consideration of the performance by the latter of an act constituting the crime of Direct or Indirect Bribery. Direct Bribery (Art. 210) is committed by a public officer by agreeing to perform an act constituting a crime in consideration of an offer, promise, or gift. On the other hand, Falsification (Art. 171) is committed by a public officer who, taking advantage of his position, falsifies a document by imitating a signature of another. Finally, Delivering Prisoners from Jail (Art. 156) is committed by any person who shall facilitate or help the escape of a prisoner from jail by means of bribery.

 Here, Filthy gave money to Loko, a public officer, who in return agreed to perform an act constituting a crime. Loko did perform the agreed act, and as means thereto falsified a document by imitating a signature. The guard took a bribery in exchange of helping or facilitating the escape of a prisoner from jail.

 Hence, Filthy committed the crime of Corruption of Public Official; Loko committed Direct Bribery and Falsification, while the guard committed the crime of Delivering a Prisoner from Jail.

 

VIII.

 Pretty was a campus beauty queen who, because of her looks and charms, attracted many suitors. Having decided that she would become a nun, Pretty turned down all her suitors. Guapo, one of her most persistent suitors, could not handle rejection and one night, decided to accost Pretty as she walked home. Together with Pogi, Guapo forced Pretty into his car and drove her to an abandoned warehouse where he and Pogi forced Pretty to dance for them. Later, the two took turns in raping her. After satisfying their lusts, Guapo and Pogi dropped her off at her house. (4%)

 (A) What crime or crimes did Guapo and Pogi commit?

 Guapo and Pogi committed Forcible Abduction with Rape, and Unjust Vexation.

 Under the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape is committed when a man, with lewd design, deprives a woman of her liberty and eventually has carnal knowledge with her through force or intimidation. On the other hand, Unjust Vexation is any act committed without violence but which unjustifiably annoys or vexes another person.

 Here, Guapo and Pogi, with lewd designs, deprived Pretty of her liberty, forced her to dance, and eventually had carnal knowledge with her without her consent. Hence, Guapo and Pogi committed the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, as well as Unjust Vexation.

 (B) Pretty, after the ordeal, decided to take her own life by hanging herself one hour after the rape. Would Guapo and Pogi be liable for Pretty’s death? Explain.

 Yes, Guapo and Pogi would be liable for Pretty’s death.

 Settled is the doctrine in Criminal Law that he whose felonious act is the proximate cause of the death of another person is criminally liable, such as when a man who causes upon another’s mind a great anguish and embarrassment is responsible for the direct, natural and logical consequence of such anguish and embarrassment. El que es causa dela causa es causa del mal causado.

 Here, the suicide committed by Pretty would be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the anguish and embarrassment proximately caused by the felonious acts of Guapo and Pogi. Hence, Guapo and Pogi would be liable for Pretty’s death.

 

IX.

 A, B, and C agreed to rob the house of Mr. D at 10 o’clock in the evening, with C as the driver of the tricycle which they would use in going to and leaving the house of Mr. D, and A and B as the ones who would enter the house to get the valuables of Mr. D. As planned, C parked the tricycle in a dark place, while A and B entered the house thru an open door. Once inside, A entered the master’s bedroom and started getting all the valuables he could see, while B entered another room. While inside the room, B saw a male person and immediately B brought out his gun but he accidentally pulled its trigger. The bullet went through the window, hitting a neighbor that killed him. Neighbors were then awakened by the gunfire and policemen were alerted. Not long after, policemen arrived. A and B panicked and got hold of a young boy and shouted to the policemen who were already outside of the house that they would harm the boy if the policemen did not disperse. A and B demanded that they should be allowed to use a vehicle to bring them to a certain place and that would be the time that they would release the young boy. The policemen acceded. In the meantime, C was arrested by the policemen while he was about to flee, while A and B, after releasing the young boy, were arrested.

 What crime/s did A, B, and C commit, and what modifying circumstances attended the commission of the crime/s? (6%)

 A, B, and C committed the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, as well as Grave Theat.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 294), the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide is committed when a person or persons, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, and on the occasion thereof shall kill another. On the other hand, Grave Threat (Art. 282) is committed by any person who shall threaten another with the infliction of any wrong amounting to a crime.  Jurisprudence states that whenever Homicide is committed as a consequence of a robbery, all those who participated in the commission of robbery are also guilty as principals in the crime of robbery with homicide even if they only participated in the robbery as a lookout, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing.

 Here, A, B, and C had conspired to commit robbery, which A and b actually executed, and as a consequence killed a neighbor and threatened to inflict harm upon a child, while C served as a lookout but did not seek to prevent the killing. Hence, A, B, and C are liable for the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide, and Grave Threat. Nighttime attended the commission of the crime as aggravating circumstance.

 

X.

 Loko advertised on the internet that he was looking for commercial models for a TV advertisement. Ganda, a 16-year-old beauty, applied for the project. Loko offered her a contract, which Ganda signed. She was asked to report to an address which turned out to be a high-end brothel. Ganda became one of its most featured attraction. What is Loko’s liability, if any? What effect would Ganda’s minority have on Loko’s liability? (4%)

 Loko is liable for Qualified Trafficking of Person.

 Under RA 9208, Trafficking of Persons is committed by recruitment of persons through fraud or deception for the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation. The crime is qualified when the person recruited for sexual exploitation is a child.

 Here, Loko recruited Ganda, a child, through deception for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Hence, Loko is criminally liable for Qualified Trafficking of Persons.

 

XI.

 A, in a public place, fired his gun at B with the intention of killing B, but the gun did not fire because the bullet is a dud. The crime is: (1%)

 (A) attempted homicide

(B) grave threat

(C) impossible crime

(D) alarm and scandal

 A

 

XII.

 Sexy boarded a taxi on her way home from a party. Because she was already tipsy, she fell asleep. Pogi, the taxi driver, decided to take advantage of the situation and drove Sexy to a deserted place where he raped her for a period of two (2) weeks. What crime did Pogi commit? (4%)

 Pogi committed the special complex crime of Kidnapping and Illegal Serious Detention with Rape.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 297), the special complex crime of Kidnapping and Illegal Serious Detention with Rape is committed when a person carries away by force another person, deprives her of her liberty for more than three days, and in the process have carnal knowledge with her against her will. Settled is the rule that a special complex crime is committed when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, and there is only one special complex crime no matter how many rapes had been committed.

 Hence, Pogi is criminally liable for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Rape.

 

XIII.

 Puti detested Pula, his roommate, because Pula was courting Ganda, whom Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to teach Pula a lesson and went to a veterinarian (Vet) to ask for poison on the pretext that he was going to kill a sick pet, when actually Puti was intending to poison Pula. The Vet instantly gave Puti a non-toxic solution which, when mixed with Pula’s food, did not kill Pula. (4%)

 (A) What crime, if any, did Puti commit?

 Puti committed an Impossible Crime.

 Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is liable for an Impossible Crime by performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

 Here, Puti would have committed the crime of Murder, an offense against persons, when with intent to kill and evident premeditation he executed the act of poisoning Pula had it not for the employment of ineffectual means. Hence, Puti is liable for Impossible Crime.

 (B) Would your answer be the same if, as a result of the mixture, Pula got an upset stomach and had to be hospitalized for 10 days?

 No, the answer would be different. Puti would be liable for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 265), any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries that require medical attendance for ten days shall be guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

 Hence, if due to the non-toxic solution Puti gave to Pula the latter got upset stomach that required medical attendance for ten days, Puti would be liable for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

 

XIV.

 Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court, promised the accused in a drug case pending before the court, that he would convince the judge to acquit him for a consideration of P5 million. The accused agreed and delivered the money, through his lawyer, to the clerk of court.

The judge, not knowing of the deal, proceeded to rule on the evidence and convicted the accused. (4%)

 (A) Malo was charged with violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, which prohibits a public officer from directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit wherein the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law. He was later charged also with indirect bribery under the Revised Penal Code. Malo claims he can no longer be charged under the Revised Penal Code for the same act under R.A. 3019. Is he correct?

 No, Malo is not correct.

 Settled is the doctrine in Criminal Law that when a single act produces two or more offenses, one under the Revised Penal Code and the other under a special law, the offender shall be criminally liable for two separate crimes, unless one absorbs the other.

 Here, Malo committed an act under RA 3019 by receiving gift or benefit from another person in consideration of the performance of an act constituting a crime, the same felonious act being punished under the Revised Penal Code as Direct Bribery (Art. 210). Hence, notwithstanding the charge under RA 3019, Malo can still be charged under the Revised Penal Code for Direct Bribery.

 (B) Malo was charged with estafa under Article 315 because he misrepresented that he had influence, when he actually had none. Is the charge correct?

Yes, the charge of Estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is correct.

 Estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC is committed by any person who defrauds another by falsely pretending that he possesses power or influence.

 Hence, the charge of Estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC is correct since Malo defrauded the accused by falsely pretending that he possessed the power to influence the decision of the judge.

 

XV.

 Which of the following is not a privilege mitigating circumstance? (1%)

 (A) 17-year-old offender

(B) 14-year-old offender

(C) incomplete self-defense

(D) incomplete defense of a relative

 D

 

XVI.

 Mr. Benjie is the owner of a hardware store specializing in the sale of plumbing materials. On February 1, 2014, Mr. Ed, a friend and regular customer of Mr. Benjie, visited the hardware store and purchased several plumbing materials in the total amount of P5 million. Mr. Benjie readily accepted Mr. Ed’s payment of three (3) postdated checks in the amount of P1 million Pesos each in view of the assurance of Mr. Ed that the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment. Mr. Benjie, as a consequence, immediately delivered the materials to the house of Mr. Ed.

The following day, Mr. Ed went back to Mr. Benjie to tender another two (2) postdated checks in the amount of P1 million each to complete the payment, with the same assurance that the checks  will be honored upon presentment for payment. When the checks were presented for payment, all were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and corresponding notices of dishonor were sent and received by Mr. Ed. One month after receipt of the notices of dishonor, Mr. Ed failed to make good the checks. Thereafter, Mr. Benjie filed before the public prosecutor’s office a complaint against Mr. Ed, although no demand letter was earlier sent to Mr. Ed.

 During the preliminary investigation, Mr. Benjie accepted several amounts from Mr. Ed as partial payments. The wife of Mr. Benjie protested and insisted that the complaint should continue despite the partial payments. On the other hand, Mr. Ed counters that no demand letter was earlier sent to him, that the obligation is merely civil in character and that novation took place when Mr. Benjie accepted the partial payments. Discuss the criminal liability, if any, of Mr. Ed. (6%)

 Mr. Ed is criminally liable for Estafa under BP No. 22.

 Well-settled is the rule that Estafa under BP No. 22 is committed when the accused issues a check without sufficient funds and he fails to deposit the amount in the check within five days after receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check by the bank. Moreover, novation is not among the modes of extinguishing criminal liability for violation of BP No. 22.

 Hence, the mere issuance by Mr. Ed of checks without sufficient funds his failure to deposit with the bank the amount in the checks within five days after receipt of the notice of dishonor makes him criminally liable for Estafa under BP 22. Neither is novation nor absence of demand letter a defense against criminal liability under BP 22 insofar as the notice of dishonor serves as demand for payment.

 

XVII.

 Pierce is a French diplomat stationed in the Philippines. While on EDSA and driving with an expired license, he hit a pedestrian who was crossing illegally. The pedestrian died. Pierce was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his defense, he claimed diplomatic immunity. Is Pierce correct? (3%)

No, Pierce is not correct.

It is a fundamental doctrine in Criminal Law, and applying the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, that diplomatic immunity applies only to acts performed by officials or their agents in connection with their official diplomatic functions.

Here, Pierce’s culpable act that constituted the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide had no connection to his official diplomatic functions. Hence, Pierce’s defense of diplomatic immunity is not correct.

 XVIII.

 Manolo, an avid art collector, was invited to Tonio’s house. There, Manolo noticed a nice painting that exactly looked like the painting which he reported was stolen from him some years back. Manolo confronted Tonio about the painting, but Tonio denied any knowledge, claiming that he bought the painting legitimately from a friend. Manolo later proved to Tonio that the painting was indeed the stolen painting. (4%)

 (A) What crime/s, if any, may Tonio be charged with?

Tonio may be charged with Fencing.

 Under RA 8049, Fencing is committed by any person who buys or acquires any article or anything of value which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of theft. The mere possession of anything of value stolen is a prima facie evidence of fencing.

 Here, Tonio bought a painting which he should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of theft. Hence, Tonio may be charged with Fencing since his mere possession of the painting is a prima facie evidence of the crime.

 (B) Manolo decided to take matters into his own hands and, one night, broke into Tonio’s house by destroying the wall and taking the painting. What, if any, would be the liability of Manolo?

 Manolo would be liable for Robbery.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 293), Robbery is committed when a person, with intent to gain, takes any personal property belonging to another by means of force upon things.

 Here, Tonio already owned the painting through sale, and Manolo with intent to gain would take the painting through force upon the wall. Hence, Manolo would be liable for Robbery.

 

XIX.

 Clepto went alone to a high-end busy shop and decided to take one of the smaller purses without paying for it. Overcame by conscience, she decided to leave her own purse in place of the one she took. Her act was discovered and Clepto was charged with theft. She claimed that there was

no theft, as the store suffered no injury or prejudice because she had left a purse in place of the one she took. Comment on her defense. (3%)

 Clepto’s defense has no merit.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 308), Theft is committed when a person with intent to gain takes a personal property belonging to another without violence or intimidation and without the consent of the owner. Jurisprudence holds that mere taking of the personal property consummates the crime of Theft, so that when taking is complete the defense of desistance does not set in anymore.

 Hence, regardless of the fact that Clepto replaced the purse she took with her own, Theft was already consummated, and desistance no longer sets in as a defense.

 

XX.

 Which of the following is not a qualifying aggravating circumstance? (1%)

 (A) treachery

(B) evident premeditation

(C) dwelling

(D) cruelty

 C

 

XXI.

 During trial for theft in 2014, the prosecution managed to show that accused AA has also been convicted by final judgment for robbery in 2003, but she eluded capture. A subsequent verification showed that AA had several convictions, to wit:

 (1.) In 1998, she was convicted of estafa;

(2.) In 2002, she was convicted of theft;

(3.) In 2004, she was convicted of frustrated homicide;

 The judge trying the theft case in 2014 is about to convict AA. What circumstances affecting the liability or penalty may the judge appreciate against AA? (4%)

 The judge may appreciate the aggravating circumstance of a recidivist.

 Under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 14), a recidivist is one who, at the time of trial for a crime, he has been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code where the current crime on trial is found.

 Here, during the trial for Theft, AA had been previously convicted by final judgment for the crime of Robbery, both crimes being embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the judge can only appreciate the aggravating circumstance of a recidivist.

 

XXII.

Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr. Green with his former girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red declared in a loud voice that if he could not have Ms. Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to the men’s room but told Mr. White and Mr. Blue to take care of Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red what he meant but Mr. Red simply said, “You already know what I want,” and then left. Mr. Blue and Mr. White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms. Yellow. (4%)

 (A) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the death of Mr. Green?

 Mr. White and Mr. Blueare criminally liable for Murder for killing Mr. Green.

 Under the Revised Penal Code, any person who kills another shall be criminally liable for Murder. Jurisprudence holds that for an accused to be liable as principal by inducement, the inducement must be expressed in clear unequivocal language, strong enough as an irresistible force.

 Hence, only Mr. White and Mr. Blue can be held criminally liable for Murder for killing Mr. Green, while Mr. Red cannot be held liable even as a principal by inducement since his statement cannot be considered as inducement insofar as it is not strong enough as an irresistible force.

 (B) What, if any, are the respective liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. Whit and Mr. Blue for the injuries of Ms. Yellow?

Similarly, Mr. White and Mr. Blue are criminally liable for Serious, Less Serious, or Slight Physical Injuries for the injuries they inflicted upon Ms. Yellow. On the other hand, Mr. Red has no criminal liability.

Under the Revised Penal Code, any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another that requires medical attention, or becomes ill or incapacitated is liable for Serious Physical Injuries if the medication, illness or incapacity is for more than 30 days, Less Serious Physical Injuries if the medication, illness or incapacity is for ten days or more, or for Slight Physical Injuries if the medication, illness or incapacity lasts for one to nine days. On the other hand, a person who has no participation in the planning of or in the actual beating or assault shall not have any criminal liability.

Hence, only Mr. White and Mr. Blue shall be criminally liable for Serious, Less Serious, or slight Physical Injuries, depending on the gravity or duration of illness, incapacity or medication caused upon Ms. Yellow, while Mr. Red cannot be held criminally liable.

 

XXIII.

Carla, four (4) years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the tricycle driver engaged by her parents to drive her to and from school every day. Enrique wrote a ransom note demanding that Carla’s parents pay him P500,000.00 ransom in exchange for her liberty. However, before the ransom note could be received by Carla’s parents, Enrique’s hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was rescued while Enrique was arrested.  The prosecutor considered that the ransom note was never received by Carla’s parents and filed a case of “Impossible crime to commit kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the prosecutor correct? If he is not correct, can he instead file a case of grave coercion? (4%)

No, the prosecution is not correct for both impossible nor grave coercion.

Jurisprudence applying the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code has held that, Impossible Crime would only be considered as a last resort if no crime against person or property or any other felony applies to the act committed. When  person deprives a child of his liberty, the crime committed is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention qualified by minority.

Hence, Impossible Crime nor Grave Coercion shall not be considered insofar as the correct crime committed was Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention qualified by minority.

 

XXIV.

A, a young boy aged sixteen (16) at the time of the commission of the crime, was convicted when he was already seventeen (17) years of age for violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165 or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs for which the imposable penalty is life imprisonment and a fine. Section 98 of the same law provides that if the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to death on minor offenders, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Under R.A. 9344, a minor offender is entitled to a privilege mitigating circumstance. (8%)

(A) May the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated considering that the penalty imposed by law is life imprisonment and fine?

Yes, the privilege of mitigating circumstance of minority may be appreciated.

 By express provision of Sec. 98 of RA 9165, notwithstanding any law, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall not apply to the provisions of RA 9165, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua. Under RA 9344, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority shall be considered for the purpose of recommending the amount of bail.

 Hence, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority may be appreciated for the purpose of recommending the amount of bail.

 (B) Is the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable considering that life imprisonment has no fixed duration and the Dangerous Drugs Law is malum prohibitum?

 Yes, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.

 Settled is the rule that by virtue of Sec. 98 of RA 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death, an indivisible penalty. The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies only to divisible penalties of more than one (1) year of imprisonment. Considering the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty shall be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which shall be reclusion temporal, a divisible penalty.

 Thus, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable because the penalty which has been indivisible became a divisible penalty of more than one year after appreciating the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority.

 (C) If the penalty imposed is more than six (6) years and a notice of appeal was filed by A and given due course by the court, may A still file an application for probation?

 No, A may not file an application for Probation.

 By express provision of the Probation Law (PD 968), where the imposed penalty is imprisonment of more than six years, the convict shall not be entitled to probation. Similarly, the Probation Law provides that appeal and probation are mutually exclusive, so that once an appeal has filed, the privilege of probation is no longer available unless the convict withdraws the appeal.

 Hence, A may not file an application for Probation insofar as the imposed penalty is imprisonment of more than six years.

 (D) If probation is not allowed by the court, how will A serve his sentence?

 Pursuant to RA 9344, the sentence for A shall be automatically suspended and the court shall determine the disposition measures under the Implementing Rules of 9344.

XXV.

 Mr. Gray opened a savings account with Bank A with an initial deposit of P50,000.00. A few days later, he deposited a check for P200,000.00 drawn from Bank B and endorsed by Mr. White. Ten days later, Mr. Gray withdrew the P200,000.00 from his account. Mr. White later complained to Bank B when the amount of P200,000.00 was later debited to his account, as he did not issue the check and his signature thereon was forged. Mr. Gray subsequently deposited another check signed by Mr. White for P200,000.00, which amount he later withdrew. Upon receiving the amount, Mr. Gray was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

 Mr. Gray was convicted of estafa and attempted estafa, both through the use of commercial documents. (4%)

 (A) Mr. Gray claims as defense that, except for Mr. White’s claim of forgery, there was no evidence showing that he was the author of the forgery and Mr. White did not suffer any injuries as to the second check (attempted estafa). Rule on the defense of Mr. Gray.

 The defense is without merit.

 Settled is the rule in Estafa cases that the disturbance of property right is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

 Here, Mr. White suffered injury when his signature was forged and his money parted from him on account of the forgery that is attributable to the bearer of the check, Mr. Gray. Hence, Mr. Gray’s defense must fail.

 (B) Mr. Gray claims that he was entrapped illegally because there was no showing that the second check was a forgery and, therefore, his withdrawal based on the second check was a legal act. Is Mr. Gray correct?

XXVI.

 

A was bitten by a dog owned by a neighbor. The following day, angered by the incident, A took the dog without the knowledge of the owner, had it butchered and cooked the meat. He then invited his friends to partake of the dish with his friends who knew fully well that the dog was taken without the knowledge of the owner. What are the friends of A liable for? (1%)

 (A) Theft

(B) Malicious mischief

(C) Accessories

(D) Obstruction of Justice

 C

—ooo0ooo—

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | October 28, 2014

2014 BAR EXAMS: Questions and Alternative Answers in Remedial Law


2014 BAR EXAMS QUESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS IN REMEDIAL LAW

 I.

 Ludong, Balatong, and Labong were charged with murder. After trial, the court announced that the case was considered submitted for decision. Subsequently, the Clerk of Court issued the notices of promulgation of judgment which were duly received. On promulgation day, Ludong and his lawyer appeared. The lawyers of Balatong and Labong appeared but without their clients and failed to satisfactorily explain their absence when queried by the court. Thus, the judge ordered the Clerk of Court to proceed with the reading of the judgment convicting all the accused. With respect to Balatong and Labong, the judge ordered that the judgment be entered in the criminal docket and copies be furnished their lawyers. The lawyers of Ludong, Balatong, and Labong filed within the reglementary period a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The court favorably granted the motion of Ludong downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide but denied the motion as regards Balatong and Labong. (4%)

(A) Was the court correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration?

                No, the court was not correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration.

                Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the available remedies. However, the accused may surrender within 15 days from promulgation of the judgment and file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies.

                Here, Balatong and Labong neither appeared during the promulgation of their judgment, presented a justifiable cause nor surrender within the 15-day period, losing all the available remedies provided in the Rules. Hence, the court has exceeded its jurisdiction when it allowed the Joint Motion for Reconsideration.

 (B) Can Balatong and Labong appeal their conviction in case Ludong accepts his conviction for homicide?

                 No, Balatong and Labong cannot appeal their conviction in case Ludong accepts his conviction.

                Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of the judgment of conviction without justifiable cause, he loses all available remedies in the Rules including the remedy of appeal.

                Hence, Balatong and Labong are not allowed by the Rules to appeal their conviction.

 

II.

 McJolly is a trouble-maker of sorts, always getting into brushes with the law. In one incident, he drove his Humvee recklessly, hitting a pedicab which sent its river and passengers in different directions. The pedicab driver died, while two (2) of the passengers suffered slight physical injuries. Two (2) Informations were then filed against McJolly. One, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property, and two, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries. The latter case was scheduled for arraignment earlier, on which occasion McJolly immediately pleaded guilty. He was meted out the penalty of public censure. A month later, the case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was also set for arraignment. Instead of pleading, McJolly interposed the defense of double jeopardy. Resolve. (4%)

                 McJolly may not quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy.

            Settled is the doctrine that prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars the subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense regardless of its various resulting acts; otherwise, prosecution of the second quasi-offense would place the accused in double jeopardy. In such a case, the accused may move to quash the information for the second quasi-offense.

                Hence, McJolly may move to quash the information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of double jeopardy.

 

III.

 While passing by a dark uninhabited part of their barangay, PO2 Asintado observed shadows and heard screams from a distance. PO2 Asintado hid himself behind the bushes and saw a man beating a woman whom he recognized as his neighbor, Kulasa. When Kulasa was already in agony, the man stabbed her and she fell on the ground. The man hurriedly left thereafter.

 PO2 Asintado immediately went to Kulasa’s rescue. Kulasa, who was then in a state of hysteria, kept mentioning to PO2 Asintado Si Rene, gusto akong patayin! Sinaksak niya ako!” When PO2 Asintado was about to carry her, Kulasa refused and said “Kaya ko. Mababaw lang to. Habulin mo si Rene.”

 The following day, Rene learned of Kulasa’s death and, bothered by his  conscience, surrendered to the authorities with his counsel. As his surrender was broadcasted all over media, Rene opted to release his statement to the press which goes:

 “I believe that I am entitled to the presumption of innocence until my guilt is proven  beyond reasonable doubt. Although I admit that I performed acts that may take one’s life away, I hope and pray that justice will be served the right way. God bless us all. (Sgd.) Rene”

 The trial court convicted Rene of homicide on the basis of PO2 Asintado’s testimony, Kulasa’s statements, and Rene’s statement to the press. On appeal, Rene raises the following errors:

 1. The trial court erred in giving weight to PO2 Asintado’s testimony, as the latter did not have any personal knowledge of the facts in issue, and violated Rene’s right to due process when it considered Kulasa’s statements despite lack of opportunity for her cross-examination.

2. The trial court erred in holding that Rene’s statement to the press was a confession which, standing alone, would be sufficient to warrant conviction. Resolve. (4%)

                 Rene’s contentions have no legs to stand on.

               Under the Rules of Evidence, testimonies based on personal knowledge and part of res gestae are given probative value to convict the accused. Personal knowledge pertains to a witness’ testimony derived from is own perception of the criminal acts, while part of res gestae whish is an exception to the hearsay rule pertains to a statement made by a victim before, during or immediately after the commission of a crime by the accused. On the other hand, confessions to be taken as mitigating circumstance must be made with the acknowledgment of the confessant’s guilt.

                Here, PO2 Asintado’s testimonies were based on personal knowledge as well as a part of res gestae, hence sufficient to convict Rene. On the other hand, the press release cannot be considered as a confession absent Rene’s acknowledgment of guilt. Hence, Rene’s contentions should be denied.

 

IV.

 An order of the court requiring a retroactive re-dating of an order, judgment or document filing be entered or recorded in a judgment is: (1%)

 (A) pro hac vice

(B) non pro tunc

(C) confession relicta verificatione

(D) nolle prosequi

 B

V.

 Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant, a resident of Marikina City, over a residential house in Las Piñas City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due date. Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his sister Maria, a special power of attorney to manage the property and file and defend suits over the property rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals due for five (5) months.

 Maria asks your legal advice on how she can expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests due. (6%)

 (A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?

                 Pursuant to the Rules on Civil Procedure, I would recommend to Maria to send the Tenant a demand for the payment of the rentals plus interests, then file for an Unlawful Detainer five days from the Tenant’s receipt of the demand and failure to make a payment.

(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?

                 Applying the Rules of Ejectment to this case, the complaint for Unlawful Detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trail Court (MTC) where the real property involved is situated, hence in Las Pinas City.

 (C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one (1)-year period within which to file the action?

                 Under Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the one-year period is reckoned from the date of demand and failure to make a payment.

 

VI.

 As a rule, courts may not grant an application for provisional remedy without complying with the requirements of notice and hearing. These requirements, however, may be dispensed with in an application for: (1%)

 (A) writ of preliminary injunction

(B) writ for preliminary attachment

(C) an order granting support pendente lite

(D) a writ of replevin

 D

 VII.

 Co Batong, a Taipan, filed a civil action for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against Jose Penduko, a news reporter of the Philippine Times, a newspaper of general circulation printed and published in Parañaque City. The complaint alleged, among others, that Jose Penduko wrote malicious and defamatory imputations against Co Batong; that Co Batong’s business address is in Makati City; and that the libelous article was first printed and published in Parañaque City. The complaint prayed that Jose Penduko be held liable to pay P200,000.00, as moral damages; P150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees.

 Jose Penduko filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

 1. The RTC is without jurisdiction because under the Totality Rule, the claim for damages in the amount of P350,000.00 fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City.

2. The venue is improperly laid because what the complaint alleged is Co Batong’s business address and not his residence address.

 Are the grounds invoked in the Motion to Dismiss proper? (4%)

                 No, the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue invoked in the Motion to Dismiss are not proper.

                Settled is the rule that in cases where the claim for damages is the main action, the claim comprises all kinds of damages, including attorney’s fees. On the other hand, the venue for the complaint for damages arising from Libel is the RTC of the province where the libelous material was published.

                Here, the total jurisdictional amount of claim for damages including attorney’s fees falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and the libelous material was published in Paranaque City. Hence, the case was properly filed in the RTC of Paranaque City.

 

VIII.

 Johnny, a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (USA) but formerly a Filipino citizen, executed a notarial will in accordance with the laws of the State of California, USA. Johnny, at the time of his death, was survived by his niece Anastacia, an American citizen residing at the condominium unit of Johnny located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City; a younger brother, Bartolome, who manages Johnny’s fish pond in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and a younger sister, Christina, who manages Johnny’s rental condominium units in Makati City. Johnny’s entire estate which he inherited from his parents is valued at P200 million. Johnny appointed Anastacia as executrix of his will. (4%)

 (A) Can Johnny’s notarial will be probated before the proper court in the Philippines?

                 Yes, Johnny’s notarial will can be probated before the proper court in the Philippines.

                Under the Ruled of Special Proceedings, a will of a non-resident alien who left an estate in the Philippines may be probated before the RTC of the province or city where the estate is located.

                Here, the testator Johnny was a non-resident alien who left some estates in the Taguig City, Makati City, and Pangasinan. Hence, his will can be probated before the RTC of any of these cities and province in the Philippines.

 (B) Is Anastacia qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s notarial will?

                 Yes, Anastacia is qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s notarial will.

                Under the Rules of Special Proceedings, any executor named in a will and who is not incompetent—minor, non-resident, or unfit to execute the trust—is qualified to serve as executor or executrix.

                Here, Anastaciais the person named in the will; she is not incompetent to serve. Hence, Anastacia is qualifieid to be the executrix of Johnny’s will.

 IX.

 Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a special power of attorney to sell his house and lot. Agente was able to sell the property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon. On his return to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly received by Agente, sought to recover the amount due him. Agente failed to return the amount as he had used it for the construction of his own house. Thus, Bayani filed an action against Agente for sum of money with damages.  Bayani subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court granted the ex-parte motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon Bayani’s posting of the required bond. Bayani prayed that the court’s sheriff

be deputized to serve and implement the writ of attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff served upon Agente the writ of attachment and levied on the latter’s house and lot. On November 20, 2013, the Sheriff served on Agente summons and a copy of the complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment alleging that at the time the writ of preliminary attachment was issued, he has not been served with summons and, therefore, it was improperly issued. (4%)

 (A) Is Agente correct?

                 Yes, Agente is correct in moving for the discharge of the writ of attachment.

               Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party whose property has been ordered attached may file a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground that the writ was improperly enforced, such as when the rule on prior or contemporaneous service of summons was not observed.

        Here, the writ of attachment was enforced prior to instead of subsequent or contemporaneous with the service of summons upon the defendant Agente. Hence, the writ of attachment should be discharged on the ground of improper enforcement of the writ of attachment.

(B) Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly executed?

                 No, the writ of preliminary attachment was not properly executed.

              Pursuant to the Rules on Civil Procedure, no levy on attachment shall be enforced unless it is preceded or contemporaneous ly accompanied by service of summons together with a copy of the complaint.

                Here, the writ of preliminary attachment was served and levied prior to the service of summons with a copy of the complaint. Hence, the writ was improperly executed.

 

X.

 Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial building where the former conducted his hardware business. The lease contract stipulated, among others, a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for a four (4)-year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed administrator of the estate of Prince Chong, but the former failed to pay the rentals for the months of January to June 2013 despite King Kong’s written demands. Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for rescission of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013. (4%)

 (A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?

                No, Kin Il Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

                Settled is the rule in Civil Procedure that an action for specific performance and damages is incapable of pecuniary estimation that falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

                Here, the action is for specific performance and damages which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, the complaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the RTC, rendering the motion to dismiss without merit.

(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong also filed the complaint for sum of money during that time, will the action be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case?

                Yes, the complaint will be dismissible if it is for sum of money only in the amount of P300,000.

               The Supreme Court has held several times that the totality of the amount claimed is determinative of what court has jurisdiction; where the total amount of the claim is only P300,000, the jurisdiction is with the MTC.

                Hence, the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction will be untenable insofar as the total amount of the claim is P300,000.

XI.

 A search warrant was issued for the purpose of looking for unlicensed firearms in the house of Ass-asin, a notorious gun for hire. When the police served the warrant, they also sought the assistance of barangay tanods who were assigned to look at other portions of the premises around the house. In a nipa hut thirty (30) meters away from the house of Ass-asin, a barangay tanod came upon a kilo of marijuana that was wrapped in newsprint. He took it and this was later used by the authorities to charge Ass-asin with illegal possession of marijuana. Ass-asin objected to the introduction of such evidence claiming that it was illegally seized. Is the objection of Assasin valid? (4%)

                 Yes, the objection of Ass-asin is valid.

                 It is basic hornbook doctrine in Criminal Procedure that articles that are seized illegally are inadmissible in evidence, based on the constitutional guideline that articles to be seized should be particularly described in the search warrant.

                 Here, the kilo of marijuana seized was not particularly described in the search warrant. Therefore, the seized kilo of marijuana is inadmissible in evidence, and the objection is valid.

 

XII.

 Mary Jane met Shiela May at the recruitment agency where they both applied for overseas employment. They exchanged pleasantries, including details of their personal circumstances. Fortunately, Mary Jane was deployed to work as front desk receptionist at a hotel in Abu Dhabi where she met Sultan Ahmed who proposed marriage, to which she readily accepted. Unfortunately for Shiela May, she was not deployed to work abroad, and this made her envious of Mary Jane.

 Mary Jane returned to the Philippines to prepare for her wedding. She secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage. It turned out from the NSO records that Mary Jane had previously contracted marriage with John Starr, a British citizen, which she never did. The purported marriage between Mary Jane and John Starr contained all the required pertinent details on Mary Jane. Mary Jane later on learned that Shiela May is the best friend of John Starr.

As a lawyer, Mary Jane seeks your advice on her predicament. What legal remedy will you avail to enable Mary Jane to contract marriage with Sultan Ahmed? (4%)

                       I will advise Mary Jane to avail of Rule 108 to cancel the fake certificate of marriage.

                   Under the Rules of Special Proceedings, any interested party may file for the cancellation of entry of marriage before the RTC in the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.  The Supreme Court has held that there is no need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since there was no marriage to speak of in the first place.

               Hence, Mary Jane should file a petition for the cancellation of entry of marriage before the RTC of the province where the local civil registry is located.

 

 XIII.

 A foreign dog trained to sniff dangerous drugs from packages, was hired by FDP Corporation, a door to door forwarder company, to sniff packages in their depot at the international airport. In one of the routinary inspections of packages waiting to be sent to the United States of America (USA), the dog sat beside one of the packages, a signal that the package contained dangerous drugs. Thereafter, the guards opened the package and found two (2) kilograms of cocaine. The owner of the package was arrested and charges were filed against him. During the trial, the prosecution, through the trainer who was present during the incident and an expert in this kind of field, testified that the dog was highly trained to sniff packages to determine if the contents were dangerous drugs and the sniffing technique of these highly trained dogs was accepted worldwide and had been successful in dangerous drugs operations. The prosecution moved to admit this evidence to justify the opening of the package. The accused objected on the grounds that: (i) the guards had no personal knowledge of the contents of the package before it was opened; (ii) the testimony of the trainer of the dog is hearsay; and (iii) the accused could not cross-examine the dog. Decide. (4%)

                 The seized dangerous drugs are admissible in evidence against the owner of the package.

                Well-entrenched is the doctrine that articles seized during an airport search is an exception to the rule on illegal searches and therefore admissible in evidence.

                Here, the dangerous drugs were seized in an airport search setting. Ergo, such articles are admissible in evidence against the owner of the package where the articles were seized.

 

XIV.

 When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC), pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction, renders an adverse judgment in an application for land registration, the aggrieved party’s remedy is: (1%)

 (A) ordinary appeal to the Regional Trial Court

(B) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court

(C) ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals

(D) petition for review to the Court of Appeals

               C

 XV.

 The Ombudsman, after conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, found probable cause to charge Gov. Matigas in conspiracy with Carpintero, a private individual, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). Before the information could be filed with the Sandiganbayan, Gov. Matigas was killed in an ambush. This, notwithstanding, an information was filed against Gov. Matigas and Carpintero.

 At the Sandiganbayan, Carpintero through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Information, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, arguing that with the death of Gov. Matigas, there is no public officer charged in the information. Is the motion to quash legally tenable? (4%)

                 No, the motion to quash is not legally tenable.

                Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual who conspired with a public official in committing any of the prohibited acts under RA 3019.

                Hence, the Sandiganbayan can prosecute Carpintero for the criminal acts he committed under RA 3019 notwithstanding the death of his co-conspirator public official, rendering the motion to quash without merit.

 XVI.

 Plaintiff filed a complaint denominated as accion publiciana, against defendant. In his answer, defendant alleged that he had no interest over the land in question, except as lessee of Z. Plaintiff subsequently filed an affidavit of Z, the lessor of defendant, stating that Z had sold to plaintiff all his rights and interests in the property as shown by a deed of transfer attached to the affidavit. Thus, plaintiff may ask the court to render: (1%)

 (A) summary judgment

(B) judgment on the pleadings

(C) partial judgment

(D) judgment by default

               A

  XVII.

 A was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a crime of plunder, a non-bailable offense, where the court had already issued a warrant for his arrest. Without A being arrested, his lawyer filed a Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant and to Fix Bail, arguing that the allegations in the information did not charge the crime of plunder but a crime of malversation, a bailable offense. The court denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused and that the accused should be under the custody of the court since the crime charged was nonbailable The accused’s lawyer counter-argued that the court can rule on the motion even if the accused was at-large because it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. According to said lawyer, there was no need for the accused to be under the custody of the court because what was filed was a Motion to Quash Arrest and to Fix Bail, not a Petition for Bail.

 (A) If you are the Sandiganbayan, how will you rule on the motion? (3%)

                 I will deny the motion to quash and fix bail.

                The Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that a motion to quash can be availed of only when a ground or grounds set therein are available as when the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Moreover, an application for bail sets in only when the accused has already acquired custody of the accused.

                Here, the information charges an offense which is the nonbailable crime of plunder.  Besides, the warrant of arrest has yet to be filed, meaning that A is not yet under the custody of the court. Therefore, the motion to quash and fix bail has no basis hence should be denied. 

(B) If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, what judicial remedy should the accused undertake? (2%)

                 If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, the accused should proceed to trial.

                Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order which is neither appealable nor subject to a petition for certiorari.

               Therefore, the remedy of the accused is to proceed to trial, await its judgment, then appeal an unfavorable judgment.

 

XVIII.

 A was charged with murder in the lower court. His Petition for Bail was denied after a summary hearing on the ground that the prosecution had established a strong evidence of guilt. No Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition for Bail. During the reception of the evidence of the accused, the accused reiterated his petition for bail on the ground that the witnesses so far presented by the accused had shown that no qualifying aggravating circumstance attended the killing. The court denied the petition on the grounds that it had already ruled that: (i) the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii) the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based on the evidence presented by the prosecution; and (iii) no Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition for Bail. (6%)

 (A) If you are the Judge, how will you resolve the incident?

                 I will deny the petition for bail.

                Basic is the hornbook doctrine that bail is not a matter of right nor discretion when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong.

              Here, the offense charged is non-bailable, and the prosecution has established a strong evidence of A’s guilt. Thus, A is not entitled to bail.

 (B) Suppose the accused is convicted of the crime of homicide and the accused filed a Notice of Appeal, is he entitled to bail?

                   No, A is not entitled to bail even pending appeal.

             The standing rule is that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, the application for bail pending appeal shall be denied.

             Here, the imposable penalty for homicide to which A has been convicted is imprisonment exceeding six years, and hence not entitled to bail pending appeal.

 

XIX.

 A vicarious admission is considered an exception to the hearsay rule. It, however, does not cover: (1%)

 (A) admission by a conspirator

(B) admission by a privy

(C) judicial admission

(D) adoptive admission

           C

 XX.

 Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom Wallis had told Debi Wallis that he wanted the annulment of their marriage because he was already fed up with her irrational and eccentric behaviour. However, in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the correct residential address of Debi Wallis was deliberately not alleged and instead, the residential address of their married son was stated. Summons was served by substituted service at the address stated in the petition. For failure to file an answer, Debi Wallis was declared in default and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis. Three (3) years after the RTC judgment was rendered, Debi Wallis got hold of a copy thereof and wanted to have the RTC judgment reversed and set aside. If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what judicial remedy or remedies will you take? Discuss and specify the ground or grounds for said remedy or remedies. (5%)

                I will file for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud.

                Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud may be filed with the Court of Appeals within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud, when the other remedies are no longer available available.

                Here, the other remedies are no longer available insofar as three years had lapsed since the promulgation of the judgment, leaving Debi with annulment of judgment as the remaining available remedy. Hence, the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud shall be properly taken.

 

XXI.

 Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al Pakino, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for specific performance against Robert White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert White filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the appropriate board resolution from the Board of Directors of Goodfeather Corporation to show the authority of Al Pakino to represent the corporation and file the complaint in its behalf. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Al Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. As nothing more could be done by Al Pakino before the RTC, he filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Robert White moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the same involved purely a question of law and should have been filed with the Supreme Court (SC). However, Al Pakino claimed that the appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law because there must be a factual determination if, indeed, Al Pakino was duly authorized by Goodfeather Corporation to file the complaint. Whose position is correct? Explain. (4%)

                 Al Parkino’s position is correct.

                Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals involving questions of law and of fact shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

                The appeal in this case involves determination of the authority of Al Parkino to file a complaint which is a question of fact. Hence, the appeal should properly be with the Court of Appeals.

 

XXII.

 Which of the following decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court (SC)? (Assume that the issues to be raised on appeal involve purely questions of law) (1%)

 (A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction

(B) Decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction

(C) Decision of the Civil Service Commission

(D) Decision of the Office of the President

 B

 XXIII.

 Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms. Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision granting the complaint and ordering Ms. Dumpty to pay damages to Mr. Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the RTC decision. Meanwhile, the RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s motion for execution pending appeal. Upon receipt of the RTC’s order granting execution pending appeal, Ms. Dumpty filed with the CA another case, this time a special civil action for certiorari assailing said RTC order. Is there a violation of the rule against forum shopping considering that two (2) actions emanating from the same case with the RTC were filed by Ms. Dumpty with the CA? Explain. (4%)

                 No, there is no violation of the rule against forum shopping.

                The settled rule in Civil Procedure is that forum shopping applies only when what is filed are complaints or initiatory pleadings.

                Here, the appeal and petition for certiorari are neither complaints nor initiatory pleadings. Thus, the proscription against forum shopping does not apply.

 

XXIV.

 Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In 2010, Solomon contracted a second marriage with Hope. When Faith found out about the second marriage of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal case for bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011. Meanwhile, Solomon filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Faith in 2012, while the case for bigamy before the RTC of Manila is ongoing. Subsequently, Solomon filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the bigamy case on the ground of prejudicial question. He asserts that the proceedings in the criminal case should be suspended because if his first marriage with Faith will be declared null and void, it will have the effect of exculpating him from the crime of bigamy. Decide. (4%)

                 The motion to suspend the proceeding in the case for bigamy should be denied.

                The established rule in Criminal Procedure is that prejudicial question exists when a civil action has been filed prior to a criminal action, and the resolution of the civil action is determinative of whether the criminal action should proceed. Moreover, the crime of bigamy is committed by the mere contracting of a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage with a different spouse notwithstanding the voidness of the previous of subsequent marriage.

                Here, the civil action for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed not prior but subsequent to the criminal case for bigamy. Importantly, Solomon had contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage with another spouse. Hence, there exists no prejudicial question that merits the suspension of the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

 

XXV.

 Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment against Mr. Jachin before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr. Jachin actively participated in every stage of the proceedings knowing fully well that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the action. In his mind, Mr. Jachin was thinking that if the MeTC rendered judgment against him, he could always raise the issue on the jurisdiction of the MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment against Mr. Jachin. What is the remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%)

 (A) File an appeal

(B) File an action for nullification of judgment

(C) File a motion for reconsideration

(D) File a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

        B

 XXVI.

 Parole evidence is an: (1%)

 (A) agreement not included in the document

(B) oral agreement not included in the document

(C) agreement included in the document

(D) oral agreement included in the document

            A

 XXVII.

 Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms. Bright for annulment of deed of sale and other documents. Ms. Bright filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. Mr. Avenger filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.  State and discuss the appropriate remedy/remedies under each of the following situations: (6%)

 (A) If the RTC grants Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, what will be the remedy/remedies of Mr. Avenger?

        Mr. Avenger can re-file the case pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

 (B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, what will be her remedy/remedies?

                 Applying Rule 16, Ms. Bright can file an answer within the balance of the period but not less than 5 days, or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 predicated on a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

 (C) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and, further proceedings, including trial on the merits, are conducted until the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will be the remedy/remedies of Ms. Bright?

                 Ms. Bright can file for a motion for reconsideration and in case of the denial thereof to file an appeal from te judgment or final order, likewise pursuant to Rule 16.

 

XXVIII.

 A was adopted by B and C when A was only a toddler. Later on in life, A filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, as he wanted to reassume the surname of his natural parents because the surname of his adoptive parents sounded offensive and was seriously affecting his business and social life.  The adoptive parents gave their consent to the petition for change of name. May A file a petition for change of name? If the RTC grants the petition for change of name, what, if any, will be the effect on the respective relations of A with his adoptive parents and with his natural parents? Discuss. (4%)

                     Yes, A may file a petition for change of name.

                Under the Rules of Summary Proceedings, a petition for change of name (surname) may be filed with the RTC on the grounds that the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce, and the change is a legal consequence of adoption.

                Hence, A may file a petition for change of name insofar as the grounds are available to him.

 XXIX.

 Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a remote part of their barrio in Benguet. However, when she visited the property after she took a long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see that her childhood friend, John, had established a vacation house on her property. Both Estrella and John were residents of the same barangay.

 To recover possession, Estrella filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging that she is the true owner of the land as evidenced by her certificate of title and tax declaration which showed the assessed value of the property as P21,000.00. On the other hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and submitted in evidence a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the filing of John’s answer, the MTC observed that the real issue was one of ownership and not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

 On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-blown trial was conducted as if the case was originally filed with it. The RTC reasoned that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of proper jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring John as the owner of the land and, hence, entitled to the possession thereof. (4%)

 (A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Why or why not?

                    No, the MTC was not correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

                Under the Rules on Ejectment, the action for ejectment is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the MTC irrespective of total amount of the claims.

                Hence, it was erroneous for the MTC to dismiss the complaint for ejectment as it falls properly within its jurisdiction.

(B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on the assessed value of the property, the case was within its original jurisdiction and, hence, it may conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it was originally filed with it? Why or why not?

                  No, the RTC ruling based on the assessed value is not correct.

                  The Supreme Court in applying the Rules has held that what determines jurisdiction of the court as conferred by law is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

               Here, the jurisdiction over ejectment cases is conferred by law exclusively and originally upon the MTC. Necessarily, the nature of the action is alleged by the facts in the complaint herein. Hence, the RTC should have remanded the case to the MTC since it is the latter that has jurisdiction over the case.

 —ooo0ooo—


Advisory to the candidates of the 2015 Bar Exams, especially those who took the Bar exams three times and more already.

 

Make sure that the schools where you attend the Refresher Course as well as the Review Center are duly accredited by the Supreme Court Legal education Board.

Please click the link below to see the Rules for Curriculum of Refresher Review as well as the List of Schools Accredited to Offer Refresher and Review Courses.

 

Rules for Curriculum of Refresher Review Class & List of Accredited Schools

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 4, 2014

PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHIES


  1. PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHIES (585-400 BCE)

 

The pre-Socratic philosophers (around 600 BCE) were the earliest rational thinkers in the Western civilization. Their philosophies centered on the questions, “What is the world made of?” “How did the world come into being” and “How can we explain the process of change?” The western Ionian seaport of Miletus across the Aegean Sea from Athens was the meeting place between the East and the West, where Oriental, Egyptian and Babylonian (Eastern) philosophies influenced the development of what came to be the enduring Greek philosophy. While Eastern philosophies probed nature’s depths intuitively and spiritually, early Greek thinkers viewed nature cognitively and scientifically. Pre-Socratic philosophy represented a paradigm shift from the mythical explanation of the origins of the cosmos to intellectual, scientific attempts to understand the origins of the universe.

SEVEN SAGES

The men traditionally referred to as the Seven Sages were philosophers, statesmen and legislators of the late seventh and sixth centuries BCE. Exactly who were in the list was later named by Plato as: Thales, Pittacus of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon of Athens (the father of Athenian Democracy), Cleobilus of Lindus, Myson of Chenae, and Chilon of Sparta. Except for Thales, they were not really philosophers in the modern sense, but practical politicians. However, in that respect their speeches and sayings can be seen as ultimate precursors of the Classical period’s greatest thinkers about ethics, politics and morality (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle).

HISTORIANS OF CLASSICAL GREECE

 

  1. HERODOTUS (c. 484-425 BCE)

Herodotus became the father of history. His subject was the history of the Archaic period (c. 750-480 BCE), and his underlying theme was the meeting of the Greek world with the cultures of Asia Minor, the Near East and Egypt. His work shares some of the preoccupations of the Presocratic philosophers in its fascination with the nature of different human cultures and the underlying causes of human actions, especially warfare, without reference to gods or divine will. His style was rather anecdotal than analytical, and he is often very naïve, but his curiosity and questioning attitude , and his attention to all sides of an issue, using both Greek and non-Greek sources, link him methodologically with the Presocratic philosophers.

  1. THUCYDIDES (c. 455-400 BCE)

Called the “pioneer of scientific history,” Thucydides unlike Herodotus, concentrated on a wholly Greek subject, the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431-404 BCE). He was more analytical historian than Herodotus was, brilliantly unraveling the complex processes of decision-making or failure to decide that determined the fortunes of the parties in the war.

MONASTIC MATERIALISM

Most of the Presocratic philosophers thought that material principles alone were principles of all things. They had varying ideas of what the primordial substance was; but they could scarcely even have conceptualized a single origin for the universe if they had not already formed a concept of the universe as an ordered whole whose order should be determined: it was neither the creation of some gods or divine force nor a disordered mess intractable to intelligent explanation. The word they used for this order was kosmos, a word cognate with kosmeuein, to arrange or set in order. Heraclitus is probably the first Greek thinker to use kosmos clearly in this sense of the ordered world. The early Presocratics also argued that the world was governed by some regulatory force; this idea lies behind the Anaximander’s notion of cosmic justice, which maintains balance in the universe. Heraclitus and Parmenides were also concerned with cosmic justice.

Mathematics was an important part of Presocratic philosophy. The Greeks traditionally regarded Egypt as the wellspring of mathematics, but it was they who applied deductive reasoning to it. Thales introduced the notion of mathematical proof and made some basic geometrical discoveries. Mathematics was central to Pythagorean movement: numerous discoveries in geometry and music, including the famous theorem about the square of the hypotenuse, have been attributed to Pythagoreans rather than to Pythagoras himself. Among other things, Pythagoreans proved the existence of “irrational” numbers, with a drastic effect on the rest of their theory of the universe.

Most of the Presocratic philosophers were aristocratic or propertied citizens, active in the government of the cities or as military leaders; but mere practical political advice hardly counts as philosophizing. The Pythagoreans were primarily interested in the soul, and believed in reincarnation. Their view of philosophy as a way of life also shows where their main interest lay. On the whole, even the later Presocratic philosophers were not explicitly interested in ethical theory, though they did concern themselves with theories of mind, its distinction from matter, and the nature of knowledge.

  1. THALES OF MILETUS (625-545 BCE)

Thales was famous for having observed or perhaps predicted the first accurately datable event in Greek history: a solar eclipse on 28 May 585 BCE. His interests in eclipses  would well have sprung from Miletus’ links with Lydia, and through Lydia with Babylonia, where eclipses had long been studied by astronomers.

Thales is widely considered to have broken new ground when he theorized that water was the original substance out of which everything else was created. This was a breakthrough, because for the first time, there was a reasoned argument to support a theory, based on Thales’ empirical observation not only on the behavior of water itself (freezing, evaporation, thawing), which caused it to change from one thing to another and reverse the process while still demonstratively water, but of the reliance of all life forms on water for nourishment. Thales’ realization that a substance could change without losing its essential nature was also important; and it was an idea carried forward by Anaximenes, the youngest of the three Milesian pioneers, in his concept of rarefaction and condensation in the universe.

Thales also held the earth floats on water, like a floating log. However, he did not explain what the water itself rests on, or whether it is limitless, as might have been appropriate for the primordial substance. Thales also theorized that all things are full of gods, and the magnet is alive for it has the power to move iron.

 

 

  1. ANAXIMANDER OF MILETUS (610-540 BCE)

The second of the Milesians, Anaximander proposed that the universe not only originated in a single primordial substance but was subject to a single law. Unlike Thales, Anaximander posited that this substance, the material principle of everything that exists, was not only familiar earthly substance but something that he called apeiron, “the boundless”. Anaximander believed that everything in the world derived from four elements—air, water, earth, and fire—that existed necessarily as pair of opposites. But he disagreed with Thales’ view that any of the four could be the underlying substance on its own, because each of them needed its opposite to maintain its existence. Beyond the four elements, he argued, there had to be something that had no opposite: accordingly he hypothesized the apeiron. As well as being limitless in extent, the apeiron was “eternal and ageless, ungenerated and indestructible,” and from it came the heavens and “all the worlds”.

Perhaps springing from the notion of constant change, Anaximander conceived of a process of generation among animals that looks at first sight like a distant ancestor of a theory of evolution. Viewed more closely, his ideas about this process seem to owe more to observation of the development of insects from larvae: that the first animals were born in moisture, surrounded by prickly bark, from which they later emerged on dry land, and for a short time lived in a different kind of life. He posited the emergence of human beings out of fish or fish-like creatures in a similar process, not emerging and taking to the land until they were able to fend for themselves.

Anaximander was the first man to make a map of the earth—which he conceived of as cylindrical,  set in the center of a spherical universe around which the sun, moon, and stars circle, equidistant from the earth, in a celestial wheel. He conceived of a series of wheels or hoops, set at different distances from the earth, hollow and filled with fire, and punctuated by openings or vents; light or fire showing through these vents accounted for the appearances of the heavenly bodies. The hoop of the sun was twenty-seven greater than the earth, that of the moon eighteen times greater. Phases of the moon and eclipses were explained in terms of the blocking and opening of the vents. This picture may seem extremely fanciful, but it contains two revolutionary features: (1) the notion that the universe was spherical, and (2) the idea that it was the circular shape of the hoops that prevented them from falling in towards the sun.

  1. ANAXIMENES OF MILETUS (c. 545 BCE)

The third in the succession of early Milesians, Anaximenes, pupil of Anaximander, adopted Thales’ idea that the primordial stuff was an observable substance, choosing air, and proposed that the single law that governed the generation of matter was one of rarefaction and condensation. Here was another process of continual change and motion. The most rarefied condition of air was fire; successive degrees of condensation produced wind, clouds, water, earth, and finally, at the densest, stone. Rarefaction was caused by heating, condensation by cooling. The movement involved in rarefaction and condensation also made matter visible or invisible.

On the shape of the universe, Anaximenes also looked back to Thales: his earth, sun and other heavenly bodies were all fiery, shaped like flat discs, and airborne, turning in a circle above the flat earth. The heavenly bodies would not fall through the air because, being flat, they offered resistance. Anaximenes’ model of the universe and in particular the earth proved highly influential: Anaxagoras and Democritus are among those who agreed with him.

 

  1. PYTHAGORAS (Born 570 BCE)

Pythagoras believed in the transmigration of souls and established a religious sect centered on that belief. Pythagoreans’ belief in reincarnation, their communal way of life, their secrecy, and their veneration to the founding figure make it difficult to identify individual members of Pythagoras’ circle to detect what is original to Pythagoras.

Pythagoras marks the beginning of a different tradition of thought from that of the Milesians. He did not concern much with nature, being more interested with the soul and its qualities. He saw both the universe and the soul as endless and unchanging, the same things recurring eternally, and within this scheme the soul was subject to a series of reincarnations. Pythagorean philosophy was full of mystical and religious thought. Much of it was expressed in short sayings or aphorisms, called akousmata (“things heard”), which included the famous advice to abstain from beans but also statements about the universe, for example that the planets were bearers of divine vengeance, the purpose of thunder was to frighten souls in the underworld, and earthquakes were gathering of the dead. Other akousmata took the form of instructions or prohibitions that seem frankly superstitious: Put your right shoe first, don’t have children by a woman who wears gold, don’t look in a mirror by lamplight, etc. These are less scientific than the Ionian pioneers, ant hey make no use of reasoned argument at all.

Pythagoreans had speculated that everything in the world, and the relations between things, could be explained in terms of numbers. Their attempt to establish measurability combined the intellectual and the mystical in a way that seems strange to us: they thought, for instance, that marriage is five because it joins the first even (female, limited) number with the first odd (male, unlimited) one. Even the soul had a number. They noticed as well that musical intervals could be expressed numerically, related to the lengths of strings on a lyre. From this they postulated that if musical harmony depended on numerical ratios, the harmony of the universe could also be expressed numerically.

In the fifth century BCE, Pythagoreans split into two factions: Aphorists (akousmatikoi), and Mathematicians (mathematikoi), reflecting the two sides of Pythagorean thought.

 

  1. XENOPHANES (580-480 BCE)

 

Poet-philosopher Xenophanes was the first philosopher of religion. He was extremely critical of the traditional portrayal of the gods in Homer and the epic poems, where they behaved so disappointingly like humans, forever committing “theft and adultery and mutual deception.” This does not mean that Xenophanes was an atheist; on the contrary, he could be very pious. His remarks are a critical analysis of religion as it was practiced in the day. He believed that people imagined God in their own image.

Xenophanes hypothesized on non-mythological theology centered on a single or supreme god—it is not entirely clear from the surviving fragments whether he is referring to just one god or a god that is the greatest of many. The important thing is that this divinity is not a person but an abstract, impersonal divine principle, similar to mortals neither in shape nor in thought, able to shape all things by the force of its mind alone, capable of accomplishing everything while always reposing the same state or place—and ultimately unknowable to human minds.

His theory of the fundamental primary substance was earth and water, or a mixture of the two. In meteorology, Xenophanes made a remarkably prescient observation that clouds are formed by vaporization caused by the heat of the sun, and used this concept to suggest explanations for a number of astronomical phenomena. In short, Xenophanes combined a new approach to belief in divine order with the lively inquiry into the nature of the world and its contents typical to his Ionian predecessors.

 

  1. HERACLITUS (540-475 BCE)

Nicknamed the “weeping philosopher,” Heraclitus was paired with Democritus who was the “laughing philosopher”. Central to Heraclitus’ philosophy was that the natural universe is governed by a law of opposites held in tension, as in a bow and a lance. In general, he saw the universe as made up of pairs of opposites similar with Anaximandrian idea, but with the difference that Heraclitus saw justice and strife as themselves necessary. This paradoxical unity of opposites can be shown in many images: the sea is most pure and polluted water; for fish, it is drinkable and preserves life; for men, it is undrinkable and it kills; or his famous riddle: the path up and down is one and the same. Thus, the same road can appear in two opposite ways, depending on which direction you are looking at it. It tells us that the natures of things are not absolute in themselves but relative to our point of view. On the other hand, it appears as more complex metaphor referring to the process of cyclical change by which the cosmos eternally comes into being.

Fire was the element Heraclitus choose as the primordial substance—or rather the primordial process of the world. He maintained that the world always existed and had been made neither by god nor man, but always was, is and will be, an ever-living fire, kindling and being quenched in proportion. Everything else had arisen from this eternally ongoing process of combustion. From this process a universal harmony emerged.

In contrast to the idea of oneness and stasis put forward by his Eleatic contemporary Parmenides, Heraclitus claimed that everything changes and nothing remains. The process of change is the logos—the logic or rationale—of the universe. Heraclitus rejected the accepted Greek religion but believed in the existence of something divine, which he identified with the eternal cosmic fire.

Heraclitus was emphatic on the imperfection of human knowledge: Me do not understand the things they meet with—not even when they have learned them do they know them. In particular, most divine acts escape our knowledge. The individual’s subjective knowledge is incomplete, and wisdom lies not in learning but in the soul’s awakening to the logos: wisdom is one thing, to grasp the knowledge of how all things are steered through all.  His theories have been considered precursors of the laws of conservation and energy; is ideas about divine logos found their way, via Plato, into Christian theology. The opening words of the gospel of John (“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”) may echo this logos, reaching right back to Heraclitus.

  1. PARMENIDES (Born 515 BCE)

Parmenides used logical argument to prove that being, or “what is” is single, without beginning or end, continuous, and also finite and spherical; and that, contrary to the evidence of our senses, our belief in plurality and change in the world is erroneous and the material world around us is an illusion. The logical theory begins with the statement that something is, or something is not. The reason is that we can only conceptualize and speak about things that exist; we are unable to do this with things that don’t exist. He also offered the startling theory that the entire universe consists of one thing, which never changes, has no parts, and can never be destroyed, calling this single thing the One.

 

  1. ZENO (Born 490 BCE)

A friend of Parmenides, Zeno is best known for his series of logical paradoxes, which illustrate the method of reduction ad absurdum—proving or disproving a statement by taking its consequences through strictly logical steps to the point of absurdity. He asserted that our senses do not give us reliable knowledge but only opinion. The most famous of the paradoxes are four arguments proving the impossibility of motion, apparently supporting Parmenides’ idea that motion was illusory. Two of those paradoxes are:

(1)    Achilles and the tortoise. In a race, the fastest runner can never overtake the slowest, for the pursuer must first reach the point where the pursued set out, so that the slower one must always be in the lead. Imagine the Greek epic hero Achilles, famed for his speed, in a race with a humble tortoise. If the tortoise, as the slower contestant, is given a head start, it will always remain ahead; for by the time Achilles has reached the point from which the tortoise started out, the tortoise has moved on—by a shorter distance than Achilles has covered, admittedly, but still it has moved on. And whenever Achilles reaches a point that the tortoise has just left, it is still ahead. Since there is an infinite number of points Achilles has to reach where the tortoise has already been, he will never catch up, for even though the distance between the racers becomes infinitesimal, it can never shrink to nothing. Zeno argues, hence, that motion is impossible.

(2)    The paradox of dichotomy, or halving. If something is divisible, theoretically it can be cut in two infinite number of times, until it either becomes an infinite number of infinitesimal pieces from which the whole could be reconstituted, or else disappears into nothing, which would mean that the whole thing was constituted from nothing—which is impossible. Therefore, Zeno concludes, there cannot be a plurality of things but just the one. Aristotle saw this paradox as a variation on Achilles and the tortoise, but there is a further problem in it, illustrated by the case of Achilles and the racetrack, or indeed anyone progressing from point A to point B. There is no competitor this time, but to get to the end of the track—from A to B—you have to reach the halfway mark; before you can get there, you have to  get a quarter of the way there; before that, an eighth of the way… and so on till, in the end, with infinitesimal divisions of the distance, it will take you forever just to start off.

In all of these arguments, Zeno was counterattacking the adversaries of Parmenides, taking seriously their assumption of a pluralistic world where a line or time is divisible. By pushing these assumptions to their logical conclusions, Zeno attempted to demonstrate that the notion of a pluralistic world lands one in insoluble absurdities and paradoxes. He therefore reiterated Parmenides’ thesis that change and motion are illusions and that there is only one being, continuous, material, and motionless. In spite of Zeno’s valiant efforts, the commonsense view of the world persisted, which prompted succeeded philosophers to take a different approach to the problem of change and constancy.

PLURALISTS

 

  1. EMPEDOCLES (490-430 BCE)

 

Empedocles was an impressive figure in Agrigentum, Sicily. Legend has it that since he wished to be remembered as a godlike figure, he ended his life by jumping into the crater of Mount Etna, hoping to leave no trace of his body so that people would think that he had gone up to heaven.

He agreed with Parmenides that being is uncreated and indestructible, that it simply is. But unlike Parmenides, Empedocles believed that existence consisted not only of One but many which are changeless and eternal. He philosophized that the objects that we see and experience do come into being and are also destroyed, but such change and motion are possible because objects are composed of many material particles. Thus, although objects can change, the particles of which they are composed of are changeless—the four eternal material elements: earth, water, air, and fire. What explains the changes in objects that we see around us is the mixture of the four elements, but not their transformation. There is “only the mingling and interchange of what has been mingled.”

Empedocles’ account of earth, air, water, and fire constitutes only the first account of his theory. The second part is an account of the specific forces that animate the process of change. The Ionians assumed that the stuff of nature simply transformed itself into various objects. Only Anaximenes made any detailed attempt to analyze the process of change with his theory of condensed and expanded air. By contrast, Empedocles assumed that there are two forces, Love and Hate (Harmony and Discord), that cause the four elements to intermingle and later separate. Hate causes the decomposition of things. The four elements then mix together or separate from each other depending on the amount of Love or Hate that is present.

Four stages of the cycle, according to Empedocles, are: (1) Love is present and Hate is completely absent. Here, the four elements are fully commingled and are held in Harmony by the governing principle of Love. (2) The force of Hate, lurking nearby, starts to invade things, but there is still more Love present than Hate. (3) Hate begins to dominate, and the particles fall into Discord and begin to separate. (4) Only Hate is present, and all particles of the four elements separate into their own four groups. There, the four elements are ready to begin a new cycle as the force of Love turns to attract the elements into harmonious combinations. The continues without end.

 

  1. ANAXAGORAS (500-428 BCE)

 

Anaxagoras’ major philosophical contribution was the concept of Nuos (mind), which he distinguished from matter. He agreed with Empedocles’ theory of mixture and separation of the existing substances, but rejected the latter’s ambiguous, mythical notions of Love and Hate. Anaxagoras thought that the world and all its objects well-ordered and intricate structures; there must then be some being with knowledge and power that organizes the material world in this fashion—this rational principle is his concept of the Nuos.

According to Anaxagoras, the nature of reality is best understood as consisting of mind and matter; before mind has influenced the shape of and behavior of matter, matter exists, as a mixture of various kinds of material substances, all uncreated and imperishable. Even when this original mass of matter is divided into actual objects, each part contains portions of every other elemental “thing” (spermata, or seeds).

Aristotle criticized Anaxagoras’ philosophy in this wise: Anaxagoras uses reason as a divine machine for making the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something, then he drags the reason in, ascribing events to anything rather than reason. Anaxagoras seemed to provide an explanation only of how matter acquired its rotary motion, leaving the rest of the order of nature to be a product of that  motion.

ATOMISTS

 

“Atom” literally means “uncuttable” or indivisible. Atomism constituted a systematic, internally coherent natural philosophy explaining everything in the perceptible world. What is innovative about the theory is that it never suggested that the movement of atoms is governed by any intelligence or intentionality, divine or otherwise, either operating upon or inherent in the primal substance. Atomism appears as the first truly materialist answer to Heraclitus’ Logos, Parmenides’ One, Empedocles’ Love and Strife, and Anaxagoras’ Nuos. By positing indivisible units of matter, the atomists were also providing an answer to Zeno’s paradoxes showing that motion is impossible.

Atomism was extremely influential. It was taken up by Epicurus and Lucretius. Less directly, it seems to have had some influence on Plato, who presents a theory based on a different conception of indivisibles. We cannot trace a direct line from ancient atomism to the modern atomic theory of the twentieth century, for it was not a scientific theory resting on experimental method. Yet lacking the advantages of experimentation, Leocippus and Democritus theorized purely materialist explanation of the world, using concepts that prefigure, however distantly, the way we understand the structure of matter today.

  1. DEMOCRITUS (460-370 BCE)

 

Democritus, “the laughing philosopher,” was probably the most prolific Greek philosopher after Aristotle. He wrote on ethical subjects (contentment, meanliness or virtue, wisdom); on natural science (a vast range of topics ranging from a description of the whole world of treatises on flavors and colors); on various natural phenomena such as the heavens, the atmosphere, fire, sounds, plants and animals; on mathematics, literature, medicine and even farming. This laughing philosopher set great value on cheerfulness or contentment in his ethical writings, defining the general goal of life as joy, contentment or tranquility, and locating it in the soul. But it is above all for the theory of atomism that both he and Leucippus are remembered.

Democritus was concerned with two other philosophical problems: the problem of knowledge and the problem of human conduct. Being a thorough materialist,, Democritus held that thought can be explained in the same way that any other phenomenon can, namely, as the movement of atoms. He distinguished between two different kinds of perception, one of the senses and one of the understanding, both of these being physical processes. When our eyes see something, this something is an “effluence” or the shedding of atoms by the object, forming an “image.” These atomic images enter the eyes, and other organs of sense, and make and impact upon the soul, which is itself made up of atoms.

Democritus further distinguishes between two ways of knowing things: “there are two forms of knowledge, the trueborn and the illegitimate. To the illegitimate belong all these: sight, hearing, taste, touch. The trueborn is quite apart from these.” What distinguishes these two types of thought is that, whereas, “trueborn” knowledge depends only on the object, “illegitimate” knowledge is affected by the particular conditions of the body of the person involved. In ethics, Democritus stressed that the  ost desirable goal of life is cheerfulness, and we best achieve this through moderation in all things along with the cultivation of culture.

 

 

  1. LEOCIPPUS

Leocippus was the founder of the atomist school. He proposed that the universe consists of two basic constituents: indivisibly small atoms, of which an infinite number (but not infinite variety) exist, and void of nothingness, which is also infinite, and in which the atoms move eternally. There is a limitless quantity of shapes among them (since there is no more reason for them to have one shape than another).

Leocippus affirmed the reality of space and thereby prepared the way for a coherent theory of motion and change. He described space as something like a receptacle that could be empty in some places and full in others. As a receptacle, space, or the void, could be the place where objects move, and Leocippus apparently saw no reason for denying this characteristic of space. Without this concept of space, it would have been impossible for Leocippus and Democritus to develop their view that all things consist of atoms.

 

SOPHISTS

Discussion of the Sophists centers much on method as on content. Te word sophists, apparently a word invented only in the fifth century BCE, means someone whose calling is that of wisdom or knowledge, and it came to be applied to peripatetic professional teachers, who travelled around teaching the rhetorical and language skills necessary to argue a case and other practical capabilities needed by men engaged in politics and the law, rather than theorizing about nature for its own sake. As itinerant teachers, they did not found schools, but as participants in the dialogues of Plato, their posterity came to be assured. Very few of the sophists were born in Athens.

The Sophists were highly influential in the development of the method of adversarial debate and advocacy, and in promoting a skeptical, questioning approach to knowledge and judgment. But they did not entirely abandon speculation about the nature of the world. In particular, they thought about knowledge and its relation with reality. The social changes of the fifth century BCE meant that the philosophy turned its attention away from questions about the nature of knowledge, morality and justice.  On the whole, Sophists did not concern themselves with cosmological or physical speculation; they were more interested in studying how we know and what is knowable than in increasing the store of what we know. This concern had come to them from theorists such as Parmenides, and it was developed by both Protagoras and Gorgias, two of the principal Sophists.

The Sophists also claimed to teach “virtue”—which they understood, for practical purposes, broadly as the qualities necessary for a successful public career in a city-state. This was the basis for the bad reputation they acquired, principally from Plato, who mocked and attacked them mercilessly in several works because they “taught wisdom for money.” But Plato’s idealism and political conservatism were naturally antithetical to the Sophists’ pragmatism and relativism. A central preoccupation of much of his thought was to arrive at impregnable definitions of justice and goodness. The Sophists on the other hand were more comfortable with the shifts that were occurring in these concepts, and said that such definitions depended on who was doing the defining. They argued that some opinions are preferable to others for particular people and particular purposes, but they are not necessarily more or less wise, or even truer.

  1. PROTAGORAS (485-411 BCE)

Protagoras was the first and arguably the greates of the Sophists, like Democraticus and the first Sophist to come to Athens. He was a friend of Pericles and suffered the fate of many friends of Pericles, being accused of “impiety” and having to leave Athens in a hurry: he was apparently drowned in a shipwreck on his way to Sicily.

We know of Protagoras’ ideas mainly through Plato, which is unfortunate, since Plato usually sets these ideas up only in order to demolish them. Protagoras has become generally known as the father of relativism—a label that shows him to have been diametrically opposed to everything Plato stood for. His chief claim to fame is familiar, and endlessly debated, aphorism, “Man is the measure of all things.” In this, he was suggesting that there is no reality apart from what we perceive. And if our perceptions are the guarantee of the reality of thigs, then the center of the universe is humanity. Protagoras accepted no absolutes existing anywhere beyond human perception and judgment, as regards the nature of the gods, the nature of the worlds around us, or to the nature of virtue and justice. Taken to their logical conclusions, these ideas could legitimate the rejection of any kind of law or morality.

Protagoras was also an agnostic: while not disbelieving in the gods, he questioned the possibility that humans can know about them. His key insight on the limits of knowledge was that truth requires a measure external to itself, and the best available measure was human knowledge and experience, and that truths are not objectively true without reference to anything else but held true within systems of thought or collectivities, such as the city.

  1. GORGIAS (483-378 BCE)

An extreme sceptic, Gorgias refuted all possible views on existence and non-existence, claiming that nothing exists; or if it does, it is unknowable; or if it is unknowable, we cannot articulate it to anyone else. He seems to have been influenced y Empedocles and Zeno. Gorgias was specifically interested in the use of speech and language on the emotions, and mentions the way tragedy can inspire pity and fear, thus prefiguring Aristotle’s views on the effect of tragic drama in his Poetics. In a defense of Helen of Troy, who was traditionally held responsible for theTrojan War, Gorgias even went so far as to claim that words are by their very nature deceptive and fraudulent and that Helen was innocent because she had been overcome by the power of persuasion.

Gorgias was a also a stylistic innovator, applying to prose the figures of speech and rhetorical effects usually confined at the time of poetry. Plato criticized him in the dialogue that bears his name, arguing for the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy.

 

  1. PRODICUS, HIPPIAS, ANTIPHON, and THRACYMACHUS

 

Prodicus came up with a utililarian  explanation of traditional theology, suggesting that the sun, the moon and other heavenly bodies were regarded as divinities because they were useful to the development of human society. The polymathic Hippias appears in two dialogues of Plato named after him, being ironically criticized by Socrates for getting rich from teaching. He is interesting for having made, possibly for the first time, the distinction between law (nomos) and nature (physics) as the basis of morality. This view was developed further by Antiphon, who asserted more radically the nature is “truth” and its edicts “compulsory,” whereas human law is mere “opinion” arrived at by consent, and that is preferable to break human law in order to follow natural law than the reverse.

Tharismachus is represented in Plato’s Republic as putting forward the thesis that justice can be defined as the interest of the stronger and that governments make laws for their own advantage. This is the kind of argument that earned the Sophists a bad name; but there is strong philosophical point in Bertrand Russell’s approval of them because they were “prepared to follow an argument wherever it might lead them,” even though that plae was often one of profound skepticism.

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 4, 2014

GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS


  1. GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS

 

AESTHETICS – The branch of Philosophy that is concerned with the analysis of concepts such as beauty or beautiful as standards for judging works of art.

AGNOSTICISM – A claim of ignorance; the claim that God’s existence can neither be proved nor disproved.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY – The philosophical school of thought associated with Russel, Moore, Ryle, Carnap, Ayer, and Wittgenstein that emphasizes the analysis of language and meaning. Specifically, it is the conviction that philosophical problems, puzzles, and errors are rooted in language and can be solved or avoided by a sound understanding of language.

ANARCHISM – That theory that all forms of government are incompatible with individual and social liberty and should be abolished.

ANIMISM – The belief that many spirits inhabit the nature.

ANTHROMORPHISM – The attribution of human qualities to human entities, especially to God.

ANTIREALISM – The doctrine that the objects of our senses do not exist independently of our perceptions, beliefs, concepts, and languages.

ATHEISM – The belief that a personal God does not exist. In the last two centuries, some of the most influential atheistic philosophers have been Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

AUTHORITY – A source of our theological knowledge, specifically for philosophers and theologians who hold that the mysteries of faith surpass the reach of human person.

AVIDYA – In Buddhism, pertains to the cause of all sufferings and frustrations; it means ignorance or unawareness that leads to clinging.

AXIOLOGY – The study of the general theory of values, including their origin, nature, and classification.

BECOMING – In Hegelian thought, refers to the world in which everything in our daily experience—persons and things—comes into being and passes away.

BEHAVIORISM – In Psychological Philosophy, it is the school of psychology that restricts the study of human nature to what can be observed rather than to states of consciousness.

BEING – A general term in metaphysics referring to ultimate reality or existence. True being, for Plato, is the realm of the eternal Forms.

BRAHMAN – The Hindu concept of a personal Supreme Being; the source and goal of everything.

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY – Founded by Siddharta Gautama (Buddha), believes that the ultimate goal of human being is the attainment of nirvana, the state that is free from the causes of pain and suffering.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE – Immanuel Kant’s ethical formula: act as if the maxim (the general rule) by which a person acts could be willed to become a universal law; it is the belief that what is right for one person is also right for everyone in similar circumstances. This is compared with hypothetical imperatives, which permit exceptions.

CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT – A thought experiment offered by by Searle to refute the claims of strong artificial intelligence advocates that suitably programmed machines are capable of cognitive mental states.

COGITO – Literally, in Latin, “I think.” Used by Descartes to describe the self as a thinking thing.

COMMON SENSE REALISM – The epistemological position that does not distinguish between an object and an experience of it.

COMPATIBILISM – The belief that both determinism and freedom of the will are true; religion and reason are compatible with each other and do not conflict.

CONCEPTUAL RELATIVIST VIEW IN EPISTEMOLOGY – The view that the true scientific theory is nothing more than a theory that coheres with the conceptual framework accepted by a community of scientists.

CONDITIONED GENESIS – The Buddha formula consisting of twelve factors that summarize the principles of conditionality, relativity, and independence.

CONFUCIANISM – An ethical theory which asserts that human beings are part of nature, who must live in accordance with the natural law that governs and guides the movements of all things.

CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORY IN ETHICS – The position that the morality of an action is determined by its nonmoral consequences.

CORRESPONDENCE THEORY – A theory concluding that truth is an agreement between a proposition and a fact.

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT – An argument for the existence of God which claims that there must be an ultimate causal explanation for why the universe as a totality exists.

COSMOLOGY – The study of the universal world processes—the process by which the world unfolds and evolves. It studies the origin and nature of the world.

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY – The analysis and definition of basic concepts and the precise expression and criticism of basic beliefs.

DECONSTRUCTION – A post-structuralist theory associated with Derrida that attempts to sho that all pairs of opposite concepts in philosophical systems are in fact self-refuting.

DEISM – A belief in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in a God who, having created the universe, remains apart from it and administers it through natural laws.

DEONTOLOGY – Any position in ethics that claims that the rightness or wrongness of actions depends on whether they correspond to our duty or not. The word derives from the Greek word for duty, deon.

DESIGN ARGUMENT – An argument for the existence of God that claims that the order and purpose manifest in the working of things in the universe require a God.

DETERMINISM – The theory that everything that occurs happens in accordance with some regular pattern or law. Accordingly, human beings do not possess freedom of the will or the power to originate independent or genuine choices.

DIALECTIC – In general, the critical analysis of ideas to determine their meanings, implications, and assumptions; as used by Hegel, a method of reasoning used to synthesize contradictions.

DIVINE COMMAND THEORY – A single-rule, non-consequential normative theory which says that we should always to the will of God. It asserts that the rightness or wrongness of actions depends on whether or not these actions correspond to God’s commands.

DOGMATISM – The act of making a positive assertion without demonstration by either rational argument or experience.

DOLORS – Utilitarian unit of pain or displeasure. Its opposite is hedon, a unit of pleasure.

DUALISM – The theory that reality is composed of two different, independent, irreducible substances so that neither one can be related to the other—thus, spirit/matter, mind/body, good/evil. This is the contrast of monism and pluralism.

DUTY THEORY – In ethics, the position that a moral action is the one that conforms with obligations accrued in the past, such as the obligations or gratitude, fidelity, or justice.

ECLECTICISM – A consequentialist ethical theory which contends that we act morally when we act in a way that promotes our own best long-term interest.

ECUMENICAL TRADITION – In various religions, this tradition is characterized by an openness to other religious traditions and a willingness to explore overlapping areas of faith; this tradition is often contrasted with fundamentalist and absolutist traditions in religion.

EMERGENCE/EMERGENT EVOLUTION – The view that in the development of the universe, new life forms appear which cannot be explained solely by analysis of previous forms.

EMOTIVISM – The metaethical position that ethical statements primarily express surprise, shock, or some other emotion. It holds that moral judgments are simply expressions of positive or negative feelings.

EMPERICISM – The position that knowledge has its origins in and derives all of its content from experience, which denies that human beings possess inborn knowledge or that they can derive knowledge through the exercise of reason alone.

ENLIGHTENMENT – (1)An intellectual movement in modern Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries that believed in the power of human reason to understand the world and to guide human conduct. (2) For Buddhists, the state of Enlightenment or nirvana is the goal of human existence.

ENTITLEMENT THEORY – A theory of social justice contending that individuals are entitled to their properties and other holdings without harming anyone in the process. This is expressed in the Latin maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.

EPICUREANISM – The belief in pleasure as the highest good.

EPIPHENOMENALISM – The view that matter is primary and the mind is a secondary phenomenon accompanying some bodily process.

EPISTEMOLOGY – The branch of Philosophy which investigates the nature, sources, limitations, and validity of knowledge.

ESSENCE – The chief characteristic, quality, or necessary function that makes a thing what it uniquely is.

ETHICAL ABSOLUTION/ABSOLUTISM – In Ethics, the view that affirms the existence of a single correct and universally applicable moral standard.

ETHICAL EGOISM – A moral theory that in its most common version (universal ethical egoism) states that each person ought to act in his or her own self-interest.

ETHICAL RELATIVISM – Any view that denies the existence of a single universally applicable moral standard. There are two types: (1) DESCRIPTIVE ETHICAL RELATIVISM, which claims as a matter of fact that different people have different moral beliefs, but it takes no stand on whether those beliefs are valid or not; and (2) NORMATIVE ETHICAL RELATIVISM, which claims that each culture’s beliefs are right within that culture and that it is impossible to judge validly another culture’s values from the outside.

ETHICS – That branch of Philosophy which is the explicit reflection on moral beliefs and practices. (1) A set of rules for human behavior; (2) a study of judgments of value—of good and evil, right and wrong, or desirable and undesirable; (3) theories of obligation or duty or why we “ought” to behave in certain way.

EUDAEMONISM – From Greek eudaimonia (“flourishing; happiness”), it is the view that the goal of life is happiness—that is, complete, long-lived kind of well-being.

EXCUSABILITY – The concept that under certain circumstances, people are nor morally responsible for their decisions and conduct.

EXISTENTIALISM – A twentieth century philosophy by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty which denies any essential human nature; each of us creates our own essence through free action.

FATALISM – The view that events are fixed, that humans can do nothing to alter them.

FORMALISM – In Ethics, it is the view that moral acts from fixed moral principles and do not change because of circumstances.

FREE WILL – The theory that in some cases the will makes decisions or choices independent of prior physiological or psychological causes.

FUNCTIONALISM – A contemporary theory of mind-body problem that mental events depend on networks, pathways, and the interconnection of mental processes, but not on any specific material stuff that the brain is composed of, such as neurons. It holds open the possibility that mental events can occur in nonbiological systems, such as silicon chips.

FUNDAMENTALISM – In various religious traditions, this is the belief that correct religious belief and practice are determined by how close they correspond to the basic texts and dogmas. In fundamentalistic traditions, basic texts and rules are often interpreted very literally.

GESTALT THEORY – The twentieth century psychological theory which states that our perceptual experience consists of a full range of characteristics—form, structure, sense, meaning, and value—all simultaneously.

HEDONISM – The doctrine that pleasure is the actual, and also the proper, motive of every choice.

HERD MENTALITY – A view in Nietzsche’s philosophy which states that people are often reduced to a common level of mediocrity.

HINDUISM – is a belief that the soul is the ultimate, eternal reality but is bound by the law of karma (action) to the world of matter, which it can escape only after spiritual progress through an endless series of births; thus, the ultimate humanity’s goal is the liberation (moksha) of the spirit (jiva).

IDEALISM – The view that mind is the ultimate reality in the world, as opposed to materialism, the view that all reality is composed of material things.

 

IDEAL UTILITARIANISM – First advanced by G.E. Moore in the nineteenth century, is a form of utilitarianism which maintains that we ought to act to maximize the realization of certain ideals, such as truth or beauty.

IDENTITY THEORY – A contemporary theory of mind-body problem associated with Armstrong and Smart that reduces mental events to brain activity.

ILLUSION – For Freud, it means a false belief growing out of a deep wish; it is an erroneous impression, such as optical illusion.

IMPRESSION – Hume’s term for experience consisting of sensations and mental reflections.

INDETERMINISM – The theory which states that in some cases the will makes decisions or choices independent of prior physiological or psychological causes.

INTEGRATIONISM – A theory that attempts to reconcile apparently conflicting tendencies or values into a single framework. Integrationist positions are contrasted with separatist positions, which advocate keeping groups (usually defined by race, ethnicity, or gender) separate from each other.

INSTRUMENTALISM – Dewey’s theory which states that thought is instrumental insofar as it produces practical consequences.

INTUITION – Direct and immediate knowledge of the self, the external world, values, or other metaphysical truths, without the need to define the notions, to justify a conclusion, or to build up inferences.

INTUITIONISM – In metaphysics, the doctrine that intuition rather than reason reveals the reality of things; in ethics, the doctrine that man has an innate sense of right and wrong.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM – The twentieth century movement in the analytical tradition that rests on the verification principle.

MARXISM – The materialist philosophy founded by Karl Marx, which advanced the theory that (1) the existence of social and economic classes is only bound up with historic phases in the development of production; (2) the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat (working class); and (3) the dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society with equal distribution of wealth.

MATERIALISM – The view that matter constitutes the basis of all that exists in the universe. Hence, combinations of matter and material forces account for every aspect of reality, including the nature of thought, the process of historical and economic events, and the standard of values based on sensuous bodily pleasures and the abundance of things; this view rejects the notion of the primacy of spirit or  mind and rational purpose in nature.

METAPHYSICS – The branch of philosophy concerned with the question of the ultimate nature of reality. Unlike the sciences, which focus on various aspects of nature, metaphysics goes beyond particular things to inquire about more general questions, such as what lies beyond nature, how things come into being, what it means for something to be, and whether there is a realm of being that is not subject to change and that is, therefore, the basis of certainty in knowledge.

MONISM – The view that there is only one substance in the universe. Idealism and Materialism are monistic theories. Monism is the contrast of Dualism and Pluralism.

MORAL ISOLATIONISM – The belief that we ought not to be morally concerned with, or involved with, people outside our own immediate group. Moral isolationism is often a consequence of some versions of moral relativism.

MORAL REALISM – The belief that moral disagreements can, at least in part, be resolved by appeals to facts about the natural order of things.

MORALITY – The first-order beliefs and practices about good and evil by means of which we guide our behavior. In contrast, ethics, the second-order, is reflective consideration of our moral beliefs and practices.

NARCISSISM – An excessive preoccupation with oneself. In mythology, Narcissus was a beautiful young man who fell in love with his own image reflected in a pool of water.

NATURAL LAW – In ethics, believers in natural law hold that (1) there is a natural order to the human world, (2) this natural order is good, and (3) people therefore ought not to violate tbat order.

NIHILISM – The view that there are no value or truth. According to Nietzsche, “death of God” will be followed by the rejection of absolute values and the rejection of the idea of an objective and universal moral law.

NIRVANA – In Hindu theory, a condition of happiness arising out of the absolute cessation of desire.

NOUMENAL WORLD – The real world as opposed to the world of appearance. According to Kant, the noumenal world cannot be known.

NOUMENON – In Kant, the ultimate reality, or Thing-in-itself, which can be conceived by thought, but cannot be perceived in experience.

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT – A proof of God’s existence devised by Anselm, such that God is defined as the greatest possible being, which necessarily entails existence.

ONTOLOGY – The study of existence and being, from the Greek ontos, “being,” and logos, “science”; related to the field of metaphysics.

PANTHEISM – The doctrine that God is immanent in all things.

PHENOMENAL WORLD – In Kant’s theory, the world of appearance versus the noumenal world beyond our knowledge.

PHENOMENOLOGY – A twentieth century philosophical movement by Husserl, which states that in accounting for knowledge, we should not go beyond the data available to consciousness derived from appearances.

PLURALISM – The view that there are more than one or two separate substances making up the world. It believes that there are multiple perspectives to an issue, each of which contains part of the truth but none of which contains the whole truth. This stands in contrast to both monism and dualism. In ethics, ethical pluralism is the belief that different moral theories each capture part of the truth of the moral life, but none of those theories has the entire answer.

POSITIVISM – A nineteenth century philosophical movement by Comte, which asserts that we should reject any investigation that does not rest on direct observation.

POSTMODERNISM – The theory in contemporary Continental philosophy which rejects the Renaissance and Enlightenment assumption that the world can be explained in a unified system.

POST-STRUCTURALISM – The radical extension of the structuralist position contending that novels and philosophical texts are completely closed systems whose meanings derive from what individual readers bring to the texts.

POSTULATE – In Kant’s theory, it pertains to a practical or moral principle that cannot be proved, such as the existence of God, the freedom of the will, or immortality, which must be believed to make possible our moral duty.

PRAGMATISM – A twentieth century movement associated with Pierce, James, and Dewey, contending that there is little value in philosophical theories that do not somehow make a difference in daily life.

PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM – A moral theory that says we ought to act in such a way as to maximize the satisfaction of everyone’s preferences.

RATIONALISM – The philosophical view that emphasizes the ability of human reason to grasp fundamental truths about the world without the aid of sense impressions.

REDUCTIONISM – The philosophical position that complex systems can be understood by reducing them into their simplest components. The type of reductionism espoused by some Pre-Socratic philosophers is called Ontological Reductionism – the idea that all matter consists of one or a very few basic substances in various combinations (hot/cold, light/dark)..

RELATIVISM – The view that there is no absolute knowledge, that truth is different for each individual, social group, or historical period and is, therefore, relative to the circumstances of the knowing subject.

RIGHTS – These are entitlements to do something without interference from other people (negative rights) or entitlements that obligate others to do something positive to assist you (positive rights). Some rights (natural rights, human rights) belong to everyone by nature or simply by virtue of being human; some rights (legal rights) belong to people by virtue of their membership in a particular political state; other rights (moral rights) are based on acceptance of a particular moral theory.

SCHOLASTICISM – The theological and philosophical method of learning in medieval schools that emphasized deductive logic and the authority of key figures such as Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine.

SKEPTICISM – (1) the tendency to doubt some fundamental component of knowledge; (2) the Ancient Greek school of thought associated with Plato’s Academy, Pyrrho, and Sextus Empiricus. In Ancient Greek, skeptics were inquirers dedicated to the investigation of concrete experience and wary of theories that might cloud or confuse that experience. In modern times, skeptics are wary of the trustworthiness of sense experience. Thus, classical skepticism primarily distrusted theories; whereas, modern skepticism primarily distrusts experience.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY – In social philosophy, the doctrine that individuals give up certain liberties and rights to the state, which in turn guarantees such rights as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

SOLIPSISM – From the Latin solus, “alone” and ipse, “self”; it is the view that the self alone is the source of all knowledge of existence, which sometimes leads to the conclusion that the self is the only reality.

SOPHISTS – Wandering teachers in fifth-century Athens who especially prepared young men for political careers, who hence emphasized rhetoric and the ability to persuade audiences and win debates, and who were less concerned with pursuing truths.

SOVEREIGN – A person or state independent of any other authority or jurisdiction.

STRUCTURALISM – The theory in contemporary Continental philosophy associated with Saussaure and Levi-Strauss that the meaning of a thing is defined by its surrounding cultural structures, which in turn rely on pairs of opposite concepts, such as light and dark.

SUBJECTIVISM – An extreme version of relativism, which maintains that each person’s beliefs are relative to that person alone and cannot be judged from the outside by any other person.

TAOISM – Introduced by Lao Tzu, this philosophy of passivity and transcendentalism, believes in supernatural explanations for anything, to disregard the ephemeral things and concentrate on the eternal through meditation, special diet, and sexual hygiene.

TELEOLOGY – From the Greek telos, “purpose”; the study of purpose is human nature and in the events of history.

TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL – This is a term introduced by Soren Kierkegaard to refer to those instances in which normal ethical duties are overridden by a command from God. Kierkegaard’s principal example of this is God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac.

TRANSCENDENTAL – beyond the realm and reach of the senses.

UNIVERSALIZABILITY – A Kantian term applied to the maxims, or subjective rules, that guide our actions. A maxim is universalizable if it can be consistently willed as a law that everyone ought to obey. The only morally good maxims are those that can be universalized. The test of universalizability ensures that everyone has the same moral obligations in morally similar situations.

UTILITARIANISM – An ethical and political economic theory associated with Bentham and Mill that an action is morally good if it produces as much good as or more good than any alternative behavior. This theory states that whatever produces the overall greatest amount of pleasure (hedonistic utilitarianism) of happiness (eudaimonistic utilitarianism) is morally right. Act utilitarians claim that we should weigh the consequences of each individual action, whereas Rule utilitarianism maintains that we should look at the consequences of adopting particular rules of conduct.

VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE – A principle in logical positivism contending that a statement is meaningful if (1) it asserts something that is true simply because the words used necessarily and always require the statement to be true (as in mathematics) or (2) it asserts something that can be judged as true or false by verifying it in experience.

VICE – A weakness of character that prevents individuals from flourishing (eudaimonia). According to Aristotle, vices typically consist of having either too much or too little of a proper virtue. Thus courage is the mean of foolhardiness (too much) and cowardice (too little).

VIRTUE – A stretch of character, usually acquired through habit, that promotes human flourishing. According to Aristotle, virtues represent a middle ground between the two extremes of too much or too little.

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY – An epistemological theory that focuses on the character traits of a person, rather than on the properties of a person’s belief.

VIRTUE THEORY – A moral theory that focuses on the development of good character traits, or virtues, rather than on rules for solving moral dilemmas.

WAGER, PASCAL’S – A contention by Pascal that, when reason is neutral on the issue of God’s existence, we should be psychologically compelled to believe based on the benefits of such belief.

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 4, 2014

TECHNIQUES IN ANSWERING BAR QUESTIONS BY ATTY. TATAD, JR.


TECHNIQUES IN ANSWERING BAR QUESTIONS BY ATTY. REY TATAD JR.

 

REASON/S BEHIND THE LAW

  1.  The purpose of the law is…
    2. The law is designed to…
    3. It is intended to shield …
    4. It is primarily aimed at protecting ____________ from unwarranted __________
    5. The rationale behind the law is…
    6. The spirit of the law is to the effect that…

DEFINITION / EXPLANATION

1. ________________ is a comprehensive term used to describe _________.
2. _________________, in its generally accepted sense, refers to ….
3. … It is a safeguard and guarantee provided by the 1987 Constitution..
4. … It is a kind of relief granted to a ______________ by the …
5. ________________ is a branch of public law (or private law) which deals with..
6. It pertains to…
7. It connotes a ….
8. … is a doctrine in (i.e. Civil Law) which refers to…
9. … is a principle in (i.e. Criminal Law) which states that…
10. It presupposes…
11. Its principal identifying feature is..
12. It is akin to…
13. The function of which is to…
14. The office of which is to…
ENUMERATION 

1. In capsule form, the following are the elements of the crime of

  1.  In a nutshell, the following are the elements of the crime of
  2.  The following elements are generally considered in the determination ofthe presence of (i.e. employer-employee relationship)
  3.  Among the (i.e. defenses/remedies) available to (i.e. Mr. X) as provided for by/in the (i.e. Civil Code) are:

(1)…
(2)…
5. The following are the requisites for…

  1.  In order that a case for (i.e. B.P. 22) to prosper, the following elements must be attendant/present:
  2.  To constitute (i.e. homicide), the following requisites must concur:
  3.  (i.e. Legal compensation) requires the concurrence of the following conditions:
  4.  To establish a person’s culpability under (i.e. estafa), it is indispensable that…

 

* Tips on answers that require enumerating something. (i.e. elements). If you can enumerate all, write it in bulleted or numbered form to highlight the fact that you know all of them and for more convenient-reading purposes.  If you cannot enumerate all, write it in paragraph form so that it would not easily be noticeable that you missed something. (I got the above tip from our mentor Atty. Gafar Lutian)
DISTINCTION 

When being asked to distinguish, do not state its definition. If you give its definition, you are in effect asking the examiner to extract out the differences of the two [or more] from your definition. Do not also give their similarities. You are asked to differentiate and contrast, so similarities are not included (That was a tip I learned from my professor in Civil Law Review I, Atty. Virgilio Gesmundo).The number of distinctions you will give must also be proportionate on the points allotted for such. If it is only worth two points, do not give 8 distinctions. The examiner cannot give you 8 points for that…. For a two point distinction question, perhaps, three would be enough (four is not too much).
1. The (i.e. two) may be distinguished from each other in the followings
ways:

  1. b.
    2. In the first, it is necessary that there be….., whereas in the second it is sufficient
    that there be ….
  2.  In the former, … while in the latter…

4. The former requires … while the latter…

5. … on the other hand ______________ is…
ANSWERING QUESTIONS WITH VAGUE FACTS (or which requires qualification)
But if the facts are complete in itself, do not attempt to add facts or assume anything.

1. We must distinguish. If… (or As far as the __________ is concerned)

2. It depends. If…(or As far as the __________ is concerned)

  1.  The question requires a qualified answer. If…

4. I will qualify. If…

5. On the assumption that…

6. My answer must be qualified.
JURISDICTION 

1. The case is beyond the ambit of the jurisdiction of the (i.e. Regional TrialCourt)

2. It is within the ambit of the (i.e. Secretary of Labor’s) power.

3. It is not within the province of the (i.e. Municipal Trial Court)

4. It is clearly within the powers of the (i.e. Labor Arbiter) to…

  1.  The case of (i.e. ejectment) lies with the Municipal Trial Court.
  2.  The case is cognizable by the (i.e. Regional Trial Court)
  3.  The case is covered by the (Rules on Summary Procedure).
  4.  The law vests upon the (i.e. Secretary of Justice) the power to…

ELABORATING/EXPOUNDING ANSWERS
Go straight to the point. The length of answers and expounding the same, must always be proportionate to the points allotted for such particular question. The higher the points, the more in-depth the elaboration should be. However, it must not appear “na nambobola ka na”. Sometimes, if your answer is too long, it is an indication that you are not sure of the answer so there is that need of getting around the bush. Remember that most of the times, MORE TALK, MORE MISTAKE!!! (I got this tip frommy professor in Political Law, Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr.)
1. It should be borne in mind that…

2. It must be noted that…

3. It may be recalled that…

4. It is worth observing…

5. It must be taken into consideration that…

6. More importantly, ….

7. Significantly,…

8. Corollarily,…

9. Furthermore,…

10. Moreover,…

11. Similarly,…

12. Parenthetically,…

13. In other words,…

14. Otherwise stated,…

15. Simply put,…

16. Simply stated,…

17. Stated more concretely…

18. The reasons are obvious. (expound)

19. The reasons are well-known. (expound)

20. The reasons are plain. (expound)

21. Under the same line of reasoning,…

22. As regards…

  1.  With regard to… (it is error to state “with regards to”)

24. Anent the (i.e. first issue),…

25. As far as the ________________ is concerned,…

26. This is indicated by the fact that…

27. The language of the law leaves no room for doubt that,…

28. Justice and fair-play dictates that,…

29. Applying the principle of….

30. For all its conceded merits, (i.e. equity is available in the absence of lawand not as its replacement)…

31. The law is categorical with regard to…

32. Notwithstanding the… (i.e. execution of the document)

33. It is beyond debate that,…

34. It is imperative to look at,…

  1.  This is consistent with the time-honored maxim (i.e. nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege).
    36. As it is imbued with public interest,…

37. In like manner,

38. In the same manner,

39. In the same vein,

40. In the same breath,

41. Likewise,..

42. In fine,

43. It bears articulating that

44. The controlling element in the (i.e. crime of estafa) is…

45. By analogy,…

46. Suffice it to state that..

47. Emphasis must also be placed at…

48. Manifestly, there was (i.e. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction)
49. Needless to stress that…

50. It goes without saying that

51. The Supreme Court frowns upon the (i.e. illegal practice of forum shopping as it erodes the administration of justice and makes a mockery of the justice system).

52. There is no denying in this case, that (i.e. the petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court; case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy)
53. It is now too late in the day for the respondent/defendant to (i.e. raise the issue
of …)

54. Equally telling is the (i.e. factual finding of the lower court) that…

55. The gravamen of the (i.e. the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government)
56. It cannot be denied that (i.e. the petitioner is also guilty of negligence)…
57. Attention must be drawn to the fact that…

58. ___________ and ____________ are two mutually exclusive remedies. An application of one precludes the application of the other.

59. To amplify,…

60. It must be pointed out that…

61. Notably,…

62. At the outset, the (i.e. defendant)…

63. Coming now to the issue of (i.e. prescription),…

 

CITING LAW PROVISIONS 
1. No less than the (i.e. 1987 Constitution) provides for the…

2. The (i.e. Rules of Court) substantially provides in part that…

3. Under the broad principles of (i.e. due process clause)…

4. Under the all-encompassing doctrine of (i.e. incontestability clause)…

5. Under the law…

6. According to the (i.e. Family Code)…

7. The law is explicit on the matter.

8. The law explicitly expresses in part that…

9. By express provision of law,…

10. By operation of law…

11. As a matter of law…

12. Worth remembering is the rule on _______________ which provides in part that…

13. Decisive on the matter is the pertinent provision of the (i.e. Law on Property)

14. The law prescribes certain rules on…

15. By legislative fiat…
QUOTING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
1. The Supreme Court in one case, had the occasion to rule that…

  1.  In a long-line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, it has always been (consistently) held that…

3. In a litany of cases decided by the Supreme Court,

4. In a long-string of cases decided by the highest court of the land,

5. According to several cases decided by the Supreme Court,…

6. In a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court,

* Do not use the words series, litany or long-line

if there is only one decision/jurisprudence for that topic.

  1.  In one case decided by the highest court of the land, it was held that

8. In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that

  1.  It has been said that…

10. In a recent case, the Supreme Court has laid to rest the issue of whether or not…
11. It is well settled in this jurisdiction…

12. It is well settled in this country…

13. The Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine which states that

14. In a case with similar facts, the Supreme Court ruled that…

15. In several notable Supreme Court decisions, the highest court declared that…
16. The Supreme Court has often stressed that…

17. In the landmark case of _____________, (if the case is so famous) the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine which substantially provides that…

18. In the leading case of …

19. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in one case,…

20. The court has repeatedly ruled…

21. A case in point is a case already decided by no other than the highest court of the land, where the Supreme Court held that…

22. There is likewise an array of cases in this jurisdiction where the Supreme Court has consistently declared that…

23. Deeply rooted is the jurisprudence which provides that…

24. In one case, the Supreme Court was emphatic when it ruled that….
EMPHASIZING CASE DOCTRINES / JURISPRUDENCE 
1. It is hornbook doctrine in (i.e. Civil Law) that…

  1.  Immortal is the rule that…

3. Well settled is the rule…

  1.   Well entrenched is the principle that..

5. Elementary is the rule that..

6. The cardinal rule in (i.e. labor law) is that

7. It is a familiar canon in (i.e. political law) that

  1.  By well settled public law…
  2.  Basic is the rule in (i.e. Criminal Law)…

10. It is an elementary principle in…

11. It is a fundamental doctrine in…

12. Well accepted is the rule that…

13. It is axiomatic in (i.e. Civil Law) that

14. Enshrined in the 1987 Constitution is the rule that (i.e. no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or Property without due process of law)

15. Consonant with the rule on…

16. It is a recognized doctrine in (i.e. Civil law) that…

17. It is a basic tenet in (i.e. Commercial Law)

18. Consistent with current jurisprudence

19. It is a legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that (i.e. official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. The burden of proving irregularity in official conduct is on the part of the petitioners.)

20. It is an oft-repeated rule that…

21. The Philippines adhere to the principle of…
REFERRING BACK TO THE CASE (correlating the facts with the law/jurisprudence)
Note: In my personal opinion, it is not proper to use the statements “in the case at
bench” or “in the case at bar” when answering. Although I guess it is very tempting
because it sounds good and professional to state, “in the case at bar/bench”, we must
not forget that the cases given in the Bar are only theoretical. The statements “in the
case at bench” and “in the case at bar” are more appropriately used in pleadings in
court. After all, you can use the statements “In the instant case, In the facts given, Inthe problem given and In the question presented.”
1. Applying the said law/doctrine in the instant case,

  1.  From the facts given, noteworthy is the …
  2.  From the facts of the case, it is readily observable that…
  3.  In the instant case, it may be observed that…
  4.  It is crystal clear from the facts presented that (i.e. the crime of treason) is present (or was committed).
  5.   In the present case, it is immediately noticeable that the element of __________ is wanting (or lacking).
  6.  Under the circumstances, the proper remedy would be…
  7.  The case obtaining indicates a case of (i.e. B.P. 22)
  8.  It logically follows…

10. It goes without saying…

  1.  Even assuming arguendo, for the sake of argument that…

12. The situation in the case at hand…

13. The situation presented evinces a case of…

14. The facts sufficiently indicated …

15. In the given facts, it is immediately apparent that…

16. It is evident that…

17. In the same token…

18. Under the facts stated in the problem,…

19. In the case under consideration,…
20. Worth stressing is the fact that
21. Worth emphasizing is the fact that
22. The facts would reveal that…
23. A careful perusal of the facts of the case would reveal that…
24. A careful scrutiny of the actuations of the accused would reveal that…
25. A careful reading of the (i.e. Deed of Absolute Sale) would reveal that…
26. A cursory examination of the…
ANSWERING IN THE POSITIVE

1. The petition is meritorious.
2. The contention has legal basis.
3. The case will prosper.
4. The argument is proper.
5. The provision is perfectly applicable.
6. The action is tenable.
7. The motion should be granted.
8. The Judge is correct.
9. The petition is impressed with merit.
10. Yes. It is a (i.e. patent violation) of the
11. There is merit in the petition.
12. The petitioner’s contention is sustainable.
ANSWERING IN THE NEGATIVE

  1.  The contention does not hold water.
  2.  With all due respect to the judge, his decision is apparently erroneous or is not in accord with law and existing jurisprudence.
  3.  The contention is totally misplaced.
  4.  It is now too late in the day to raise the issue of…
  5.  The petition is not meritorious.
  6.  The evidence presented deserves scant consideration.
  7.  The contention has no legal basis.
  8.  The argument is bereft of merit.
  9.  The petition is devoid of merit.

10. Petitioner’s reliance on the (i.e. doctrine of…) is inappropriate. The doctrine of … does not apply in cases where / of…

11. It is a futile gesture on the part of the respondent to invoke the rule on…

12. The theory/argument has no ground to stand upon.

13. The contention has no leg with which to stand on.

14. The position of the petitioner runs counter with the doctrine of…

15. The case will not prosper.

16. The case is not tenable.

17. The act of the accused in… is of no moment.

18. The assertion lacks substance.

19. The decision is erroneous.

20. The court cannot countenance the (i.e. inconsistent postures of the petitioner)

21. The testimony that…, cannot be given credence.

22. The evidence presented has no probative value.

23. The allegation is belied by the fact that…

24. To put it otherwise would be to render the law on _____________ useless/futile.

25. The actuations of the accused in (i.e. fleeing and hiding) negates (i.e. innocence)

26. While it is true that _______________ is a (i.e. constitutional guaranteed right of a person), it does

not, however mean…

27. It is not correct to say that…

28. It is not proper to state that…

29. It is not accurate to conclude outright that…

30. A contrary conclusion would erode the rule that provides in part that…

31. To sustain the contention would be to render the law on ____________ nugatory.
32. It would be absurd and incongruous to sustain the argument that…

33. It is not enough that…

34. The fact that … is immaterial since…

35. The fact that … is irrelevant since…

36. In itself, mere …… is not sufficient (i.e. to warrant conviction)….

37. The petitioner cannot give any additional meaning to the clear and plain language of the law.
38. The Supreme Court, in several cases, has struck down the (i.e. defense of alibi)

39. The attendant circumstances of the case are contrary to the petitioner’s assertion.
40. The evidence does not support the theory of the petitioners.

41. There is no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the (i.e. Court of Appeals)

42. The claim for (i.e. moral damages) must necessarily fail.

43. The (i.e. respondent) cannot rely on (i.e. mere alibis) to aid his cause.
CONCLUDING WORDS 
 

1. From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered/deduced that,…

2. Taken all together,…

3. Finally, …

4. Hence, …

5. Therefore, …

6. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that there is really (i.e. a violation of…)

7. From the foregoing, it is now safe to conclude that….

8. Lastly, …

9. Consequently,…

10. As a necessary consequence…

11. The logical implication is that…

12. At any rate,…

13. In view of the foregoing,…

14. As an inevitable conclusion,…

15. In the light of the circumstances,…

16. Undoubtedly,…

17. Indubitably,…

18. Clearly, the case at hand falls squarely within the purview of…

19. Verily, he/she has committed…

20. For this/these reason/s, it is unavoidable to conclude that…

21. Based on the facts obtaining,…

22. In this light,…

23. This being the case…

24. Clearly therefore, applying the aforecited ruling in the case at hand,…

25. In light of the foregoing, it is beyond cavil (doubt) that,…

26. There is no doubt that…

27. To the unprejudiced mind, the actuations of the three, when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion except that (i.e. conspiracy among them existed)

28. Inescapably, therefore,…

29. All things considered,…

30. It follows therefore that…

31. As a logical result…

32. In sum,..

33. In view of the fact that…,

34. All told,…

35. Given the prevailing facts…

36. Having stated the foregoing premises,…

37. One final point,…

38. Accordingly,…

 
MY PERSONAL ADVICE FOR FUTURE BAR CANDIDATES DURING THE REVIEW 
· Always pray before and after studying.

· Turn off your cellular phones. (Turn it on only during your break). Most or a significant part of our time reviewing is sometimes spent on non-sense (or not so important) texting-replying-texting-replying. There is a time for everything. But when you review, avoid interruptions. Cellular phone, believe me, is one of the major interruptions. Although it is hard, why not sacrifice a little for the sake of being a lawyer.

· Believe in yourself. If you will not, then who do you expect would believe in you. (Tip from Sir Bubut Cayco)
· Choose a study buddy if you want. But sometimes it is better that you do

not have one. More study buddies, more interruptions (more kwento). Without you knowing it, “tapos na araw or September na”.

· Before starting your review, be sure that the tension has already subsided. (Specifically starting the month of July when tensions really soars high for most Bar candidates) Bear in mind that we can comprehend more if we are in a relaxed state of mind.

· Set your own pace. Do not compare your pace with others (like asking others, “ilang reading ka na?”) This is not a rat race. Quality reading(studying/reviewing actually) is what is needed. Bar does not dwell on the amount of pages/books you have read, it is more of how much you have mastered.

· Do not memorize without comprehending. When mental block occurs, you cannot recall even a single thing. Moreover, in applying the law in a given theoretical case problem, for sure you can hardly answer the same if you have memorized without understanding.

· Do not highlight the entire reviewer . Sometimes, the problem with highlighting is that it becomes our security blanket that we have read and understood what we have read. But more often, we have not.
· When you have a query or some matters in mind that needs clarification, just write it in a piece of paper, pag marami na, ask it to a professor you believe is competent in that field. Don’t ask your co-barristers. It might only end in a debate and waste of time, when no reliable answer is concluded. Remember, time is precious during the pre-bar review.

· Set one day for recreations alone. It could rejuvenate your energy and create hunger for review the following day.

· Attend to the needs of your entire being. Physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually. This will also help you avoid being exhausted in the review.

· Take vitamins and take your meals on time.
BEFORE THE BAR EXAM PROPER 
· Make sure you have enough and complete sleep. A well rested mind can answer and articulate better.
· Pray

· Review the material you personally believe is a good last minute tip for you.

· Compose yourself, your mind, heart and spirit. Focus on the exam alone and not on the fear of failing. Stop or reduce your tension. Tension is normal, as long as it is at a moderate level. After all, you will already be taking the bar, no turning back. So might as well do your best. And you can only perform well if you are in a composed mind and heart. (I suggest you close your eyes. Inhale then exhale as you count one to ten. It might help)

· Boost your confidence by telling yourself “Walang (your surname) na di magaling.” Or tell yourself “What kind of celebration will I do if I top or at least pass

the bar?” at least you might laugh kahit kabado .
DURING THE BAR EXAM PROPER 
· I suggest that before answering, formulate on your mind what will be placed on your first, second and third paragraphs. The first paragraph normally contains a one-sentence direct to the point answer to the question. The second paragraph commonly contains legal basis (provision of law in point, jurisprudence, co-relation of the jurisprudence/provision with the facts of the case and application).Third paragraph normally contains the conclusion. When you are already decided of your answer, write it according to your thoughts. In this approach, you will not only be avoiding unnecessary revisions and erasures, you will also maintain the cleanliness of your booklet. Bear in mind that, a dirty booklet is irritating to the eyes of the person checking the same.

· Allocate the time depending on the number of questions.

· Answer each question one at a time. Focus on one question before thinking or bothering yourself of the succeeding questions.

· Do not stay in a number for so long. Leave at least a sheet for a 5point question. Go to the next number if you do not know the answer. If I am not mistaken, more than one (1) bar candidate had not succeeded because of stocking himself / herself in an item he/she does not know the answer of. As a necessary result, he/she failed to finish the exam. As one of my friends told me, “No matter how grossly wrong your answer may be, do not ever leave an item unanswered. Malay mo, may points for the effort/ink .Kidding aside, a blank sheet will surely get an automatic 0 point. So better answer all.”

· Don’t blame yourself or don’t panic if you failed to answer an item or two. It’s perfectly normal. What is abnormal is if you failed to answer questions that you know the answer of just because you bothered/blamed yourself so much on the items you don’t know. In short, if you failed to finish the exam.
· As my professor Atty. Francis Sababan told us before, “mga bata, avoid passing your booklet too early. The time allocated for each subject may be too much, but it must be used wisely to: (1) write legibly, (2) compose your answers properly, (3) avoid erasures, (4) observe proper margin, and (5) review your answers. After all there are no prizes for early finishers.”
AFTER A BAR SUBJECT (OR ENTIRE BAR EXAM) 
· Do not discuss answers. It is futile because the booklets had already been submitted and it could greatly affect your performance for the remaining subjects. If your noble reason on asking about the answers is for you to know the same, I suggest that you wait until the exam results have been already released. For self-preservation reasons, for sure you will be anxious and fearful if you would discover that you have incurred (just for example) 10 mistakes.
IMPORTANT REMINDER IN ANSWERING 
If you are so sure of the answer, you can directly answer yes or no. But if you are just guessing or not so sure of the answer, you better start citing law provisions and jurisprudence first. 
Logic behind: If you answer yes or no and it happened to be wrong, chances are, you will get an automatic ZERO (0) for that item. The examiner might not read your answer anymore. Come to think of it, it would be a waste of his time reading explanation of a wrong answer. Besides, there are so many booklets to check.
On the other hand, if you cite the law provisions and jurisprudence first, even though your yes or no answer placed in the last paragraph/sentence is wrong, you might get some credit. (The examiner might say, “may alam tong batang to, nalito lang”). Finally, at least, the examiner has read all your answer and explanation before grading you for that item.
CARDINAL RULES IN TAKING THE BAR 
. Do not forget your test permits, Supreme Court color coded Identification card, and other pertinent documents/things as required in the letter coming from the SC allowing you to take the Bar.
. Bring a watch with you to keep you updated of the time left.

. Never be tempted to cheat.

. Keep your focus.

. Carefully read and comprehend the instructions and questions.

. Answer one at a time.

. Answer straight to the point. Be responsive to the question. Answer only what is being asked. Though it is tempting to showcase your knowledge, do not over-elaborate.

. Avoid erasures.

. Do not hurry at the expense of substance (and readability) of your answers.

. Leave a space before starting a new paragraph.

. Review your answers. Scan your booklet before submitting the same. Be sure you have not left any question unanswered.

. Bring extra sign/fountain pens.

. Observe proper margin.
DISCLAIMER!!!

This is only a guide material and will not and cannot assure anyone of passing or even topping the BAR. What is assured only is that it will greatly facilitate the candidates’ presentation of his/her answers.

——–GO O D LUCK! ! ! ——

Atty. Reynulfo C. Tatad, Jr.

September 2006 Bar Exam Passer

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 5, 2013

2012 Bar Exams Results


According to a Supreme Court insider, the results for the 2012 Bar Examinations shall be out on March 22nd 2013, a Friday. Oath-taking shall be on the 24th of April, at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC).

More than 5,000 graduates from Law schools nationwide trooped to the Pontifical University of Santo Tomas in the four Sundays of October 2012 and hurdled the grueling examinations, touted as the most difficult national professional licensure examination in the Philippines.

298x224xsupreme-court-logo-298x224.jpg.pagespeed.ic.7zpczZ4lW4

courtesy of newsinfo.inquirer.net

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | April 4, 2012

REMEDIAL LAW QUIZ #4


Please click the box/link below to get started. Get 8 out of 10 correct answers to pass. Have fun!

 

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 31, 2012

REMEDIAL LAW QUIZ #3


Please click the box/link below to get started. Get 8 out of 10 in order to pass. Have fun!

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 30, 2012

REMEDIAL LAW QUIZ #2


 

Please click the box/link below to get started. Get 8/10 correct answers to pass. Good luck!

 

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 30, 2012

REMEDIAL LAW QUIZ #1


 

Please the box/link below to get started. Passing rate is 75%. Good luck!

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 29, 2012

CIVIL LAW QUIZ #2


CLICK THE LINK BELOW TO GET STARTED

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 29, 2012

CIVIL LAW QUIZ #1


CLICK THE LINK BELOW TO GET STARTED

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | March 23, 2012

Bar Topnotchers 2010-2020


Rank Name School Rate
2010
1 Caesario Antonio S. Singzon AdMU 89.00
2 Filemon Ray L. Javier AdMU 86.95
3 Paolo Carlo C. Tolentino AU 86.80
4 Janette R. Ancog AdMU 85.90
5 Johana T. Sunga AdMU 85.85
6 Krizelle Marie F. Poblacion UP 85.65
7 Ma. Christina C. Ortua UP 85.05
  Krystal Lyn T. Uy UP 85.05
8 Joanna Eileen M. Capones UP 84.80
9 William Benson S. Gan AdMU 84.75
10 Glenn C. Carampatana USC 84.55
  Darren L. Salipsip AU 84.55
2011
1 Raoul Angelo D. Atadero AdMU 85.53
2 Luz Danielle O. Bolong AdMU 84.55
3 Cherry Liez O. Rafal-Roble AU 84.45
4 Rosemil R. Banaga NDU 84.12
5 Christian Louie C. Gonzales UST 84.09
6 Ivan M. Bandal SU 84.09
7 Eireene Xina M. Acosta SBC 84.06
8 Irene Marie P. Qua AdMU 84.05
9 Elaine Marie G. Laceda FEU 84.04
10 Rodolfo Q. Aquino SBC 83.72
2012
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2013
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2014
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Posted by: Elmer Brabante | July 16, 2011

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER (PDF)


Please click the link below. When another screen pulls up instead of the file, click the link “CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER” therein as well and wait for the download to complete.

CONSOLIDATED CRIMINAL LAW REVIEWER

This personal reviewer had been published with the implied understanding that no commercial transaction is intended.  Any hard copy nor pdf  copy emailed for sale is not authorized. Please beware of any poseur.

Please do not be deceived by any seller such as a certain networkingboys who sells, among others, this reviewer. An ad appears at sulit.com.

LINK TO THE AD

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | June 12, 2011

Consolidated Reviewer in Remedial Law (PDF)


Click the link below. When a new window pulls up, click the link anew to go to the file.

ELMER’S REMEDIAL LAW REVIEWER 2011

 

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | June 1, 2011

Reviewer in Criminal Procedure


 PART III.

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rules 110 – 127

 General Matters

Requisites for exercise of criminal jurisdiction

 

  1. The court is clothed with jurisdiction over the offense by virtue of the imposable penalty and its nature; and

  2. The action has been filed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

 

Jurisdiction of Criminal courts

Court

Original

Exclusive Appellate

Supreme Court

Exclusive:Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the CA and Sandiganbayan.

Concurrent:

a) with CA: petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against RTC;

b) with CA and RTC: petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts;

c) with Sandiganbayan: petitions for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and ancillary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

By Appeal:a) from the RTC in all criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion;

b) Automatic review where death penalty is imposed.

By Petition for Review on Certiorari:

a) from the Court of Appeals;

b) from the Sandiganbayan;

c) from the RTC where only an error or question of law is involved.

Court of Appeals

Exclusive:Actions for annulment of judgments of the RTC

Concurrent:

a) with the SC: petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against RTC;

b) with SC and RTC: petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts.

By Appeal:From the RTC in cases commenced therein, except those appealable to the SC or the Sandiganbayan;

By Petition for Review:

From the RTC in cases appealed thereto from the lower courts and not appealable to the Sandiganbayan

Sandiganbayan

Exclusive:a) Violations of RA 3019, as amended, RA 1379, and bribery and corruption offenses under the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees mentioned in Sec. 4[a], PD 1606, as amended by RA 7075;

b) Criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,

By Appeal:

 

a) from the RTC in cases under PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, whether or not the cases were decided b them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdictions;

 

Regional Trial Courts

All criminal cases which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body.

All cases decided by lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Original:a) Violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions;

b) All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine, and in all cases of damage to property through criminal negligence, regardless of other penalties and the civil liabilities arising therefrom; and

c) All offenses (except violations of RA 3019, RA 1379 and Arts. 210 to 212, RPC) committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in GOCCs, and by private individuals charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years or where none of the accused holds a position of salary Grade 27 and higher.

Summary Procedure

a) Traffic violations;

b) Violations of the rental law;

c) Violations of city or municipal ordinances; and

d) All other offenses where the penalty does not exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P1,000 fine, irrespective of other penalties or civil liabilities arising therefrom, and in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.

 

 

When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution

 

(1) General Rule: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction.

(2) Exceptions:

  1. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

  2. Then necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

  3. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;

  4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

  5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

  6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

  7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

  8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

  9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

  10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; and

  11. To prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990).

 

Prosecution of Offenses Rule 110)

Criminal actions, how instituted

(1) Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.

(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor, unless otherwise provided in their charters.

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws (Sec. 1).

  1. Preliminary investigation is required for offenses punishable by at least 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day, unless the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant, in which case, an inquest must have been conducted (Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 112).

Who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio 

All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.

The offenses of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.

The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offenses mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party.

The prosecution of complaints for violation of special laws shall be governed by their provisions thereof (Sec. 5).

Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code refers to crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio: These are private crimes, namely:

  1. Adultery and concubinage – to be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse, impleading both guilty parties, if both alive, unless he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders;

  2. Seduction, abduction, or acts or lasciviousness – to be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, unless expressly pardoned by the above named persons (in such stated order);

  3. Defamation – to be prosecuted at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party (Art. 360, RPC).

 

Criminal actions, when enjoined

Control of prosecution

  1. Whenever a criminal case is prosecuted and the State is the offended party, the case must always be prosecuted under control and guidance of the State through the government prosecutors. Whenever there is acquittal or dismissal of the case and the private complainant intends to question such acquittal or dismissal, the same must likewise be undertaken by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may question such acquittal or dismissal or appeal therefrom only insofar as the civil aspect is concerned, in the name of the petitioner or appellant and not in the name of the People of the Philippines (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Veridiano II, 360 SCRA 359).

  2. The prosecution determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. It is basically the prosecutor’s function to determine what degree of complicity to the commission of a crime a person should be charged with, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory (People vs. Pajo, 348 SCRA 493).

  3. The rule that the Solicitor General is the lawyer of the People in appellate courts admits an exception, namely, that which is provided for in RA 8249, which states in part that “in all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and fro the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to EO 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.”

 

Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

  1. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states:

(a) The name of the accused;

(b) The designation of the offense given by the statute;

(c) The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

(d) The name of the offended party;

(e) The approximate date of the commission of the offense; and

(f) The place wherein the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information (Sec. 6).

  1. If the prosecutor refuses to include one accused, the remedy is mandamus. The procedure for state witness allows for initial inclusion of the accused in the information.

 

Designation of Offense

  1. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it (Sec. 8).

 

Cause of the Accusation

  1. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment (Sec. 9).

 

Duplicity of the Offense; Exception

  1. A complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13).

  2. Exception: The law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses, such as in continuing and complex crimes.

 

Amendment or Substitution of complaint or information

  1. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial (Sec. 14).

  1. The test as to whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information (People vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236).

  2. Amendment and substitution distinguished:

  1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes; substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

  2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court; substitution of information must be with leave of court, as the original information has to be dismissed;

  3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

  4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge; hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. Substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy (Teehankee vs. Madayag, 207 SCRA 685).

  5. In substitution under the second paragraph of Sec. 14, where the new information charges an offense distinct and different from the one initially charged, due to mistake in charging the proper offense, there is need for a new preliminary investigation and another arraignment (People vs. Jaralba, 226 SCRA 602).

 

Venue of criminal actions

  1. Place where action is to be instituted:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where said train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed (Sec. 15).

 

Intervention of offended party

  1. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense (Sec. 16).

 

Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111)

Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action 

  1. The general rule is that the institution or filing of the criminal action includes the institution therein of the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged, except in the following cases:

  1. The offended party waives the civil action;

  2. He reserves his right to institute the civil action separately; or

  3. He institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.The exception to the reservation requirement is a claim arising out of a dishonored check under BP 22, where no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed, which means that the filing of the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action and that unless a separate civil action has been filed before the institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal action has been filed as the same has been included therein.

  1. Another instance where no reservation shall be allowed and where a civil action filed prior to the criminal action has to be transferred to the subsequently filed criminal action for joint hearing is a claim arising from an offense which is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

 

When civil action may proceed independently

 

  1. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action (Sec. 3).

  2. Civil Code provisions on the matter:

 

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

 

When separate civil action is suspended

 

  1. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which civil liability may arise did not exist (Sec. 2).

 

(2) Effect of criminal action on separate civil action

  1. If criminal action has been commenced earlier – separate civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

  2. If the criminal action is filed after the separate civil action has already been instituted –

Civil action suspended, in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits, until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.

Civil action may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action

Evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action

Without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and the parties to present additional evidence.

The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

  1. During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

 

Effect of the death of accused or convict on civil action

 

  1. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased (Sec. 4).

 

Rule 3, Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

Rule 3, Sec. 20. Action on contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

Rule 87, Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. – No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Rule 39, Sec. 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of the death of party, execution may issue or be enforced in the following manner:

(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the application of his executor or administrator, or successor in interest;

(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his executor or administrator or successor in interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of real or personal property, or the enforcement of the lien thereon;

(c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment obligation, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.

 

Prejudicial Question

 

  1. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests (Sec. 6).

  2. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 7).

  3. General Rule: Criminal action takes precedence of civil actions.

Exceptions:

independent civil actions

prejudicial question

Even a preliminary investigation may be suspended by a prejudicial question.

To suspend a criminal action, the move to suspend should be filed before the prosecution rests.

  1. Prejudicial question which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said cases, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Lu Hayco vs. CA, Aug. 26, 1985).

  2. The test in determining the existence of a prejudicial question: It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused (Yap vs. Paras, GR 101236, Jan. 30, 1992).

  3. A prejudicial question can be interposed at the Office of the Prosecutor, but;

  1. The question can also be raised in court;

  2. If raised, the court should merely suspend the criminal case;

  3. The court must wait for a motion, otherwise, that is a waiver;

  4. The court cannot motu propio suspend the criminal case (Yap vs. Paras, supra).

  1. A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit (NIñal vs. Badayog, GR 133778, March 14, 2000).

 

Rule on Filing Fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action

 

  1. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages. Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages (Sec. 1).

 

Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112)

 

 

Nature of right

 

  1. The preliminary investigation as defined in Sec. 1 is the preliminary investigation proper, which is not a judicial function, but a part of the prosecution’s job, a function of the executive. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information (Paderanga vs. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86).

  2. The right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional grant; it is merely statutory and may be invoked only when specifically created by statute (People vs. Carlos, 78 Phili. 535). While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial of a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration of some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right…to deny petitioner’s claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process (Go vs. CA, 206 SCRA 138).

  3. Preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, although the prosecutor, in the discharge of such function, is a quasi-judicial authority tasked to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.

  4. The right to preliminary investigation may be waived by the accused either expressly or impliedly. The posting of a bond by the accused constitutes such a waiver, such that even if the warrant was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it is cured when the accused submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail (In Re: Letter of Freddie Manuel, 54 SCAD 97, Aug. 4, 1994). It is also cured by submitting himself to arraignment (People vs. Hubilo, 220 SCRA 389).

 

Purposes of preliminary investigation

 

  1. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial (Sec. 1).

  2. The basic purpose of preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 52 SCAD 516 , June 17, 1994).

  3. Generally, preliminary investigation has a three-fold purpose:

  1. To inquire concerning the commission of crime and the connection of accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime charged against him, and if there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the state may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial;

  2. To preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the state; and

  3. To determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable (Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 540 [1969]).

 

Who may conduct determination of existence of probable cause

 

  1. On basis of the evidence before him, the investigating office must decide whether to dismiss the case or to file the information in court. This involves the determination of probable cause. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the municipal trial judge or prosecutor conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (Ortiz vs. Palaypayon, 234 SCRA 391).

  2. The Court has maintained the policy of non-interference in the determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutor powers of prosecutors upon practicality as well (Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 303 SCRA 309).

  3. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation:

  1. Provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants:

  2. National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

  3. Other officers as may be authorized by law (COMELEC, PCGG, Ombudsman)

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions (Sec. 2, as amended by AM 05-8-26-SC, Oct. 3, 2005).

 

Resolution of investigation prosecutor

 

  1. If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If, upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in the preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman (Sec. 4).

 

Review

 

  1. A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power to direct and control criminal actions. He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice, which the latter may exercise motu propio or upon petition of the proper party. In reviewing resolutions of state prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court (Joaquin, Jr. vs. Drilon, 302 SCRA 225).

  2. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors, and may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Supervision and control include the authority to act directly whenever specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials. Sec. 37 of RA 3783 provides that any specific power, authority, duty, function or activity entrusted to a chief of a bureau, office, division or service shall be understood as also conferred upon the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679).

 

When warrant of arrest may issue

 

(1) (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. – A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction (Sec. 5, as amended by AM 05-8-26-SC).

 

Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation

 

  1. No preliminary investigation is required in the following cases:

(a) If filed with the prosecutor. – If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within (10) days from its filing.

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. – If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of the said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest (Sec. 8).

Remedies of accused if there was no preliminary investigation

 

  1. One remedy if there was no preliminary investigation is to hold in abeyance the proceedings and order the prosecutor to hold preliminary investigation (Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, April 7, 1993).

  2. Section 7, last paragraph thereof, provides that if the case has been conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing ask for a preliminary investigation. The five-day period to file the motion for preliminary investigation is mandatory, and an accused is entitled to ask for preliminary investigation by filing the motion within the said period. The failure to file the motion within the five-day period amounts to a waiver of the right to ask for preliminary investigation. Apart from such waiver, posting bail without previously or simultaneously demanding for a preliminary investigation justifies denial of the motion for investigation (People vs. CA, 242 SCRA 645).

 

Arrest (Rule 113)

  1. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec 1).

 

Arrest, how made

  1. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. No violence or unnecessary force shall he used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention (Sec. 2).

 

Arrest without warrant, when lawful

(1) A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112 (Sec. 5).

 

Method of arrest

  1. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. – When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable (Sec. 7). 

  1. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. – When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest (Sec. 8).

  1. Method of arrest by private person. – When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest (Sec. 9).

 

Requisites of a valid warrant of arrest

  1. (1) Requisites for arrest warrant issued by a RTC judge under Sec. 5, Rule 112:

    1. Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information

    2. The judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.

    3. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest

    4. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause

      1. The judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice; and

      2. The issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint of information.

  1. (2) Requisites for issuing search warrant under Sec. 4, Rule 126:

    1. It must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense;

    2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;

    3. In the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witness he may produce; and

    4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

 

Determination of Probable Cause for issuance of warrant of arrest

  1. It is the judge alone who determines the probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain (People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 788).

 

Distinguish probable cause of fiscal from that of a judge

  1. The determination by the prosecutor of probable cause is for the purpose of either filing an information in court or dismissing the charges against the respondent, which is an executive function. The determination by the judge of probable cause begins only after the prosecutor has filed the information in court and the latter’s determination of probable cause is for the purpose of issuing an arrest warrant against the accused, which is judicial function (People vs. CA, 301 SCRA 475).

  2. Probable cause to hold a person for trial refers to the finding of the investigating prosecutor after the conduct of a preliminary investigation, that there is sufficient ground to hold a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Based on such finding, the investigating prosecutor files the corresponding complaint or information in the competent court against the accused. The determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is a judicial function. A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she believes honestly that there is no probable cause for doing so (People vs. CA, 102 SCAD 375, Jan. 21, 1999).

 

Bail (Rule 114)

Nature

  1. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required (Sec. 13, Art. III, The Constitution).

  2. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance (Sec. 1).

  3. Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appear before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him. It is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction (Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1. Its main purpose is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and secure his appearance at the trial (Paderanga vs. CA, 247 SCRA 741).

  4. The person seeking provisional release need not wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to all persons where the offense is bailable, so long as the applicant is in the custody of the law (Paderanga vs. CA, 247 SCRA 741).

  5. Kinds of bail:

  1. Corporate bond — one issued by a corporation licensed to provide bail subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer duly authorized by its board of directors (Sec. 10).

  2. Property bond — an undertaking constituted as a lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bond (Sec. 11).

  3. Recognizance — an obligation of record entered into usually by the responsible members of the community before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual act being to assure the appearance of the accused for trial (People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566).

  4. Cash deposit — the money deposited by the accused or any person acting on his behalf, with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Considered as bail, it may be applied to the payment of any fees and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit (Sec. 14).

When a matter of right; exceptions

  1. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment (Sec. 4, Rule 114).

  2. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proccedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue (Govt. of Hongkong vs. Olalia, GR 153675, April 19, 2007).

  3. Bail is a matter of right before final conviction, but the rule is not absolute. The exception is when a person is charged with a capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong, or when the offense for which on is charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The exception to this rule, however, is even if a person is charged with a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong, if the accused has failing health, hence, for humanitarian reasons, he may be admitted to bail, but that is discretionary on the part of the court (De La Ramos vs. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461; Catiis vs. CA, 487 SCRA 71).

When a matter of discretion

  1. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case (Sec. 5, Rule 114).

  1. Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal (Sec. 17[a]).

  2. The discretion lies in the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. If it is determined that it is not strong, then bail is a matter of right. There is no more discretion of the court in denying the bail, the moment there is a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

Hearing of application for bail in capital offenses

  1. A bail application in capital offense does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. Accordingly, the prosecution must be given ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, because, by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. Though not absolute nor beyond control, the discretion within reasonable bounds (People vs. Antona, GR 137681, Jan. 31, 2002).

  2. A hearing in an application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. In receiving evidence on bail, while a court is not required to try the merits of the case, he must nevertheless conduct a summary hearing which is “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of the bail (In re complaint against Judge Elma, AM RTJ-94-1183, Feb. 8, 1994).

  3. A judge should not hear a petition for bail in capital offenses on the same day that the petition was filed. He should give the prosecution a reasonable time within which to oppose the same. Neither is he supposed to grant bail solely on the belief that the accused will not flee during the pendency of the case by reason of the fact that he had even voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. Voluntary surrender is merely a mitigating circumstance in decreasing the penalty that may eventually be imposed upon the accused in case of conviction but is not a ground for granting bail to an accused charged with a capital offense (Sule vs. Judge Bitgeng, 60 SCAD 341,April 18, 1995).

Guidelines in fixing amount of bail

(1) The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

Excessive bail shall not be required (Sec. 9).

Bail when not required

  1. No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.

When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.

A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court (Sec. 16).

Increase or Reduction of Bail

  1. After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody (Sec. 20).

Forfeiture and Cancellation of bail

(1) When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted (Sec. 21).

  1. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail (Sec. 22).

Application not a bar to objections in illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

  1. The posting of the bail does not constitute a waiver of any question on the irregularity attending the arrest of person. He can still question the same before arraignment, otherwise, the right to question it is deeme3d waived. It was also said that posting bail is deemed to be a forfeiture of a habeas corpus petition which becomes moot and academic (Arriba vs. People. `07 SCRA 191; Bagcal vs. Villaroza, 120 SCRA 525).

  2. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case (Sec. 26).

  3. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender (Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCAD 369). an accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In Lavides vs. CA, 324 SCRA 321, it was held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should be understood in the light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. It was explained that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 148468-69, 149116, Jan. 28, 2003).

Hold Departure Order & Bureau of Immigration Watchlist

  1. Supreme Court Cir. No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997 limits the authority to issue hold departure orders to the RTCs in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, MTC judges have no authority to issue hold-departure orders, following the maxim, express mention implies the exclusion. Neither does he have authority to cancel one which he issued (Huggland vs. Lantin, AM MTJ-98-1153, Feb. 29, 2000).

  2. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Where it appears that the accused had the propensity to evade or disobey lawful orders, the issuance of a hold departure order is warranted (Santos vs. CA, 116 SCAD 575, Dec. 3, 1999).

  3. The fact that the accused surreptitiously left for Hongkong, after getting a clearance for purposes of leaving the country but without permission of the trial court, and thereafter could not return for trial as she was imprisoned in Hongkong for a criminal offense, does not relieve the bondsman of liability.

 

Rights of the Accused (Rule115)

Rights of accused at the trial

(1) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law (Sec. 1).

 

Rights of persons under Custodial Investigation

  1. The rights of an accused person under in-custody investigation are expressly enumerated in Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution, viz:

  1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel;

  2. No torture, force, violence, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited;

  3. Any confession or admission in violation of this or Sec. 17 (Self-Incrimination Clause) hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him;

  4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation to aid rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practice, and their families.

  1. Under RA 7834, the following are the rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation:

  1. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel;

  2. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer;

  3. The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever;

  4. Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding;

  5. Any waiver by person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect;

  6. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by his or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by his counsel, or by any national NGO duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person’s “immediate family” shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece and guardian or ward.

  1. Three rights are made available by Sec. 12(1):

  1. The right to remain silent — Under the right against self-incrimination in Sec. 17, only an accused has the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an accused may assume the stance of silence only when asked an incriminatory question. Under Sec. 12, however, a person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be used against him (People vs. Alegre and Gordoncillo, 94 SCRA 109);

  2. The right to counsel — Example of those who are not impartial counsel are (1) Special counsel, private or public prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is adverse to that of the accused; (2) a mayor, unless the accused approaches him as counselor or adviser; (3) a barangay captain; (4) any other whose interest may be adverse to that of the accused (People vs. Tomaquin, GR 133188, July 23, 2004);

  3. The right to be informed o his rights — the right guaranteed here is more than what is shown in television shows where the police routinely reads out the rights from a note card; he must also explain their effects in practical terms (People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169). Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot then truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).

  1. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to custodial investigation begins only when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements (Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478; People vs. Marra, 236 SCRA 565). It should be noted however, however, that although the scope of the constitutional right is limited to the situation in Escobedo and Marra, RA 7438 has extended the guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning (People vs. Dumantay, GR 130612, May 11, 1999; People vs. Principe, GR 135862, May 2, 2002).

 

Arraignment and Plea (Rule 116)

  1. Arraignment is the formal mode of implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

  2. Some rules on arraignment:

  1. Trial in absentia is allowed only after arraignment;

  2. Judgment is generally void if the accused has not been arraigned;

  3. There can be no arraignment in absentia;

  4. If the accused went to trial without arraignment, but his counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and after prosecution, he was arraigned, the defect was cured (People vs. Atienza, 86 Phil. 576).

  1. Arraignment is important because it is the mode of implementing the constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, and to fix the identity of the accused. It is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed and the right to speedy trial (Lumanlaw vs. Peralta, 482 SCRA 396).

 

Arraignment and Plea, how made

  1. Section 1, Rule 116 provides:

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.

(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.

(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment.

(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea-bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.

 

When should plea of NOT GUILTY be entered

  1. At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty (Sec. 5).

  2. A plea of “not guilty” should be entered where

  1. The accused so pleaded;

  2. When he refuses to plead;

  3. Where in admitting the act charged, he sets up matters of defense or with a lawful justification;

  4. When he enters a conditional plea of guilt;

  5. Where, after a plea of guilt, he introduces evidence of self-defense or other exculpatory circumstances ; and

  6. When the plea is indefinite or ambiguous (US vs. Kelly, 35 Phil 419; People vs. Sabilul, 93 Phil. 567; People vs. Balisacan; People vs. Stron, L-38626, Mar. 14, 1975).

 

When may accused enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense

  1. At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary (Sec. 2).

  2. An accused can enter a plea to a lesser offense if there is consent of the other party and the prosecutor. If he did so without the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor and he was convicted, his subsequent conviction in the crime charged would not place him in dhouble jeopardy. It has been held that the accused can still plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution has rested (People vs. Villarama, Jr., 210 SCRA 246; People vs. Luna, 174 SCRA 204). It is further required that the offense to which he pleads must be necessarily included in the offense charged (Sec. 2).

 

Accused plead guilty to capital offense, what the court should do

  1. The court should accomplish three (3) things;

  1. It should conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea;

  2. It should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of culpability; and

  3. It should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him if he so desires (Sec. 3; People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637).

 

Searching Inquiry

  1. Searching question means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term. It also includes the exact lengthy of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve at the national penitentiary or a penal colony (People vs. Pastor, GR 140208, Mar. 12, 2002). It is intended to undermine the degree of culpability of the accused in order that the court may be guided in determining the proper penalty.

 

Improvident plea

  1. Conviction based on an improvident plea of guilty may set aside only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. But if the trial court relied on the evidence of the prosecution and convincing evidence to convict beyond reasonable doubt, not on his plea of guilty, such conviction must be sustained (People vs. Lunia, GR 128289, April 23, 2002).

  2. Courts must be careful to avoid improvident pleas of guilt and, where grave crimes are involved, the proper course is to take down evidence to determine guilt and avoid doubts (People vs. Siabilul, supra).

  3. The withdrawal of an improvident plea of guilty, to be substituted by a plea of not guilty, is permitted even after judgment has been promulgated but before the same becomes final. While this Rule is silent on the matter, a plea of not guilty can likewise be withdrawn so that the accused may instead plead guilty to the same offense, but for obvious reasons, this must be done before promulgation of judgment. In either case, however, if the prosecution had already presented its witnesses, the accused will generally not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance based on a plea of guilty (People vs. Lumague, GR 53586, Jan. 31, 1982).

 

Grounds for suspension of arraignment

(1) Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (Sec. 11).

 

Motion to Quash (Rule 117)

  1. A motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, hence the court in resolving the motion cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information, except those admitted by the prosecution (People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516).

  2. The motion to quash must be filed before the arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by the court, the only exceptions being those in Sec. 9 which adopts the omnibus motion rule, subject to said exceptions. Sec. 3 has been amended to separately refer to lack to jurisdiction over the offense, not over the person of the accused since, by filing a motion to quash on other grounds, the accused has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

 

Grounds

(1) The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

By service of the sentence;

By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;

By absolute pardon;

By prescription of the crime;

By prescription of the penalty;

By the marriage of the offended woman in

Seduction

abduction or

acts of lasciviousness (Art. 344 RPC)

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (Sec. 3).

(2) Grounds that are not waived even if not alleged:

(a) Failure to charge an offense;

(b) Lack of jurisdiction;

(c) Extinction of criminal action or liability;

(d) Double jeopardy (People vs. Leoparte, 187 SCRA 190).

 

Distinguish from demurrer to evidence

 

 

Motion to Quash

Demurer to Evidence

 

Rule 117

Section 23, Rule 119

When filed

At any time before accused enters plea

After the prosecution rests its case

Grounds

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (Sec. 3).

(1) Insufficiency of evidence

Effect if granted

If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge (Sec. 5).

The remedy of prosecution is to amend the information to correct the defects thereof, except on the grounds of (g) and (j); of the prosecution may appeal the quashal of information or complaint

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within 10 days from receipt of the motion.

 

Effect if denied

The usual course to take is for the accused to proceed with trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal therefrom and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash (Lalican vs. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518).

An accused who files a demurrer to evidence with leave of court does not lose the right to present evidence in the event his motion is denied. On the other hand, if he files the demurrer without leave of court and the same is denied, he loses the right to present evidence, in which event the case will be deemed submitted for decision (De Carlos vs. CA, 312 SCRA 397).

Remedies if denied The order denying the motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or to demur itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or certiorari before judgment.

 

  1. A special civil action may lie against an order of denial of a motion to quash, as an exception to the general rule, in any of the following instances:

  1. Where there is necessity to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

  2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

  3. Where there is prejudicial question which is sub judice;

  4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

  5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

  6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

  7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

  8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

  9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

  10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused; and

  11. To avoid multiplicity of actions (Brocka vs. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183).

Effects of sustaining the motion to quash

  1. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no

  2. new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody of another charge (Sec. 5).

Exception to the rule that sustaining the motion is not a bar to another prosecution

  1. An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Sec. 3(g) and (i) – that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished and that the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged (Sec. 6).

  2. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable (People vs. Macandog, L-18601, Jan. 31, 1963) and generally, such denial cannot be controlled by certiorari (Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575); and the denial of a motion to quash grounded on double jeopardy is not controllable by mandamus (Tiongson vs. Villacete, 55 OG 7017).

Double Jeopardy

  1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act (Sec. 21, Art. III, Constitution).

  2. The requirements of double jeopardy are:

  1. Valid indictment;

  2. Competent court;

  3. Valid arraignment;

  4. Valid plea entered;

  5. Case is dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Bocar, Aug. 10, 1985; Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 53 SCAD 294, July 18, 1994).

  1. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense (Sec. 7).

Provisional Dismissal

  1. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived (Sec. 8).

  1. Requisites for Sec. 8 to apply:

  1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of the case;

  2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

  3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;

  4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order or provisional dismissal of the case.

  1. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the Rule. The raison d’etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein (People vs. Bellosillo, 8 SCRA 835).

  2. The order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of the prosecution (Sec. 5, Rule 112), without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal (People vs. Lacosn, GR 149453, April 1, 2003).

 

Pre-trial (Rule 118)

  1. The process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.).

Matters to be considered during pre-trial

(1) In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case (Sec. 1).

What the court should do when prosecution and offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused

  1. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court (Sec. 2).

 

Pre-trial agreement

  1. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court (Sec. 2).

Non-appearance during pre-trial

  1. If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties (Sec. 3).

  2. The rule is intended to discourage dilatory moves or strategies as these would run counter to the purposes of pre-trial in criminal cases, more specifically those intended to protect the right of the accused to fair and speedy trial.

 

Pre-trial order

  1. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Sec. 4).

Trial (Rule119)

  1. Continuous trial is one where the courts are called upon to conduct the trial with utmost dispatch, with judicial exercise of the court’s power to control the trial to avoid delay and for each party to complete the presentation of evidence with the trial dates assigned to him (Admin. Cir. 4 dated Sept. 22, 1988).

Instances when presence of accused is required by law

  1. The only instances when the presence of the accused is required by law and when the law may forfeit the bond if he fails to appear are:

  1. On arraignment;

  2. On promulgation of judgment except for light offenses;

  3. For identification purposes;

  4. When the court with due notice requires so (Marcos vs. Ruiz, Sept. 1, 1992).

 

Requisite before trial can be suspended on account of absence of witness

  1. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness (Sec. 3[b]).

  2. To warrant postponement due to absence of a witness, it must appear:

  1. That the witness is really material and appears to the court to be so;

  2. That the party who applies for postponement has not been guilty of neglect;

  3. That the witness can be had at the time to which the trial has been deferred; and

  4. That no similar evidence could be obtained (US vs. Ramirez, 39 (Phil. 738).

  1. The non-appearance of the prosecution at the trial, despite due notice, justifies a provisional dismissal (Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452), or an absolute dismissal (People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016), depending on the circumstances. Sec. 3, Rule 22 does not apply to criminal cases.

 

Trial in Absentia

  1. The Constitution permits trial in absentia of an accused after his arraignment who unjustifiably fails to appear during the trial notwithstanding due notice. The purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases. The requisites of trial in absentia are:

  1. The accused has been arraigned;

  2. He has been duly notified of the trial; and

  3. His failure to appear is justified (People vs. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196).

  1. The waiver of the accused of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by the witnesses which is vital for conviction of the accused, except where he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial. Such waiver does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever required. The accused may waive his right but he cannot disregard his duty or obligation to the court. He can still be subpoenaed to appear for identification purposes, without violating his right against self-incrimination as he will not take the stand to testify but merely to be present in court, where the prosecution witness may, while in the witness stand, point to him as the accused (Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273).

 

Remedy when accused is not brought to trial within the prescribed period

  1. If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section (Sec. 9).

  1. Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period (Sec. 1[g], Rule 116).

 

Requisites for discharge of accused to become a state witness

  1. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 17).

  1. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the program (to be a state witness) whenever the following circumstances are present:

  1. The offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

  2. There is absolute necessity for his testimony;

  3. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

  4. His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

  5. He does not appear to be most guilty; and

  6. He has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 10, RA 6981, the Witness Protection Law).

Effects of Discharge of accused as state witness

  1. The order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless:

  1. The accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge (Sec. 18);

  2. If he was granted immunity and fails to keep his part of the agreement, his confession of his participation in the commission of the offense is admissible in evidence against him (People vs. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694).

  1. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information. Admission into such Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used (Sec. 12, RA 6981).

Demurrer to Evidence

  1. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment (Sec. 23).

 

Judgment (Rule 120)

  1. Judgment means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused (Sec. 1).

  2. Memorandum decision is one in which the appellate court may adopt by reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of law contained in the decision appealed from (Sec. 24, Interim Rules and Guidelines).

Requisites of a judgment

  1. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based (Sec. 1).

Contents of Judgment

  1. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Sec. 2).

Promulgation of judgment; instances of promulgation of judgment in absentia

  1. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

  1. In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice (Sec. 6).

When does judgment become final (four instances)

  1. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final:

  1. After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;

  2. When the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served;

  3. When the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal; or

  4. Has applied for probation (Sec. 7).

 

New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 121)

MNT or MR in Criminal Cases

MNT or MR in Civil Cases

Either on motion of accused, or the court motu proprio with consent of the accused Must be upon motion of a party, can’t be motu proprio
Grounds for MNT – errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, or newly discovered evidence Grounds for MNT – FAME, or newly discovered evidence
Ground for MR – error of law or fact Grounds for MR – Excessive damages, insufficient evidence, or decision is contrary to law
Filed any time before judgment of conviction becomes final Filed within the period for taking an appeal
  Should include all the grounds then available and those not so included shall be deemed waived.
When granted, the original judgment is always set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered There may be partial grant

 

 

Grounds for New Trial

 

(1) The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment (Sec. 2).

Grounds for Reconsideration

  1. The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings (Sec. 3).

Requisites before a new trial may be granted on ground of newly discovered evidence

  1. They are the following:

  1. The evidence was discovered after trial;

  2. The evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with exercise of reasonable diligence;

  3. The evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;

  4. It must go to the merits as it would produce a different result if admitted (Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 257).

Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration

 

(1) The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly (Sec. 6).

Application of NeypesDoctrine in Criminal Cases

  1. If the motion is denied, the movants has a fresh period of 15 days from receipt or notice of the order denying or dismissing the motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice to appeal. This new period becomes significant if either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial has been filed but was denied or dismissed. This fresh period rule applies only to Rule 41 governing appeals from the RTC but also to Rule 40 governing appeals from MTC to RTC, Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, Rule 43 on appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. Accordingly, this rule was adopted to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules to afford fair opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize errors of judgment. Obviously, the new 15 day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41 (Neypes vs. CA, GR 141524, Sept. 14, 2005). The Neypes ruling shall not be applied where no motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration has been filed in which case the 15-day period shall run from notice of the judgment.

  2. The fresh period rule does not refer to the period within which to appeal from the order denying the motion for new trial because the order is not appealable under Sec. 9, Rule 37. The non-appealability of the order of denial is also confirmed by Sec. 1(a), Rule 41, which provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration

 

Appeal (Rule 122)

  1. An appeal opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and the damages involved (Quemuel vs. CA, 22 SCRA 44).

Effect of an Appeal

  1. Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or order appealed from is stayed as to the appealing party (Sec. 11[c]). The civil appeal of the offended party does not affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from.

  2. Upon perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case (Syquia vs. Concepcion, 60 Phil. 186), except:

  1. To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal;

  2. To approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmission of the records on appeal to the appellate court (Sec. 9, Rule 41).

Where to appeal

(1) The appeal may be taken as follows:

(a) To the Regional Trial Court, in cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court;

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and

(c) To the Supreme Court, in cases decided by the Court of Appeals (Sec. 2).

How appeal taken

  1. under Sec. 3, Rule 122:

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Effect of appeal by any of several accused

  1. under Sec. 11, Rule 122:

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

(b) The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from.

(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party.

Grounds for dismissal of appeal

  1. The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be:

(a) Patently without merit;

(b) Prosecuted manifestly for delay; or

(c) The questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration (Sec. 8, Rule 65).

 

Search and Seizure (Rule 126)

Nature of search warrant

  1. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether a citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in whish is his residence, his papers and other possession (Villanueva vs. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345). The overriding function of the constitutional guarantee is to protect personal privacy and human dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. It is deference to one’s personality that lies at the core of his right, but it could also be looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area primarily one’s house, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a man’s prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any intrusion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life (Schmerber vs. California, 384 US 757).

  2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

Distinguish from warrant of arrest

Search Warrant (Rule 126)

Warrant of Arrest (Rule 113)

A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court (Sec. 1, Rule 126).

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113).

 

 

Requisites:

A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines (Sec. 4, Rule 126).

  1. Requisites for arrest warrant issued by RTC judge under Sec. 5, Rule 112:

    1. Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information

    2. The judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.

    3. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest

    4. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause

      1. The judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice; and

      2. The issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of the complaint of information

Search or seizure without warrant, when lawful:

    1. Consented search;

    1. As an incident to a lawful arrest;

    2. Searches of vessels and aircrafts for violation of immigration, customs and drug laws;

    3. Searches of moving vehicles;

    4. Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;

    5. Where the prohibited articles are in plain view;

    6. Searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary and building regulations;

    7. Stop and frisk” operations;

    8. Exigent and emergency circumstances (in times of war and within the area of military operation)

 

  1. Arrest without warrant, when lawful:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 5, Rule 113).

 

Application for search warrant, where filed 

(1) An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending (Sec, 2).

Probable Cause

  1. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, GR 76649-51, 08/19/88). Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626).

  2. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines (Sec. 4).

  3. Issuance and form of search warrant. – If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules (Sec. 6).

Personal examination by judge of the applicant and witnesses

  1. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted (Sec. 5).

Particularity of place to be searched and things to be seized

  1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

  2. The place specified in the search warrant, and not the place the police officers who applied for the search warrant had in mind, controls. For the police officers cannot amplify nor modify the place stated in the search warrant (People vs. CA, 291 SCRA 400). The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. Where there are several apartments in the place to be searched, a description of the specific place can be determined by reference to the affidavits supporting the warrant that the apartment to be searched is the one occupied by the accused. The searching party cannot go from one apartment to the other as the warrant will then become a general warrant (People vs. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683).

Personal property to be seized

(1) Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense (Sec. 3).

(2) It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession (People vs. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174).

Exceptions to search warrant requirement

  1. In a case (People vs. Abriol, 367 SCRA 327), the Court added other exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless search, thus:

    1. Consented search;

    2. As an incident to a lawful arrest;

    3. Searches of vessels and aircrafts for violation of immigration, customs and drug laws;

    4. Searches of moving vehicles;

    5. Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders;

    6. Where the prohibited articles are in plain view;

    7. Searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary and building regulations;

    8. Stop and frisk” operations;

    9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (People vs. Valez, 304 SCRA 140).

a. Search incidental to lawful arrest – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant (Sec. 13, Rule 126). The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made. The process cannot be reversed (People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 40). Thus, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants (People vs. Paco, 170 SCRA 681).

The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided in Sec. 12, Rule 126, and that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in any other than the place of arrest (Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 500).

b. Consented Search – Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law (Art. 6, Civil Code). To constitute a valid waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear: (1) that the right exists, (2) the person involved had knowledge either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) said person has an actual intention to relinquish the right (People vs. Salangga, GR 100910, 07/25/94).

As the constitutional guarantee is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights, but instead they hold that a peaceful submission and silence of the accused in a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard to the supremacy of the law (People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557).

c. Search of moving vehicle – This is justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicles to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63).

In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection (People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557). Warrantless search o moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought (People vs. Lo Ho Wong, 193 SCRA 122).

d. Check points; body checks in airport – In Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424, a warrantless search conducted at police or military checkpoints has been upheld for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to visual search.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible is this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area (Caballes vs. CA, GR 136292, 01/15/02).

e. Plain view situation – The plain view doctrine recognizes that objects inadvertently falling in plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure without warrant (Harris vs. US, 390 US 324). It may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures, nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of a defendant’s guilt. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object (Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 403 US 443). It is also been suggested that even if an object is observed in plain view, the seizure of the subject will not be justified where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure (People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597).

The elements of “plain view” seizure are: (a) prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626).

f. Stop and Frisk situation – This is based on the conduct of the person, who acts suspiciously, and when searched, such search would yield unlawful items in connection with an offense, such as unlicensed firearms, and prohibited drugs. Thus, it has been held that a person who was carrying a bag and acting suspiciously could be searched by police officers and the unlicensed firearm seized inside the bag is admissible in evidence, being an incident of a lawful arrest. Similarly, a person roaming around in a place where drug addicts usually are found, whose eyes were red and who was wobbling like a drunk, could be legally searched of his person and the illegal drug seized from him is admissible in evidence against him (Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400).

A stop and frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective criminal protection and detection which underlie the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him (Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1).

g. Enforcement of Custom Laws – For the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, person deputized by the Bureau of Customs can affect searches, seizures and arrests even without warrant of seizure or detention. They could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when there is reasonable cause to suspect the presence of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law. They can likewise stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such articles (Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857). The intention behind the grant of such authority is to prevent smuggling and to secure the collection of the legal duties, taxes and other charges (Sec. 2202, Tariff and Customs Code).

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, Customs officers are authorized to make arrest, search and seizure of any vessel, aircraft, cargo, articles, animals or other movable property when the same is subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine under the customs and tariff laws, rules and regulations (Sec. 2205) and may at any time enter, pass through or search any land or inclosure or any warehouse, store or other building without being a dwelling house 9Sec. 2208). A dwelling house may be entered or searched only upon warrants issued by judge upon sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing the placed to be searched and person or things to be searched (Sec. 220).

Remedies from unlawful search and seizure

  1. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court (Sec. 14).

  2. If a search warrant is issued and it is attacked, a motion quash is the remedy or a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant would be available. Replevin may also be proper if the objects are legally possessed.

  3. Alternative remedies of the accused adversely affected by a search warrant are the following:

  1. Motion to quash the search warrant with the issuing court; or

  2. Motion suppress evidence with the court trying the criminal case.

The remedies are alternative, not cumulative. If the motion to quash is denied, a motion to suppress cannot be availed of subsequently.

 

Provisional Remedies (Rule 127)

Nature

  1. The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action (Sec. 1).

  2. The requisites and procedure for availing of these provisional remedies shall be the same as those for civil cases. Consequently, an application for recovery of damages on the bond posted for purposes of said provisional remedies shall be made in the same action and, generally, cannot be the subject of a separate action (Sec. 14, Rule 57; Sec. 8, Rule 58; Sec. 9, Rule 59; Sec. 10, Rule 60). For this reason, the order of trial now specifically provides that the accused may present evidence, not only to prove his defense, but also such damages as he may have sustained and arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case (Sec. 11[b], Rule 119; Sec. 12, Rule 124).

  3. The provisional remedies under this Rule are proper only where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto has not been expressly waived or the right to institute such civil action separately is not reserved, in those cases where such reservation may be made. A fortiori, where the civil action has actually been instituted, whether such action has been suspended by the subsequent institution of the criminal action (Se3c. 2, Rule 111) or may proceed independently of the criminal action but may be applied for in the separate civil action.

Kinds of provisional remedies

(1) Attachment. – When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused in the following cases:

(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;

(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so; and

(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines (Sec. 2).

(2) Rule 57 on preliminary attachment applies on the procedure to secure an attachment in the cases authorize3d under Rule 127.

Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer or a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication (Sec. 2, Rule 57).

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 28, 2011

2011 Remedial Law Reviewer (Special Proceedings)


PART II.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rules 72 – 109

(1)     Subject Matters of Special Proceedings: CATCH AGED SHARC (Rules 72 – 109)

(a)     Change of Name

(b)     Adoption

(c)     Trustees

(d)     Constitution of Family Home

(e)     Hospitalization of Insane Persons

(f)      Absence and Death, Declaration of

(g)     Guardianship and Custody of Children

(h)     Escheat

(i)       (Voluntary) Dissolution of Corporation

(j)       Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons

(k)     Habeas Corpus

(l)       (Judicial) Approval of Voluntary Recognition of Minor Natural Children

(m)   Rescission and Revocation of Adoption

(n)     Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

(2)     Special Proceedings is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact, generally commenced by application, petition or special form of pleading as may be provided for by the particular rule or law.

I.     SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS (Rules 73 – 91)

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons, Venue and Process (Rule 73)

Which court has jurisdiction

(1)     If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen of an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the RTC in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of any province in which he had his estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Sec. 1).

(2)     Under RA 7691, the law expanding the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, MTC, MeTC and MCTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over probate proceedings, testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed P200,000 (outside Metro Manila) or where such estate does not exceed P400,000 (in Metro Manila).

(3)     The jurisdiction of the RTC is limited to the settlement and adjudication of properties of the deceased and cannot extend to collateral matters.

Venue in judicial settlement of estate

(1)     The residence of the decedent at the time of his death is determinative of the venue of the proceeding. If he was a resident (inhabitant) of the Philippines, venue is laid exclusively in the province of his residence, the jurisdiction being vested in the Regional Trial Court thereof. Residence means his personal, actual, or physical habitation, his actual residence or place of abode.

(2)     It is only where the decedent was a nonresident of the Philippines at the time of his death that venue lies in any province in which he had estate, and then CFI thereof first taking cognizance of the proceeding for settlement acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. The question of residence is determinative only of the venue and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the institution of the proceeding in the province wherein the decedent neither had residence nor estate does not vitiate the action of the probate court.

(3)     Where the proceedings were instituted in two courts and the question of venue is seasonably raised, the court in which the proceeding was first filed has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue (De Borja vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 872).

Extent of jurisdiction of Probate Court

(1)     The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased person either summarily or through the process of administration. The RTC acting a s a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent unless the claimant and all other parties have legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court. In that case, if the probate court allows the introduction of evidence on ownership it is for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory, which is within the probate court’s competence. The determination is only provisional subject to a proper action at the RTC in a separate action to resolve the title.

(2)     The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills, the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is, as a rule, an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality (Intestate Estate of Ismael Reyes, Heirs of Reyes vs. Reyes, GR 139587, Nov. 2, 2000).

Powers and Duties of Probate Court

(1)     In probate proceedings, the court:

(a)     Orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Sec. 3, Rule 77);

(b)     Grants letters of administration of the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Sec. 5, Rule 79);

(c)     Supervises and controls all acts of administration;

(d)     Hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Sec. 11, Rule 86);

(e)     Orders payment of lawful debts (Sec. 11, Rule 88);

(f)      Authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Sec. 2, Rule 89);

(g)     Directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Sec. 1, Rule 90);

(h)     Issue warrants and processes necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect their orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law (Sec. 3, Rule 73);

(i)       If a person defies a probate order, it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he performs such order or judgment, or is released (Sec. 3, Rule 73).

(2)     The court acts as trustee, and as such, should jealously guard the estate and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated (Timbol vs. Cano, 111 Phil. 923).

Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74)

(1)     Summary settlement of estate is a judicial proceeding wherein, without the appointment of executor or administrator, and without delay, the competent court summarily proceeds to value the estate of the decedent; ascertain his debts and order payment thereof; allow his will if any; declare his heirs, devisee and legatees; and distribute his net estate among his known heirs, devisees, and legatees, who shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the parts of the estate so awarded to them, respectively (Sec. 2).

Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs, when allowed

(1)     If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof (Sec. 1).

(2)     Extrajudicial partition of the estate shall be valid when the following conditions concur:

(a)     The decedent left no will;

(b)     The decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid;

(c)     The heirs are all of age or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representative;

(d)     The partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds; and

(e)     The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation.

Two-year prescriptive period

(1)     It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent (Sec. 1).

(2)     If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made (Sec. 4).

Affidavit of Self-adjudication by sole heir

(1)     If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds (Sec. 1).

Summary settlement of estates of small value, when allowed

(1)     Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register’s office (Sec. 2).

(2)     The court, before allowing a partition, may require the distributees, if property other than real is to be distributed, to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by court, conditioned for the payment of any just claim (Sec. 3).

Remedies of aggrieved parties after extra-judicial settlement of estate

(1)     The creditor may ask for administration of enough property of the estate sufficient to pay the debt, but the heirs cannot prevent such administration by paying the obligation (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil. 211);

(2)     Where the estate has been summarily settled, the unpaid creditor may, within the two-year period, file a motion in the court wherein such summary settlement was had for the payment of his credit. After the lapse of the two-year period, an ordinary action may be instituted against the distributees within the statute of limitations, but not against the bond.

(3)     The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud should be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud (Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964).

Production and Probate of Will (Rule 75)

Nature of probate proceeding

(1)     Probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. It cannot be dispensed with and substituted by another proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending public policy. It is mandatory as no will shall pass either real or personal property unless proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules. It is imprescriptible, because it is required by public policy and the state could not have intended to defeat the same by applying thereto the statute of limitation of actions (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479).

Who may petition for probate; persons entitled to notice

(1)     Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court for the allowance of his will (Sec. 1, Rule 76).

(2)     The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not be petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs (Sec. 4, Rule 76).

Allowance or Disallowance of Will (Rule 76)

Contents of petition for allowance of will

(1) A petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters are prayed;

(e) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance of the will, or the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration with the will annexed (Sec. 2, Rule 76).

Grounds for disallowing a will

(1)     The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(a)     If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b)     If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;

(c)     If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d)     If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e)     If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto (Sec. 9, Rule 76).

(2)     Grounds under Art. 839, Civil Code:

(a)     If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(b)     If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(c)     If it was executed through force or duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d)     If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(e)     If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(f)      If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

Reprobate; Requisites before will proved outside allowed in the Philippines; effects of probate

(1)     Will proved outside Philippines may be allowed here. Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 77).

(2)     When will allowed, and effect thereof. If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a       certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge, and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court (Sec. 3, Rule 77).

(3)     When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country (Sec. 4, Rule 77).

(4)     Certificate of allowance attached to proved will. To be recorded in the Office of Register of Deeds. If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken and filed, that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence, or fraud, a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge, and attested by the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and the will and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk. Attested copies of the will devising real estate and of certificate of allowance thereof, shall be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the lands lie (Sec. 13, Rule 76).

(5)     The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of the decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over the property in another state or country (Leon & Ghezzi vs. Manufacturer’s Life Ins., 80 Phil. 495). When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in foreign country, administration shall be had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of the decedent’s domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed ancillary administration. The ancillary administration is proper whenever a person dies leaving in a country other than that of his domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 175).

 

Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rule 78)

(1)     Letters testamentary is the appointment issued by a probate court, after the will has been admitted to probate, to the executor named in the will to administer the estate of the deceased testator, provided the executor named in the will is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond (Sec. 4).

When and to whom letters of administration granted

(1) No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude (Sec. 1).

(2) Executor of executor not to administer estate. The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator (Sec. 2).

(3) Married women may serve. A married woman may serve as executrix or administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect her authority so to serve under a previous appointment (Sec. 3).

(4) Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as required by these rules (Sec. 4).

(5) Where some coexecutors disqualified others may act. When all of the executors named in a will cannot act because of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are competent, accept and give bond, and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust required by the will (Sec. 5).

(6) If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select (Sec. 6).

Order of preference

 

(1) Priority in selecting an administrator

(a)     Surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, or person as such surviving spouse, or next of kin, requests;

(b)     One or more of the principal creditors – if such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected, be incompetent or unwilling, or if they neglect for 30 days after the death of the decedent to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to, if competent and willing to serve;

(c)     Such other person as the court may select.

 

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary; simultaneous filing of petition for administration

 

(1)     Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed (Sec. 1, Rule 79).

Powers and duties of Executors and Administrators; restrictions on the powers (Rule 84)

(1)     An executor is the person nominated by a testator to carry out the directions and requests in his will and to dispose of his property according to his testamentary provisions after his death (21 Am. Jur. 369).

(2)     An administrator is person appointed by the court, in accordance with the governing statute, to administer and settle intestate estate and such testate estate as no competent executor was designated by the testator.

(3)     Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and property. How right enforced. The executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased partner shall at all times have access to, and may examine and take copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership business, and may examine and make invoices of the property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving partner or partners, on request, shall exhibit to him all such books, papers, and property in their hands or control. On the written application of such executor or administrator, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may order any such surviving partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and to exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided, and may punish any partner failing to do so for contempt (Sec. 1, Rule 84).

(4)     Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 84).

(5)     Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration (Sec. 3, Rule 84).

(6)     An administrator of an intestate cannot exercise the right of legal redemption over a portion of the property owned in common sold by one of the other co-owners since this is not within the powers of administration (Caro vs. CA, 113 SCRA 10). Where the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without any prior approval of the Court (Estate of Olave vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767). The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (Manaquil vs. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335).

Appointment of Special Administrator

(1)     When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed (Sec. 1, Rule 80).

Grounds for removal of administrator

(1)     Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. If after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, and render his account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore provided (Sec. 1, Rule 82).

(2)     Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person (Sec. 2, Rule 82).

Claims Against the Estate (Rule 86)

(1)     Administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses.

(2)     The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

Time within which claims shall be filed; exceptions

(1)     In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month (Sec. 2).

Statute of Non-claims

(1)     The rule requires certain creditors of a deceased person to present their claims for examination and allowance within a specified period, the purpose thereof being to settle the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 213).

Claim of Executor or administrator against the Estate

(1)     If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim (Sec. 8).

Payment of Debts (Rule 88)

(1)     If there are sufficient properties, the debts shall be paid, thus:

(a)     All debts shall be paid in full within the time limited for the purpose (Sec. 1);

(b)     If the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of debts they shall be paid according to the provisions of the will, which must be respected (Sec. 2);

(c)     If the estate designated in the will is not sufficient, such part of the estate as is not disposed of by will shall be appropriated for the purpose (Sec. 2);

(d)     The personal estate not disposed of by will shall be first chargeable with payment of debts and expenses (Sec. 3);

(e)     If the personal estate is not sufficient, or its sale would be detrimental to the participants of the estate, the real estate not disposed of by will shall be sold or encumbered for that purpose (Sec. 3);

(f)      Any deficiency shall be met by contributions from devisees, legatees and heirs who have entered into possession of portions of the estate before debts and expenses have been paid (Sec. 6);

(g)     The executor or administrator shall retain sufficient estate to pay contingent claims when the same becomes absolute (Sec. 4).

(2)     If the estate is insolvent, the debts shall be paid in the following manner:

(a)     The executor or administrator shall pay the debts in accordance with the preference of credits established by the Civil Code (Sec. 7);

(b)     No creditor of any one class shall receive any payment until those of the preceding class are paid (Sec. 8);

(c)     If there are no assets sufficient to pay the credits of any one class of creditors, each creditor within such class shall be paid a dividend in proportion to his claim (Sec. 8);

(d)     Where the deceased was a nonresident, his estate in the Philippines shall be disposed of in such a way that creditors in the Philippines and elsewhere may receive an equal share in proportion to their respective credits (Sec. 9);

(e)     Claims duly proved against the estate of an insolvent resident of the Philippines, the executor or administrator, having had the opportunity to contest such claims, shall e included in the certified list of claims proved against the deceased. The owner of such claims shall be entitled to a just distribution of the estate in accordance with the preceding rules if the property  of such deceased person in another country is likewise equally apportioned to the creditors residing in the Philippines and other creditors, according to their respective claims (Sec. 10);

(f)      It must be noted that the payments of debts of the decedent shall be made pursuant to the order of the probate court (Sec. 11).

(3)     Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice, within what periods. On granting letters testamentary or administration the court shall allow to the executor or administrator a time for disposing of the estate and paying the debts and legacies of the deceased, which shall not, in the first instance, exceed one (1) year; but the court may, on application of the executor or administrator and after hearing on such notice of the time and place therefor given to all persons interested as it shall direct, extend the time as the circumstances of the estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a single extension nor so that the whole period allowed to the original executor or administrator shall exceed two (2) years (Sec. 15).

(4)     Applicable provisions under the Civil Code:

Art. 2241. With reference to specific movable property of the debtor, the following claims or liens shall be preferred:

(1) Duties, taxes and fees due thereon to the State or any subdivision thereof;

(2) Claims arising from misappropriation, breach of trust, or malfeasance by public officials committed in the performance of their duties, on the movables, money or securities obtained by them;

(3) Claims for the unpaid price of movables sold, on said movables, so long as they are in the possession of the debtor, up to the value of the same; and if the movable has been resold by the debtor and the price is still unpaid, the lien may be enforced on the price; this right is not lost by the immobilization of the thing by destination, provided it has not lost its form, substance and identity; neither is the right lost by the sale of the thing together with other property for a lump sum, when the price thereof can be determined proportionally;

(4) Credits guaranteed with a pledge so long as the things pledged are in the hands of the creditor, or those guaranteed by a chattel mortgage, upon the things pledged or mortgaged, up to the value thereof;  

(5) Credits for the making, repair, safekeeping or preservation of personal property, on the movable thus made, repaired, kept or possessed;

(6) Claims for laborers’ wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;

(7) For expenses of salvage, upon the goods salvaged;

(8) Credits between the landlord and the tenant, arising from the contract of tenancy on shares, on the share of each in the fruits or harvest;

(9) Credits for transportation, upon the goods carried, for the price of the contract and incidental expenses, until their delivery and for thirty days thereafter;

(10) Credits for lodging and supplies usually furnished to travellers by hotel keepers, on the movables belonging to the guest as long as such movables are in the hotel, but not for money loaned to the guests;  

(11) Credits for seeds and expenses for cultivation and harvest advanced to the debtor, upon the fruits harvested;

(12) Credits for rent for one year, upon the personal property of the lessee existing on the immovable leased and on the fruits of the same, but not on money or instruments of credit;

(13) Claims in favor of the depositor if the depositary has wrongfully sold the thing deposited, upon the price of the sale.

In the foregoing cases, if the movables to which the lien or preference attaches have been wrongfully taken, the creditor may demand them from any possessor, within thirty days from the unlawful seizure.    

Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the following claims, mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:

(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;

(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;

(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects, engineers and contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;

(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;  

(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate mortgaged;

(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law authorizes reimbursement, upon the immovable preserved or improved;  

(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by attachments or executions, upon the property affected, and only as to later credits;

(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them, upon the real property thus divided;

(9) Claims of donors or real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions imposed upon the donee, upon the immovable donated;

(10) Credits of insurers, upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for two years.   

Art. 2243. The claims or credits enumerated in the two preceding articles shall be considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property, or liens within the purview of legal provisions governing insolvency. Taxes mentioned in No. 1, article 2241, and No. 1, article 2242, shall first be satisfied.  

Art. 2244. With reference to other property, real and personal, of the debtor, the following claims or credits shall be preferred in the order named:

(1) Proper funeral expenses for the debtor, or children under his or her parental authority who have no property of their own, when approved by the court;

(2) Credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees, laborers, or household helpers for one year preceding the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency;

(3) Expenses during the last illness of the debtor or of his or her spouse and children under his or her parental authority, if they have no property of their own;

(4) Compensation due the laborers or their dependents under laws providing for indemnity for damages in cases of labor accident, or illness resulting from the nature of the employment;

(5) Credits and advancements made to the debtor for support of himself or herself, and family, during the last year preceding the insolvency;

(6) Support during the insolvency proceedings, and for three months thereafter;

(7) Fines and civil indemnification arising from a criminal offense;

(8) Legal expenses, and expenses incurred in the administration of the insolvent’s estate for the common interest of the creditors, when properly authorized and approved by the court;

(9) Taxes and assessments due the national government, other than those mentioned in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(10) Taxes and assessments due any province, other than those referred to in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(11) Taxes and assessments due any city or municipality, other than those indicated in articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242, No. 1;

(12) Damages for death or personal injuries caused by a quasi-delict;

(13) Gifts due to public and private institutions of charity or beneficence;

(14) Credits which, without special privilege, appear in (a) a public instrument; or (b) in a final judgment, if they have been the subject of litigation. These credits shall have preference among themselves in the order of priority of the dates of the instruments and of the judgments, respectively.  

Art. 2245. Credits of any other kind or class, or by any other right or title not comprised in the four preceding articles, shall enjoy no preference.    

CHAPTER 3

ORDER OF PREFERENCE OF CREDITS

Art. 2246. Those credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific movables, exclude all others to the extent of the value of the personal property to which the preference refers.

Art. 2247. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific movable property, they shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of duties, taxes and fees due the State or any subdivision thereof.

Art. 2248. Those credits which enjoy preference in relation to specific real property or real rights, exclude all others to the extent of the value of the immovable or real right to which the preference refers.

Art. 2249. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific real property or real rights, they shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of the taxes and assessments upon the immovable property or real right.  

Art. 2250. The excess, if any, after the payment of the credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific property, real or personal, shall be added to the free property which the debtor may have, for the payment of the other credits.  

Art. 2251. Those credits which do not enjoy any preference with respect to specific property, and those which enjoy preference, as to the amount not paid, shall be satisfied according to the following rules:

(1) In the order established in article 2244;

(2) Common credits referred to in article 2245 shall be paid pro rata regardless of dates.

Actions by and against Executors and Administrators (Rule 87)

(1)     No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debts or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator (Sec. 1).

Actions that may be brought against executors and administrators

(1)     An action to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator (Sec. 1).

(2)     Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

        The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs (Sec. 16, Rule 3).

(3)     When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person (Sec. 20, Rule 3).

Requisites before creditor may bring an action for recovery of property fraudulently conveyed by the

deceased

(1)     For the creditor to file and action to recover property fraudulently conveyed by the deceased, the following requisites must be present:

(a)     There is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator for the payment of debts and expenses of administration;

(b)     The deceased in his lifetime had made or attempted to make a fraudulent conveyance of his real or personal property, or a right or interest therein, or a debt or credit, with intent to defraud his creditors or to  avoid any right, debt or duty; or had so conveyed such property, right, debt, or credit that by law the conveyance would be void as against his creditors;

(c)     The subject of the attempted conveyance would be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime;

(d)     The executor or administrator has shown to have no desire to file the action or failed to institute the same within a reasonable time;

(e)     Leave is granted by the court to the creditor to file the action;

(f)      A bond is filed by the creditor as prescribed in the Rules;

(g)     The action by the creditor is in the name of the executor or administrator (Sec. 10).

Distribution and Partition (Rule 90)

(1)     Before there could be a distribution of the estate, the following two stages must be followed:

(a)     Payment of obligations (liquidation of estate) – under the Rules, the distribution of a decedent’s assets may only be ordered under any of the following three circumstances: (1) when the inheritance tax, among other is paid; (2) when a sufficient bond is given to meet the payment of the inheritance tax and all other obligations; and (3) when the payment of the said tax and all other obligations has been provided for; and

(b)     Declaration of heirs – there must first be declaration of heirs to determine to whom the residue of the estate should e distributed. A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. And likewise after, not before the declaration of heirs is made may the residue be distributed and delivered to the heirs.

(2)     The settlement of a decedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem which is binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound.

Liquidation

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such person may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

        No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

Sec. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. If at the time of the distribution the executor or administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be paid by such executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the executor or administrator against the party not paying for the sum assessed.

Project of Partition

(1)     Project of partition is a document prepared by the executor or administrator setting forth the manner in which the estate of the deceased is to be distributed among the heirs. If the estate is a testate estate, the project of partition must conform to the terms of the will; if intestate, the project of partition must be in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano, 63 Phil. 629).

Remedy of an heir entitled to residue but not given his share

(1)     If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases (Sec. 1).

(2)     The better practice for the heir who has not received his share is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or judge (Ramos vs. Octuzar, 89 Phil. 730).

(3)     It has been held that an order which determines the distributive share of the heirs of a deceased person is appealable. If not appealed within the reglementary period, it becomes final (Imperial vs. Muñoz, 58 SCRA).

(4)     The Court allowed the continuation of a separate action to annul the project of partition by a preterited heir, since the estate proceedings have been closed and terminated for over three years (Guilas vs. Judge of the CFI of Pampanga, 43 SCRA 117), and on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud (Solivio vs. CA, 99 Phil. 1069).

Instances when probate court may issue writ of execution

(1)     The only instances when the probate court may issue a writ of execution are as follows:

(a)     To satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88);

(b)     To enforce payment of expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90); and

(c)     To satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 132).

  1. II.     GENERAL GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP

Trustees (Rule 98)

Distinguished from executor/administrator

Conditions of the Bond

(1)     A trustee appointed by the court is required to furnish a bond and the terms of the trust or a statute may provide that a trustee appointed by a court shall be required to furnish a bond in order to qualify him to administer the trust (54 Am. Jur. 425). However, the court may until further order exempt a trustee under a will from giving a bond when the testator has directed or requested such exemption or when all persons beneficially interested in the trust, being of full age, request the exemption. Such exemption may be cancelled by the court at any time, and the trustee required to forthwith file a bond (Sec. 5). If the trustee fails to furnish a bond as required by the court, he fails to qualify as such. Nonetheless the trust is not defeated by such a failure to give bond.

(2)     The following conditions shall be deemed to be a part of the bond whether written therein or not:

(a)   That the trustee will make and return to the court, at such time as it may order, a true inventory of all the real and personal estate belonging to him as trustee, which at the time of the making of such inventory shall have come to his possession or knowledge;

(b)   That he will manage and dispose of all such estate, and faithfully discharge his trust in relation thereto, according to law and the will of the testator or the provisions of the instrument or order under which he is appointed;

(c)   That he will render upon oath at least once a year until his trust is fulfilled, unless he is excused therefrom in any year by the court, a true account of the property in his hands and of the management and disposition thereof, and will render such other accounts as the court may order;

(d)   That at the expiration of his trust he will settle his accounts in court and pay over and deliver all the estate remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person or persons entitled thereto.

        But when the trustee is appointed as a successor to a prior trustee, the court may dispense with the making and return of an inventory, if one has already been filed, and in such case the condition of the bond shall be deemed to be altered accordingly (Sec. 6).

Requisites for the removal and resignation of a trustee

(1)     A trustee may be removed upon petition to the proper RTC of the parties beneficially interested, after due notice to the trustee and hearing, if it appears essential in the interests of the petitioners. The court may also, after due notice to all persons interested, remove a trustee who is insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or evidently unsuitable therefor. A trustee, whether appointed by the court or under a written instrument, may resign his trust if it appears to the court proper to allow such resignation (Sec. 8).

(2)     A trustee whose acts or omissions are such as to show a want of reasonable fidelity will be removed by the court and where trust funds are to be invested by the trustee, neglect to invest constitutes of itself a breach of trust, and is a ground for removal (Gisborn vs. CAvende, 114 US 464).

 

Grounds for removal and resignation of a trustee

(1)     The proper Regional Trial Court may, upon petition of the parties beneficially interested and after due notice to the trustee and hearing, remove a trustee if such removal appears essential in the interests of the petitioners. The court may also, after due notice to all persons interested, remove a trustee who is insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or evidently unsuitable therefor. A trustee, whether appointed by the court or under a written instrument, may resign his trust if it appears to the court proper to allow such resignation (Sec. 8).

(2)     A trustee whose acts or omissions are such as to show a want of reasonable fidelity will be removed by the court and where trust funds are to be invested by the trustee, neglect to invest constitutes of itself a breach of trust, and is a ground for removal (Gisborn vs. CAvende, 114 US 464).

 

Extent of authority of trustee

(1)     A trustee appointed by the RTC shall have the same rights, powers, and duties as if he had been appointed by the testator. No person succeeding to a trust as executor or administrator of a former trustee shall be required to accept such trust (Sec. 2).

(2)     Such new trustee shall have and exercise the same powers, rights, and duties as if he had been originally appointed, and the trust estate shall vest in him in like manner as it had vested or would have vested, in the trustee in whose place he is substituted; and the court may order such conveyance to be made by the former trustee or his representatives, or by the other remaining trustees, as may be necessary or proper to vest the trust estate in the new trustee, either alone or jointly with the others (Sec. 3).

Escheat (Rule 91)

(1)     Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person in the Philippines, become the property of the state upon his death, without leaving any will or legal heirs (21 CJS, Sec. 1, p. 848).

When to file

(1)     When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated (Sec. 1).

Requisites for filing of petition

(1)     In order that a proceeding for escheat may prosper, the following requisites must be present:

(a)     That a person died intestate;

(b)     That he left no heirs or person by law entitled to the same; and

(c)     That the deceased left properties (City of Manila vs. Archbishop of Manila, 36 Phil. 815).

Remedy of respondent against petition; period for filing a claim

(1)     When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for, and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoints. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground, the petition may be dismissed unconditionally and the petitioner is not entitled to be afforded an opportunity to amend his petition (Go Poco Grocery vs. Pacific Biscuit Co., 65 Phil. 443).

(2)     While the Rules do not in fact authorize the filing of a motion to dismiss the petition presented for that purpose, and the Rules permitting the interposition of a motion to dismiss to the complaint and answer, respectively, are not applicable to special proceedings, nevertheless, there is no reason of a procedural nature which prevents the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon any of the grounds provided for by law for a motion to dismiss the complaint. In such a case, the motion to dismiss plays the role of a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal questions raised therein (Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laugna vs. Colegio de San Jose, 65 Phil. 318).

Guardianship (Rules 92 – 97)

(1)     Guardianship is the power of protective authority given by law and imposed on an individual who is free and in the enjoyment of his rights, over one whose weakness on account of his age or other infirmity renders him unable to protect himself (Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 908). Guardianship may also describe the relation subsisting between the guardian and the ward. It involves the taking of possession of an management of, the estate of another unable to act for himself.

(2)     A guardian is a person lawfully invested with power and charged with the duty of taking care of a person who for some peculiarity or status or defect of age, understanding or self-control is considered incapable of administering his own affairs (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Editoin).

(3)     Kinds of guardians:

(a)     According to scope or exent

a)       Guardian of the person – one who has been lawfully invested with the care of the person of  minor whose father is dead. His authority is derived out of that of the parent;

b)       Guardian of the property – that appointed by the court to have the management of the estate of a minor or incompetent person;

c)       General guardians – those appointed by the court to have the care and custody of the person and of all the property of the ward.

(b)     According to constitution

1)       Legal – those deemed as guardians without need of a court appointment (Art. 225, Family Court);

2)       Guardian ad litem – those appointed by courts of justice to prosecute or defend a minor, insane or person declared to be incompetent, in an action in court; and

3)       Judicial – those who are appointed by the court in pursuance to law, as guardian for insane persons, prodigals, minor heirs or deceased was veterans and other incompetent persons.

(4)     Under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (RA 8369), the Family Courts are vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases:

(a)     Criminal case where one or more of the accused is below 18 years of age but less than 9 years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense;

(b)     Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

(c)     Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;

(d)     Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;

(e)     Actions for support and acknowledgment;

(f)      Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of EO 209, the Family Code;

(g)     Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under PD 603, EO 56 (s. 1986), and other related laws;

(h)     Petitions for the constitution of family home;

(i)       Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

(j)       Violations of RA 7610, the Anti-Child Abuse Law, as amended by RA 7658;

(k)     Cases of domestic violence against women and children;

General powers and duties of guardians (Rule 96)

(1)     The powers and duties of a guardian are:

(a)     To have care and custody over the person of his ward, and/or the management of his estate (Sec. 1);

(b)     To pay the just debts of his ward out of the latter’s estate (Sec. 2);

(c)     To bring or defend suits in behalf of the ward, and, with the approval of the court, compound for debts due the ward and give discharges to the debtor (Sec. 3);

(d)     To manage the estate frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family (Sec. 4);

(e)     To sell or encumber the real estate of the ward upon being authorized to do so (Sec. 4);

(f)      To join in an assent to a partition of real or personal estate held by the ward jointly or in common with others (Sec. 5).

Conditions of the bond of the guardian

(1)     Under Sec. 1, Rule 94, the conditions for the bond of a guardian are:

(a)     To file with the court complete inventory of the estate of the ward within 3 months;

(b)     To faithfully execute the duties of his trust to manage and dispose of the estate according to the Rules for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper use, custody, and education of the ward;

(c)     To render a true account of all the estate, and of the management and disposition of the same;

(d)     To settle his accounts with the court and deliver over all the estate remaining in his hands to the person entitled thereto;

(e)     To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed (Sec. 1; Sec. 14, AM 03-02-05-SC).

Rule on Guardianship over Minors (AM 03-02-05-SC)

(1)     The father and mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. The Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code on guardianship (Sec. 1).

(2)     On grounds authorized by law, any relative or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor himself if 14 years of age or over, may petition the Family Court for the appointment of a general guardian over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the Secretary of DSWD and of the DOH in the case of an insane minor who needs to be hospitalized (Sec. 1).

(3)     Grounds of petition (Sec. 4):

(a)     Death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents;

(b)     Suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority;

(c)     Remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter is found unsuitable to exercise parental authority; or

(d)     When the best interest of the minor so require.

(4)     Qualifications of guardians (Sec. 4);

(a)     Moral character;

(b)     Physical, mental and psychological condition;

(c)     Financial status;

(d)     Relationship of trust with the minor;

(e)     Availability to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship;

(f)      Lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and

(g)     Ability to manage the property of the minor.

(5)     Order of preference in the appointment of guardian or the person and/or property of minor (Sec. 6):

(a)     The surviving grandparent and in case several grandparents survive, the court shall select any of them taking into account all relevant considerations;

(b)     The oldest brother or sister of the minor over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;

(c)     The actual custodian of the minor over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(d)     Any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of the minor.

(6)     Factors to consider in determining custody:

(a)     Any extrajudicial agreement which the parties may have bound themselves to comply with respecting the rights of the minor to maintain direct contact with the non-custodial parent on a regular basis, except when there is an existing threat or danger of physical, mental, sexual or emotional violence which endangers the safety and best interests of the minor;

(b)     The desire and ability of one parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the minor and the other parent;

(c)     The health, safety and welfare of the minor;

(d)     Any history of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial relationship with the minor, including anyone courting the parent;

(e)     The nature and frequency of contact with both parents;

(f)      Habitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances;

(g)     Marital misconduct;

(h)     The most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for the holistic development and growth of the minor; and

(i)       The preference of the minor over 7 years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit (Sec. 14, AM No. 03-04-04-SC).

(7)     The court shall order a social worker to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing.

Adoption (Rules 99-100, superseded by AM 02-6-02-SC)

(1)     Adoption is a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity (Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 669).

(2)     Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between the two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.

(3)     Adoption is not an adversarial proceeding. An adversarial proceeding is one having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it excludes an adoption proceeding. In adoption, there is no particular defendant to speak of since the proceeding involves the status of a person it being an action in rem.

Distinguish domestic adoption from inter-country adoption

Domestic Adoption

Inter-Country Adoption

Governed by RA 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; procedure governed by AM No. 02-06-02-SC, Aug. 22, 2002. Governed by RA 8043, the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995; procedure governed by the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on ICAA.
Applies to domestic adoption of Filipino children, where the entire adoption process beginning from the filing of the petition up to the issuance of the adoption decree takes place in the Philippines. Applies to adoption of a Filipino child in a foreign country, where the petition for adoption is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken and the decree of adoption is issued outside of the Philippines.

Who may be adopted

Who may be adopted

A child legally available for adoption.Requisites:

a)       Below 18 years of age; and

b)       Judicially declared available for adoption.

Exceptions:

a)       Legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

b)       Illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter;

c)       Person of legal age if, prior to the adoption said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter/s as his/her own child since minority.

Only a legally free child may be adopted.Requisites:

a)   Below 15 years of age; and

b)   Has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the DSWD in accordance with PD 603.

Who may adopt

Who may adopt

  1. Filipino Citizens

1)       Of legal age;

2)       In possession of full civil capacity and legal rights;

3)       Of good moral character;

4)       Has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;

5)       Emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children;

6)       In a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family;

7)       At least 16 years older than the adoptee but this latter requirement may be waived if (a) the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee; or (b) the adopter is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent; and

8)       Permanent resident of the Philippines.

  1. Aliens

1)       Same qualifications as above, and in addition:

2)       His/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;

3)       His/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter;

4)       Has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered; and

5)       Has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country. This requirement may be waived if (a) a former Filipino citizens seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity; (b) one seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; (c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.

  1. Filipino Citizens

1)       Permanent resident of a foreign country;

2)       Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under Philippine laws;

3)       Has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in country of domicile;

4)       Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

5)       Eligible to adopt under Philippine laws;

6)       In a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;

7)       Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of the ICAA;

8)       Residing in a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed in that country;

9)       Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the ICAA and in other applicable Philippine laws;

10)   At least 27 years of age at the time of the application; and

11)   At least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless (a) adopted is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted; or (b) adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the child to be adopted.

  1. Aliens

1)       At least 27 years of age at the time of the application;

2)       At least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent;

3)       Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws;

4)       Has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country;

5)       Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

6)       Eligible to adopt under his/her national law;

7)       In a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;

8)       Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of the ICAA;

9)       Comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and

10)   Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the ICAA and in other applicable Philippine laws.

Requirement of Joint Adoption by Spouses

Requirement of Joint Adoption by Spouses

General rule: husband and wife shall jointly adopt; otherwise, the adoption shall not be allowed.Exceptions:

1)       If one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;

2)       If one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter but the other spouse must give his/her consent;

3)       If the spouses are legally separated from each other.

Rule: if the adopter is married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption.

Procedure

Procedure

Where to file application: In the Family Court of the province or city where the prospective parents reside.After filing: The petition shall not be set for hearing without a case study report by a licensed social worker.

 

Supervised Trial Custody:

a)       Temporary parental authority is vested in prospective adopter;

b)       Period is at least 6 months, but may be reduced by the court motu propio or upon motion;

c)       If adopter is alien, the law mandatorily requires completion of the 6-month trial custody and may not be reduced, except if: (1) a former Filipino citizen seeks to adopt a relative within 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity; (2) one seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; (3) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.

 

Decree of Adoption:  Issued by Philippine Family Court.

Consent Required: Written consent of the following to the adoption is required, in the form of affidavit: (1) adoptee, if 10 years of age or over; (2) biological parent/s of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; (3) legitimate and adopted sons or daughters, 10 years of age or over, of the adopter/s and adoptee, if any; (4) illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age of over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any; (5) spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Where to file application: Either in (a) Family Court having jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be found, or (b) Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents.After filing: (a) if filed in the FC, court determines sufficiency of petition in respect to form and substance, after which, petition is transmitted to ICAB; (b) if petition is already with ICAB, it conducts matching of the applicant with an adoptive child; (c) after matchmaking, the child is personally fetched by the applicant for the trial custody which takes place outside of the Philippines.

 

Supervised Trial Custody:

a)       This process takes place outside of the country and under the supervision of the foreign adoption agency;

b)       For a period of 6 months;

c)       If unsuccessful, ICAB shall look for another prospective applicant. Repatriation of the child is to be resorted only as a last resort;

d)       If successful, ICAB transmits a written consent for the adoption to be executed by the DSWD, and the applicant then files a petition for adoption in his/her country.

Decree of Adoption: Issued by a foreign court.

Consent Required:

(1) Written consent of biological or adopted children above 10 years of age, in the form of sworn statement is required to be attached to the application to be filed with the FC or ICAB;

(2) If a satisfactory pre-adoptive relationship is formed between the applicant and the child, the written consent to the adoption executed by the DSWD is required.

 

 

Domestic Adoption Act (RA 8552; AM 02-06-02-SC)

Effects of adoption

(1)     Transfer of parental authority – except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, the parental authority of the biological parents shall terminate and the same shall be vested in the adopters (Sec. 16).

(2)     Legitimacy – the adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind (Sec. 17).

(3)     Successional rights

(a)     In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation (Sec. 18);

(b)     However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern (Sec. 18);

(c)     Art. 18(3) of the Family Code and Sec. 18, Art V of RA 8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent (Obiter Dictum in In re In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Naty Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541).

(4)     Issuance of new certificate and first name and surname of adoptee

(a)     The adoption decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known (Sec. 13). An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname (Sec. 14);

(b)     The original certificate of birth shall be stamped “cancelled” with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue (Sec. 14);

(c)     All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the DSWD, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential and the court may order its release under the following conditions only: (1) the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption; (2) the disclosure will be for the best interest of the adoptee; and (3) the court may restrict the purposes for which it may be used (Sec. 15).

Instances when adoption may be rescinded

(1)     Grounds for rescission:

(a)     Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;

(b)     Attempt on the life of the adoptee;

(c)     Sexual assault or violence; or

(d)     Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations (Sec. 19).

(2)     Prescriptive period:

(a)     If incapacitated – within five (5) years after he reaches the age of majority;

(b)     If incompetent at the time of the adoption – within five (5) years after recovery from such incompetency (Sec. 21, Rule on Adoption).

Effects of rescission of adoption

(1)     Parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated;

(2)     Reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished;

(3)     Cancellation of the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restoration of his/her original birth certificate; and

(4)     Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected (Sec. 20).

 

Inter-Country Adoption (RA 8043)

(1)     Inter-Country Adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued in the Philippines (Sec. 3[a]).

When allowed

(1)     Inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the child’s best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights (Sec. 2).

(2)     It is allowed when all the requirements and standards set forth under RA 8043 are complied with.

Functions of the RTC

(1)     An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations (Sec. 10).

“Best Interest of the Minor” Standard

(1)     In case of custody cases of minor children, the court after hearing and bearing in mind the best interest of the minor, shall award the custody as will be for the minor’s best interests.

(2)     The totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor and most encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor.

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rule 102)

(1)     Writ of habeas corpus is a writ which has been esteemed to the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom having for its object the speedy release by judicial decree of persons who are illegally restrained of their liberty, or illegally detained from the control of those who are entitled to their custody (Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition; Nava vs. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172).

(2)     The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. In all petitions for habeas corpus, the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of the petitioner’s detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of the Constitution has been satisfied. However, once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release (Sec. 1; Bernarte vs. CA, 75 SCAD 400 [Oct. 18, 1996]).

(3)     Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person (Martinez vs. Dir. Gen. Mendoza, GR 153795, Aug. 17, 2006).

(4)     The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review (Galvez vs. CA, 237 SCRA 685).

(5)     The general rule is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint. Petitioner’s temporary release does not render the petition for writ moot and academic (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778).

(6)     Some instances when the writ may issue:

(a)     To inquire into the legality of an order of confinement by a court martial (Ogvir vs. Dir. of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401);

(b)     To test the legality of an alien’s confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682);

(c)     To enable parents to regain custody of a minor child, even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will (Salvaña vs. Gaela, 55 Phil. 680);

(d)     To obtain freedom for an accused confined for failure to post bail where the prosecuting officer unreasonably delays trial by continued postponement (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650);

(e)     To give retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused when the trial judge has lost jurisdiction by virtue of the finality of the judgment of conviction (Rodriguez vs. Dir. of Prisons, 57 Phil. 133);

(f)      To determine the constitutionality of a statute (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66);

(g)     To permit an alien to land in the Philippines (The Huan vs. Collector of Customs, 54 Phil. 129);

(h)     To put an end to an immoral situation, as when a minor girl, although preferring to stay with her employer, maintains illicit relationship with him (Macazo vs. Nuñez, L-12772, Jan. 24, 1956);

(i)       When a bond given by an accused entitled thereto is not admitted or excessive bail is required of him (In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41);

(j)       To determine the legality of an extradition (US vs. Rauscher, 119 US 407);

(k)     To determine the legality of the action of a legislative body in punishing a citizen for contempt (Lopez vs. Delos Reyes, 55 Phil. 170);

(l)       To obtain freedom after serving minimum sentence when the penalty under an old law has been reduced by an amendatory law.

Contents of the petition

(1) Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a)   That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;

(b)   The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;

(c)   The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

(d)   A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear (Sec. 3).

 

Contents of the Return

(1) When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably:

(a)   Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;

(b)   If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order, execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;

(c)   If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge;

(d)   If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made (Sec. 10).

Distinguish peremptory writ from preliminary citation

Peremptory writ

Preliminary citation

Unconditionally commands the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified; Requires the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted
(Lee Yick Hon vs. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 563)  

When not proper/applicable

(1)     Instances when the writ of habeas corpus is not proper are:

(a)     For asserting or vindicating denial of right to bail (Galvez vs. CA, 237 SCRA 685);

(b)     For correcting errors in appreciation of facts or appreciation of law – where the trial court had no jurisdiction over the cause, over the person of the accused, and to impose the penalty provided for by law, the mistake committed by the trial court, in the appreciation of the facts and/or in the appreciation of the law cannot be corrected by habeas corpus (Sotto vs. Director of Prisons, May 30, 1962);

(c)     Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer file a petition for habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information or warrant (Rodriguez vs. Judge Bonifacio, Nov. 26, 2000).

 

When writ disallowed/discharged

(1)     If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment (Sec. 4).

Distinguish from writ of Amparo and Habeas Data

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Writ of Amparo

Writ of Habeas Data

A remedy available to any person, it covers cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Who may file petition:By the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf. Who may file (in order):a)    Any member of the immediate family: spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;

b)    Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of aggrieved party within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;

c)    Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if no known member of immediate family.

Who may file (in order):a)    Any member of the immediate family: spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;

b)    Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of aggrieved party within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

Where to file:RTC, enforceable within its area of jurisdiction.

CA or SC, enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Where to file:RTC, Sandiganbayan, CA, SC;

Writ is enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Where to file:RTC, SC, CA, Sandiganbayan;

Writ is also enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

  Petitioner is exempted to pay docket and other lawful fees. Indigent petitioner is exempted to pay docket and other lawful fees.
When issued:Forthwith when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, When issued:Immediately if on its face it ought to be issued;

Served immediately;

Summary hearing set not later than seven (7) days from date of issuance.

When issued:Immediately if on its face it ought to be issued;

Served within 3 days from issuance;

Summary hearing set not later than ten (10) work days from date of issuance.

Contents of verified petition:

(a)   That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;

(b)   The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;

(c)   The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

(d)   A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear

Contents of verified petition:a)     Personal circumstances of petitioner and of respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission;

b)     Violated or threatened right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved party, and how committed with attendance circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

c)     Investigation conducted, specifying names, personal circumstances and addresses of investigating authority or individuals, as well as manner and conduct of investigation together with any report;

d)     Actions and recourses taken by petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of aggrieved party and identity of person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

e)     The relief prayed for.

f)       May include general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Contents of verified petition:a)    Personal circumstances of petitioner and respondent;

b)    The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of aggrieved party;

c)    Actions and recourses taken by petitioner to secure the data or information;

d)    Location of files, registers or databases, government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

e)    Reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by respondent;

f)     In case of threats, relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

g)    Such other reliefs as are just and equitable.

Contents of return:

a)  Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;

b)  If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order, execution, or other process, if any, upon which the party is held;

c)  If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge;

d)  If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made.

Contents of return:a)    Lawful defenses;

b)    Steps or actions taken to determine whereabouts of aggrieved party;

c)    All relevant information pertaining to threat, act or omission against aggrieved party;

d)    If respondent is a public official or employee, further state: (1) verify the identity of aggrieved; (2) recover and preserve evidence related to death or disappearance of person identified in petition; (3) identify witnesses and their statements; (4) determine cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as pattern or practice; (5) identify and apprehend person/s involved in the death/disappearance; (6) bring suspected offenders before a competent court.

 

Contents of return:a)    Lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of source of information;

b)    Disclosure of data/info about petitioner, nature of data/info, purpose of collection;

c)    Steps or actions taken by respondent to ensure security and confidentiality of data or information;

d)    Currency and accuracy of data or information;

e)    Other allegations relevant to resolution of the proceedings.

* A general denial of the allegations in the petition is not allowed.

  Effects of failure to file return:The court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.

 

Effects of failure to file return:The court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires petitioner to submit evidence.
  Procedure for hearing:The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.

Procedure for hearing:The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

 

  Interim reliefs available before final judgment:a)  Temporary Protection Order – protected in a government agency of by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety;

b)  Inspection Order – with a lifetime of 5 days which may be extended, may be opposed on the ground of national security or privileged information, allows entry into and inspect, measure, survey or photograph the property;

c)  Production Order – to require respondents to produce and permit inspection, copying or photographing of documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that contain evidence.

(Not applicable)
  Effect of filing criminal action:A criminal action first filed excludes the filing of the writ; relief shall be by motion in the criminal case. A criminal case filed subsequently shall be consolidated with the petition for the writ of amparo. Effect of filing criminal action:A criminal action first filed excludes the filing of the writ; relief shall be by motion in the criminal case; A criminal case filed subsequently shall be consolidated with the petition for the writ of habeas data.
Appeal:To the SC under Rule 45, within 48 hours from notice of judgment (Tan Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez, GR 137571, Sept. 21, 2000).

A writ of habeas corpus does not lie where petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (Galvez vs. CA, GR 114046, Oct. 24, 1994).

Appeal:To the SC under Rule 45, within 5 days from notice of adverse judgment, to be given the same priority as habeas corpus cases. Appeal:To the SC under Rule 45, within 5 days from notice of judgment or final order, to be given the same priority as habeas corpus and amparo cases.
  Quantum of proof:By substantial evidence. Private respondent to prove ordinary diligence was observed in the performance of duty. Public official/employee respondent to prove extraordinary diligence was observed, and cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.  

Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (AM No.

03-04-04-SC)

(1)     The Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear petitions for custody of minors and the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in relation to custody of minors. The Court is tasked with the duty of promulgating special rules or procedure for the disposition of family cases with the best interests of the minor as primary consideration, taking into account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. It should be clarified that the writ is issued by the Family Court only in relation to custody of minors. An ordinary petition for habeas corpus should be filed in the regular Court. The issue of child custody may be tackled by the Family Court without need of a separate petition for custody being filed.

(2)     The Committee chose the phrase “any person claiming custody” as it is broad enough to cover the following: (a) the unlawful deprivation of the custody of a minor; or (b) which parent shall have the care and custody of a minor, when such parent is in the midst of nullity, annulment or legal separation proceedings (Sec. 2).

(3)     The hearings on custody of minors may, at the discretion of the court, be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released to non-parties without its approval (Sec. 21).

(4)     A motion to dismiss the petition is not allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. Any other ground that might warrant the dismissal of the petition shall be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer (Sec. 6).

(5)     Upon the filing of the verified answer of the expiration of the period to file it, the court may order a social worker to make a case study of the minor and the parties and to submit a report and recommendation to the court at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial (Sec. 8).

(6)     Hold Departure Order – The minor child subject of the petition shall not be brought out of the country without prior order from the court while the petition is pending. The court motu propio or upon application under oath may issue ex parte a hold departure order addressed to the BID of the DOJ a copy of the hold departure order within 24 hours from its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal (Sec.16).

Writ of Amparo (AM No. 07-9-12-SC)

Coverage; Distinguish from habeas corpus and habeas data; Who may file; Contents of return; Effects of failure to file return; Procedure for hearing; Institution of separate action; Effect of filing of a criminal action; Consolidation; Interim reliefs available to petitioner and respondent; Quantum of proof in application for issuance of writ of Amparo

 

(1)     See table above.

Differences between Amparo and search warrant

Omnibus waiver rule

 

Writ of Habeas Data (AM No. 08-1-16-SC)

Scope of writ; Availability of writ; Distinguish from Habeas Corpus and Amparo; Who may file; Contents of the petition; Consolidation; Effect of filing of a criminal action; Institution of separate action

 

(1)     See table above.

Instances when petition be heard in chambers

(1)     A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character (Sec. 12).

 

Change of Name (Rule 103)

Differences under Rule 103, RA 9048 and Rule 108

 

Rule 103

RA 9048

Rule 108

Petition should be filed in the RTC where the petitioner resides Petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar, or with consul general for citizens living abroad Verified petition filed in the RTC where the corresponding Civil Registry is located
Civil Registrar is not a party. Solicitor General to be notified by service of a copy of petition.   Civil Registrar is an indispensable party. If not made a party, proceedings are null and void. Reason: he is interested party in protecting the integrity of public documents. Solicitor General must also be notified by service of a copy of the petition.
Petition is filed by the person desiring to change his name Verified petition in the form of affidavit is filed by any person having direct and personal interest in the correction By a person interested in any acts, event, order or decree
Involves change of name only Involves first name and nickname All cancellation or correction of entries of: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments or annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalizations; (k) election, loss  or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Involves substantial changes Involves clerical or typographical errors Substantial and adversary if change affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party; Summary if involves mere clerical errors (Republic vs. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462).
Grounds:(a)     Name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(b)     Change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;

(c)     Change will avoid confusion;

(d)     One has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage;

(e)     Change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and

(f)      Surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest (Republic vs. Hernandez, 68 SCAD 279); Republic vs. Avila, 122 SCRA 483).

Grounds:a)       First name or nickname is found to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

b)       The first name or nickname has been habitually and continuous used by petitioner publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;

c)       Change will avoid confusion.

Grounds:Cancellation or correction of entries of: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments or annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalizations; (k) election, loss  or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Order for hearing to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Petition shall be published at least once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.Also to be posted in a conspicuous place for ten consecutive days. Order shall also be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and court shall cause reasonable notice to persons named in the petition.
Entry is correct but petitioner desires to change the entry Entry is incorrect. Cancellation or correction of correct or incorrect entries
An appropriate adversary proceeding An appropriate administrative proceeding. An appropriate summary or adversary proceeding depending on effects
Requires judicial order Does not require judicial order. Directed or changed by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general without judicial order
Service of judgment shall be upon the civil register concerned Transmittal of decision to civil registrar general Service of judgment shall be upon the civil register concerned
Appeal may be availed of if judgment or final order rendered affects substantial rights of person appealing. In case denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil register general or file appropriate petition with proper court by petition for review under Rule 43. Appeal may be availed of if judgment or final order rendered affects substantial rights of person appealing, to the RTC or to the CA.

Grounds for change of name

(g)     When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(h)     When the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;

(i)       When the change will avoid confusion;

(j)       When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage;

(k)     When the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and

(l)       When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest (Republic vs. Hernandez, 68 SCAD 279); Republic vs. Avila, 122 SCRA 483).

Absentees (Rule 107)

(1) Stages of absence:

(a)     provisional absence

(b)     declaration of absence

(c)     presumption of death

Purpose of the Rule

(1)     The purpose of the Rule is to allow the court to appoint an administrator or representative to take care of the property of the person who is sought to be judicially declared absent. It also aims to have the court appoint the present spouse as administrator or administratrix of the absent spouse’s properties, or for the separation of properties of the spouses.

Who may file; when to file

(1)     The following may file an application for the declaration of absence of a person:

(a)     Spouse present;

(b)     Heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;

(c)     Relatives who would succeed by the law of intestacy; and

(d)     Those who have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death (Sec. 2).

(2)     After the lapse of two (2) years from his disappearance and without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, or of five (5) years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, the declaration of his absence and appointment of a trustee or administrator may be applied for (Sec. 2).

(3)     When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without having left an agent to administer his property, or the power conferred upon the agent has expired, any interested party, relative or friend, may petition the Court of First Instance of the place where the absentee resided before his disappearance for the appointment of a person to represent him provisionally in all that may be necessary (Sec. 1).

 

Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108)

Entries subject to cancellation or correction under Rule 108, in relation to RA 9048

(1)     Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (a) changes of name (Sec. 2, Rule 108).

(2)     The petition for change of first names or nicknames may be allowed when such names or nicknames are ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; or the new name or nickname has been used habitually and continuously petitioner and has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or the change will avoid confusion (Sec. 4, RA 9048).

 

Appeals in Special Proceeding (Rule 109)

Judgments and orders for which appeal may be taken

(1) An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a)   Allows or disallows a will;

(b)   Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;

(c)   Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d)   Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e)   Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f)    Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration (Sec. 1).

When to appeal

(1)     Appeals in special proceedings necessitate a record on appeal as the original record should remain with the trial court, hence the reglementary period of thirty (30) days is provided for the perfection of appeals in special proceedings.

Modes of appeal

(1)     While under the concept in ordinary civil actions some of the orders stated in Sec. 1 may be considered interlocutory, the nature of special proceedings declares them as appealable orders, as exceptions to the provisions of Sec., Rule 41. Thus:

(a)     Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b)     Petition for review. The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c)     Petition for review on certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the SC by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Rule on Advance Distribution

(1)     Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules (Sec. 2).

 

 

Posted by: Elmer Brabante | May 28, 2011

2011 Remedial Law Reviewer (Special Civil Actions)


I.    SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Rules 62 – 71)

Ordinary civil actions versus special civil actions 

(1)     Although both types of actions are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, there are certain rules that are applicable only to specific special civil actions (Sec. 3[a], Rule 1). The fact that an action is subject to special rules other than those applicable to ordinary civil actions is what makes a civil action special.

(2)     An ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action (Sec. 1, Rule 2). This means that the defendant must have performed an act or omitted to do an act in violation of the rights of another (Sec. 2, Rule 2). These definitions do not fit the requirements of a cause of action in certain special civil actions. The cause of action as defined and required of an ordinary civil action finds no application to the special civil action of declaratory declaratory relief. In finds no application also in a complaint for interpleader. In this action, the plaintiff may file a complaint even if he has sustained no actual transgression of his rights. In fact, he actually has no interest in the subject matter of the action. This is not so in an ordinary civil action.

(3)     Ordinary civil actions may be filed initially in either the MTC of the RTC depending upon the jurisdictional amount or the nature of the action involved. On the other hand, there are special civil actions which can only be filed in an MTC like the actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. There are also special civil actions which cannot be commenced in the MTC, foremost of which are the petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

(4)     The venue in ordinary civil actions is determined by either the residence of the parties where the action is personal or by the location of the property where the action is real. This dichotomy does not always apply to a special civil action. For instance, the venue in a petition for quo warranto iw where the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals sits if the petition is commenced in any of these courts and without taking into consideration where the parties reside. It is only when the petition is lodged with the RTC that the residence is considered in venue analysis. While in ordinary civil actions the residences of both the plaintiff and the defendant are factored in the determination, a petition for quo warranto failed in the RTC merely looks into the residence of the respondent, not that of the petitioner. But if it is the Solicitor General who commences the action, another special rule is followed because the petition may only be commenced in the RTC in Manila, in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.

(5)     While ordinary civil actions when filed are denominated as “complaints”, some special civil actions are not denominated as such but “petitions”.

(a)     Special civil actions initiated by filing of a Petition:

  1. Declaratory relief other than similar remedies;
  2. Review of adjudication of the COMELEC and COA;
  3. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus;
  4. Quo warranto; and
  5. Contempt

(b)     Special civil actions initiated by filing of a Complaint:

  1. Interpleader;
  2. Expropriation;
  3. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
  4. Partition; and
  5. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

 

Jurisdiction and venue

(1)     The subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief raises issues which are not capable of pecuniary estimation and must be filed with the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 19[1], BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63). It would be error to file the petition with the Supreme Court which has no original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief (Untied Residents of Dominican Hill vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782; Ortega vs. Quezon City Government, 469 SCRA 388).

 

Interpleader (Rule 62)

(1)     Interpleader is a person who has property in his possession or an obligation to render, wholly or partially without claiming any right therein, or an interest in which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to the same.

(2)     Interpleader is a special civil action filed by a person against whom two conflicting claims are made upon the same subject matter and over which he claims no interest, to compel the claimants to interplead and to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves (Sec. 1).

 

Requisites for interpleader

(1)     There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests to a property in the custody or possession of the plaintiff;

(2)     The plaintiff in an action for interpleader has no claim upon the subject matter of the adverse claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest is not disputed by the claimants;

(3)     The subject matter of the adverse claims must be one and the same; and

(4)     The parties impleaded must make effective claims.

 

When to file

(1)     Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves (Sec. 1).

 

Declaratory Reliefs and Similar Remedies (Rule 63)

(1)     An action for declaratory relief is brought to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a contract or a statute for their guidance in the enforcement or compliance with the same (Meralco vs. Philippine Consumers Foundation, 374 SCRA 262). Thus, the purpose is to seek for a judicial interpretation of an instrument or for a judicial declaration of a person’s rights under a statute and not to ask for affirmative reliefs like injunction, damages or any other relief beyond the purpose of the petition as declared under the Rules.

(2)     The subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief is any of the following:

(a)     Deed;

(b)     Will;

(c)     Contract or other written instrument;

(d)     Statute;

(e)     Executive order or regulation;

(f)      Ordinance; or

(g)     Any other governmental regulation (Sec. 1).

(3)     The petition for declaratory relief is filed before there occurs any breach or violation of the deed, contract, statute, ordinance or executive order or regulation. It will not prosper when brought after a contract or a statute has already been breached or violated. If there has already been a breach, the appropriate ordinary civil action and not declaratory relief should be filed.

 

Who may file the action

(1)     Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or other governmental regulation may before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the RTC to determine any question of construction or validity arising and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder (Sec. 1).

(2)     Those who may sue under the contract should be those with interest under the contract like the parties, the assignees and the heirs as required by substantive law (Art. 1311, Civil Code).

(3)     If it be a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance, the petitioner is one whose rights are affected by the same (Sec. 1, Rule 63). The other parties are all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration. The rights of person not made parties to the action do not stand to be prejudiced by the declaration (Sec. 2).

 

Requisites of action for declaratory relief

(1)     The subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance;

(2)     The terms of said document or the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;

(3)     There must have been no breach of said document;

(4)     There must be actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one( there is threatened litigation the immediate future); there must be allegation of any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation of petitioner’s right sought to be prevented by the declaratory relief sought;

(5)     The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse;

(6)     The issue must be ripe for judicial determination e.g. administrative remedies already exhausted;

(7)     The party seeking the relief has legal interest in the controversy; and

(8)     Adequate relief is not available thru other means.

(9)     Stated otherwise, the requisites are:

(a)     There must be a justiciable controversy;

(b)     The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;

(c)     The party seeking the relief must have legal interest in the controversy; and

(d)     The issue is ripe for judicial determination (Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114).

 

When court may refuse to make judicial declaration

(1) Grounds for the court to refuse to exercise declaratory relief;

(a)     A decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action; or

(b)     The declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances as when the instrument or the statute has already been breached (Sec. 5).

(4)     In declaratory relief, the court is given the discretion to act or not to act on the petition. It may therefore choose not to construe the instrument sought to be construed or could refrain from declaring the rights of the petitioner under the deed or the law. A refusal of the court to declare rights or construe an instrument is actually the functional equivalent of the dismissal of the petition.

(5)     On the other hand, the court does not have the discretion to refuse to act with respect to actions described as similar remedies. Thus, in an action for reformation of an instrument, to quiet or to consolidate ownership, the court cannot refuse to render a judgment (Sec. 5).

 

Conversion to ordinary action

(1)     If before final termination of the case, a breach should take place, the action may be converted into ordinary action to avoid multiplicity of suits (Republic vs. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005).

(2)     Ordinary civil action – plaintiff alleges that his right has been violated by the defendant; judgment rendered is coercive in character; a writ of execution may be executed against the defeated party.

(3)     Special civil action of declaratory relief – an impending violation is sufficient to file a declaratory relief; no execution may be issued; the court merely makes a declaration.

 

Proceedings considered as similar remedies

(1)     Similar remedies are:

(a)     Action for reformation of an instrument;

(b)     Action for quieting of title; and

(c)     Action to consolidate ownership (Art. 1607, Civil Code).

 

Reformation of an instrument

(1)     It is not an action brought to reform a contract but to reform the instrument evidencing the contract. It presupposes that there is nothing wrong with the contract itself because there is a meeting of minds between the parties. The contract is to be reformed because despite the meeting of minds of the parties as to the object and cause of the contract, the instrument which is supposed to embody the agreement of the parties does not reflect their true agreement by reason of mistake, inequitable conduct or accident. The action is brought so the true intention of the parties may be expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359, CC).

(2)     The instrument may be reformed if it does not express the true intention of the parties because of lack of skill of the person drafting the instrument (Art. 1363, CC). If the parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of property, but the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper (Art. 1365, CC).

(3)     Where the consent of a party to a contract has been procured by fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, and an instrument was executed by the parties in accordance with the contract, what is defective is the contract itself because of vitiation of consent. The remedy is not to bring an action for reformation of the instrument but to file an action for annulment of the contract (Art. 1359, CC).

(4)     Reformation of the instrument cannot be brought to reform any of the following:

(a)     Simple donation inter vivos wherein no condition is imposed;

(b)     Wills; or

(c)     When the agreement is void (Art. 1666, CC).

 

Consolidation of ownership

(1)     The concept of consolidation of ownership under Art. 1607, Civil Code, has its origin in the substantive provisions of the law on sales. Under the law, a contract of sale may be extinguished either by legal redemption (Art. 1619) or conventional redemption (Art. 1601). Legal redemption (retracto legal) is a statutory mandated redemption of a property previously sold. For instance, a co-owner of a property may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third person (Art. 1620). The owners of adjoining lands shall have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land with a size of one hectare or less is alienated (Art. 1621). Conventional redemption (pacto de retro) sale is one that is not mandated by the statute but one which takes place because of the stipulation of the parties to the sale. The period of redemption may be fixed by the parties in which case the period cannot exceed ten (10) years from the date of the contract. In the absence of any agreement, the redemption period shall be four (4) years from the date of the contract (Art. 1606). When the redemption is not made within the period agreed upon, in case the subject matter of the sale is a real property, Art. 1607 provides that the consolidation of ownership in the vendee shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.

(2)     The action brought to consolidate ownership is not for the purpose of consolidating the ownership of the property in the person of the vendee or buyer but for the registration of the property. The lapse of the redemption period without the seller a retro exercising his right of redemption, consolidates ownership or title upon the person of the vendee by operation of law. Art. 1607 requires the filing of the petition to consolidate ownership because the law precludes the registration of the consolidated title without judicial order (Cruz vs. Leis, 327 SCRA 570).

 

Quieting of title to real property

(1)     This action is brought to remove a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. The action contemplates a situation where the instrument or a record is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title to real property. This action is then brought to remove a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. It may also be brought as a preventive remedy to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein (Art. 476).

(2)     The plaintiff need not be in possession of the real property before he may bring the action as long as he can show that he has a legal or an equitable title to the property which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 477).

 

Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolution of the COMELEC and COA (Rule 64)

(1)     A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 (Sec. 2). The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the SC directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just (Sec. 8). To prevent the execution of the judgment, the petitioner should obtain a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction because the mere filing of a petition does not interrupt the course of the principal case.

(2)     Decisions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all judgments or final orders of such commission (RA 7902).

(3)     The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial (Sec. 3).

(4)     Note that petition for review from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies to the CA should be within 15 days and does not stay the decision appealed. Petition for review from decisions of the RTC decided in its appellate jurisdiction filed to the CA should be filed within 15 days and stays execution, unless the case is under the rules of Summary Procedure. Special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, from Comelec and COA should be filed within 30 days, and does not stay the decision appealed. Bottomline: Decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are not stayed by appeal alone. Decisions of regular courts are stayed on appeal. Although in petition for review on certiorari to the SC via Rule 45, there is no express provision on effect of appeal on execution.

(2)     The “not less than 5 days” provision for filing a pleading applies only to:

(a)     filing an answer after a denial of a MtD;

(b)     filing an answer after denial or service of a bill of particulars;

(c)     filing an special civil action for certiorari from a decision of the Comelec or CoA after denial of a MfR or MNT. It does not apply to filing appeal from decisions of other entities after denial of a MfR or MNT. In such cases, either the parties have a fresh 15 days, or the balance.

 

Application of Rule 65 under Rule 64

(1)     Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution reads, “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.” The provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court to refer to certiorari under Rule 65 and not appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84). To implement the above constitutional provision, the SC promulgated Rule 64.

 

Distinction in the application of Rule 65 to judgments of the COMELEC and COA and the application of Rule 65 to other tribunals, persons and officers

 

Rule 64

Rule 65

Directed only to the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA; Directed to any tribunal, board or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
Filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment; Filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment;
The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial if allowed, interrupts the period for the filing of the petition for certiorari. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than 5 days reckoned from the notice of denial. The period within which to filed the petition if the motion for reconsideration or new trial is denied, is 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion.

 

 

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65)

(1)     Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, sine the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment (New Frontier Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, GR 165001, Jan. 31, 2007).

(2)     Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. Hence, if there was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision and what was being questioned was merely the findings in the decision of whether or not the practice of the other party constitutes a violation of the agreement, the matter is a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari (Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allieid Workers Union vs. CA, GR 165486, May 31, 2006).

(3)     Filing of petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceeding, unless an application for a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate court is granted (Sec. 7). Neither does it interrupt the reglementary period for the filing of an answer nor the course of the case where there is no writ of injunction (People vs. Almendras, 401 SCRA 555).

(4)     In a summary proceeding, petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against an interlocutory order of the court are not allowed (Sec. 19, RRSP).

(5)     Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. The remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the lower court is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion. The existence and availability of the right to appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for certiorari is that there is no appeal (Bugarin vs. Palisoc, GR 157985, Dec. 5, 2005).

(6)     Exceptions to the rule that certiorari is not available when the period for appeal has lapsed and certiorari may still be invoked when appeal is lost are the following:

(a)     Appeal was lost without the appellant’s negligence;

(b)     When public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;

(c)     When the broader interest of justice so requires;

(d)     When the writs issued are null and void; and

(e)     When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority (Chua vs. CA, 344 SCRA 136).

 

 

Definitions and distinctions

Certiorari

Prohibition

Mandamus

 

Certiorari is an extraordinary writ annulling or modifying the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, there being no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Sec. 1, Rule 65).

 

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with abuse of its discretion, there being no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Sec. 2, Rule 65).

 

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person, to do an act required to be done:

(a)     When he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; or

(b)     When one unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled (Sec. 3, Rule 65).

Directed against a person exercising to judicial or quasi-judicial functions Directed against a person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, or ministerial functions Directed against a person exercising ministerial duties
Object is to correct Object is to prevent Object is to compel
Purpose is to annul or modify the proceedings Purpose is to stop the proceedings Purpose is to compel performance of the act required and to collect damages
Person or entity must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion Person or entity must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion Person must have neglected a ministerial duty or excluded another from a right or office

 

Prohibition

Injunction

Always the main action May be the main action or just a provisional remedy
Directed against a court, a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions Directed against a party
Ground must be the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction Does not involve a question of jurisdiction

Prohibition

Mandamus

To prevent an act by a respondent To compel an act desired
May be directed against entities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions May be directed against judicial and non-judicial entities
Extends to discretionary functions Extends only to ministerial functions

Mandamus

Quo warranto

Clarifies legal duties, not legal titles Clarifies who has legal title to the office, or franchise
Respondent, without claiming any right to the office, excludes the petitioner Respondent usurps the office

 

Requisites

Certiorari

Prohibition

Mandamus

That the petition is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

The petition is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions; The plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;

 

The tribunal, board or officer has acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction The tribunal, corporation, board or person must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; It must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, which is ministerial and not discretionary, because the same is mandated by law;
There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
Accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject of the petition, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and sworn certification of non-forum shopping under Rule 46. Accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject of the petition, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and sworn certification of non-forum shopping under Rule 46. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

 

Injunctive relief

(1)     The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case (Sec. 7).

(2)     The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari  with a higher court or tribunal, absent a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge (AM 07-7-12-SC, Dec. 12, 2007).

 

Certiorari  distinguished from Appeal by Certiorari; Prohibition and Mandamus distinguished from Injunction; when and where to file petition

Certiorari as a Mode of Appeal (Rule 45) Certiorari as a Special Civil Action (Rule 65)

 

Called petition for review on certiorari, is a mode of appeal, which is but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case;

 

A special civil action that is an original action and not a mode of appeal, and not a part of the appellate process but an independent action.

Seeks to review final judgments or final orders;

May be directed against an interlocutory order of the court or where not appeal or plain or speedy remedy available in the ordinary course of law

Raises only questions of law;

Raises questions of jurisdiction because a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

Filed within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration or new trial;

Filed not later than 60 days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60 day period is counted from notice of denial of said motion;

Extension of 30 days may be granted for justifiable reasons

Extension no longer allowed;

Does not require a prior motion for reconsideration;

Motion for Reconsideration is a condition precedent, subject to exceptions

Stays the judgment appealed from;

Does not stay the judgment or order subject of the petition unless enjoined or restrained;

Parties are the original parties with the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as the respondent without impleading the lower court or its judge;

The tribunal, board, officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is impleaded as respondent

Filed with only the Supreme Court

May be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, or Regional Trial Court
SC may deny the decision motu propio on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

 

 

(1)     The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The antithetic character of appeal and certiorari has been generally recognized and observed save only on those rare instances when appeal is satisfactorily shown to be an inadequate remedy. Thus, a petitioner must show valid reasons why the issues raised in his petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal (Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA, 334 SCRA 305).

Prohibition and Mandamus distinguished from Injunction; when and where to file petition

 

Prohibition

Mandamus

Injunction

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with abuse of its discretion, there being no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Sec. 2, Rule 65). Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person, to do an act required to be done:

(a)         When he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; or

(b)         When one unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled (Sec. 3, Rule 65).

Main action for injunction seeks to enjoin the defendant from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or to compel a particular act in violation of the rights of the applicant. Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy to preserve the status quo and prevent future wrongs in order to preserve and protect certain interests or rights during the pendency of an action.
Special civil action Special civil action Ordinary civil action
To prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction; To compel the performance of a ministerial and legal duty; For the defendant either to refrain from an act or to perform not necessarily a legal and ministerial duty;
May be directed against entities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions May be directed against judicial and non-judicial entities Directed against a party
Extends to discretionary functions Extends only to ministerial functions Does not necessarily extend to ministerial, discretionary or legal functions;
Always the main action Always the main action May be the main action or just a provisional remedy
May be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, or in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where respondent resides. May be brought in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, or in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where respondent resides. May be brought in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the territorial area where respondent resides.

 

Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition

(1)  When the issue is one purely of law;

(2)     When there is urgency to decide upon the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner;

(3)     Where the subject matter of the action is perishable;

(4)     When order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction or there was no due process;

(5) When questions have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court;

(6) When is urgent necessity for the resolution of the question;

(7) When Motion for Reconsideration would be useless, e.g. the court already indicated it would deny any Motion for Reconsideration;

(8) In a criminal case, where relief from order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(9) Where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;

(10) When petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for urgent relief; and

(11) When issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved;

 

Reliefs petitioner is entitled to

(1)     The primary relief will be annulment or modification of the judgment, order or resolution or proceeding subject of the petition. It may also include such other incidental reliefs as law and justice may require (Sec. 1). The court, in its judgment may also award damages and the execution of the award for damages or costs shall follow the procedure in Sec. 1, Rule 39 (Sec. 9).

Where to file petition

Supreme Court Subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and only when compelling reasons exist for not filing the same with the lower courts
Regional Trial Court If the petition relates to an act or an omission of an MTC, corporation, board, officer or person
Court of Appeals only If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or rules
Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan Whether or not in aid of appellate jurisdiction
Commission on Elections In election cases involving an act or an omission of an MTC or RTC
As amended by AM No. 07-7-12-SC, Dec. 12, 2007  

 

(1)     A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected by appeal (Microsoft Corp. vs. Best Deal Computer Center Corp., GR 148029, Sept. 24, 2002; Estrera vs. CA, GR 154235, Aug. 16, 2006).

 

Effects of filing of an unmeritorious petition

(1)     The Court may impose motu propio, based on res ipsa loquitur, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory an unmeritorious petition for certiorari (AM 07-7-12-SC, Dec. 12, 2007). The court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B.

 

Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

(1)     Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws they cannot legally exercise by virtue of a grant and authority from the State (44 Am. Jur. 88-89).

(2)     It is a special civil action commenced by a verified petition against (a) a person who usurps a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer who performs an act constituting forfeiture of a public office; or (c) an association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority to do so (Sec. 1).

 

Distinguish from Quo Warranto in the Omnibus Election Code

Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

Quo Warranto (Election Code)

Subject of the petition is in relation to an appointive office; Subject of the petition is in relation to an elective office;
The issue is the legality of the occupancy of the office by virtue of a legal appointment; Grounds relied upon are: (a) ineligibility to the position; or (b) disloyalty to the Republic.
Petition is brought either to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court; May be instituted with the COMELEC by any voter contesting the election of any member of Congress, regional, provincial or city officer; or to the MeTC, MTC or MCTC if against any barangay official;
Filed within one (1) year from the time the cause of ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold the office or position arose; Filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election;
Petitioner is the person entitled to the office; Petitioner may be any voter even if he is not entitled to the office;
The court has to declare who the person entitled to the office is if he is the petitioner. When the tribunal declares the candidate-elect as ineligible, he will be unseated but the person occupying the second place will not be declared as the one duly elected because the law shall consider only the person who, having duly filed his certificate of candidacy, received a plurality of votes.

 

When government commence an action against individuals

(1)     Quo warranto is commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by the Solicitor General, or in some instances, by a public prosecutor (Secs. 2 and 3). When the action is commenced by the Solicitor General, the petition may be brought in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (Sec. 7)

(2)     An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines thru the Solicitor General against:

(a)     A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b)     A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office;

(c)     An association which acts a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act (Sec. 1).

 

When individual may commence an action

(1)     The petition may be commenced by a private person in his own name where he claims to be entitled to the public office or position alleged to have been usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another (Sec. 5). Accordingly, the private person may maintain the action without the intervention of the Solicitor General and without need for any leave of court (Navarro vs. Gimenez, 10 Phil. 226; Cui vs. Cui, 60 Phil. 37). In bringing a petition for quo warranto, he must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly being held by another (Cuevas vs. Bacal, 347 SCRA 338). It is not enough that he merely asserts the right to be appointed to the office.

 

Judgment in Quo Warranto action 

(1)     When the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of the parties to the action as justice requires (Sec. 9).

 

Rights of a person adjudged entitled to public office

(1)     If the petitioner is adjudged to be entitled to the office, he may sue for damages against the alleged usurper within one (1) year from the entry of judgment establishing his right to the office in question (Sec. 11).

 

Expropriation (Rule 67)

(1)     Expropriation is an exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain wherein the government takes a private property for public purpose upon payment of just compensation.

Matters to allege in complaint for expropriation

(1)     An expropriation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a verified complaint which shall:

(a)     State with certainty the right of the plaintiff to expropriation and the purpose thereof;

(b)     Describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated; and

(c)     Join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part of the property or interest therein showing as far as practicable the interest of each defendant. If the plaintiff cannot with accuracy identify the real owners, averment to that effect must be made in the complaint (Sec. 1).

Two stages in every action for expropriation

(1)     Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to expropriate – this includes an inquiry into the propriety of the expropriation, its necessity and the public purpose. This stage will end in the issuance of an order of expropriation if the court finds for the plaintiff or in the dismissal of the complaint if it finds otherwise.

(2)     Determination of just compensation through the court-appointed commissioners (National Power Corporation vs. Joson, 206 SCRA 520).

When plaintiff can immediately enter into possession of the real property, in relation to RA 8974

(1)     Except for the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the expropriator shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary (Sec. 2, Rule 67).

New system of immediate payment of initial just compensation

(1)     For the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, upon the filing of the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) 100 percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Sec. 7 of RA 8974 (Sec. 4, RA 8974).

Defenses and objections

(1)     Omnibus Motion Rule — Subject to the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 15).

(2)     If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.

If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.

A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award (Sec. 3)..

 

Order of Expropriation

(1)     If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable (Sec. 4).

Ascertainment of just compensation

(1)     The order of expropriation merely declares that the plaintiff has the lawful to expropriate the property but contains no ascertainment of the compensation to be paid to the owner of the property. So upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the property. Objections to the appointment may be made within 10 days from service of the order of appointment (Sec. 5). The commissioners are entitled to fees and their fees shall be taxed as part of the costs of the proceedings, and all costs shall be paid by the plaintiff except those costs of rival claimants litigating their claims (Sec. 12).

(2)     Where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Although the findings of the commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may do so only for valid reasons, that is where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

Appointment of Commissioners; Commissioner’s report; Court action upon commissioner’s report

(1)     Appointment. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court.

Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the objections (Sec. 5).

(2)     Proceedings. Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken (Sec. 6).

(3)     Report. The court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire (Sec. 7).

(4)     Action upon the report. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken (Sec. 8).

 

Rights of plaintiff upon judgment and payment

(1)     After payment of the just compensation as determined in the judgment, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate the same for the public use or purpose defined in the judgment or to retain possession already previously made in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 67.

(2)     Title to the property expropriated passes from the owner to the expropriator upon full payment of just compensation (Federated Realty Corp. vs. CA, 477 SCRA 707).

 

Effect of recording of judgment

(1)     The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or purpose (Sec. 13).

 

Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (Rule 68)

(1)     A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract executed by a debtor in favor of a creditor as security for the principal obligation. This principal obligation is a simple loan or mutuum described in Art. 1953, Civil Code. To be a real estate mortgage, the contract must be constituted on either immovables (real property) or inalienable real rights. If constituted on movables, the contract is a chattel mortgage (Art. 2124, CC).

(2)     A mortgage contract may have a provision in which the mortgage is a security for past, present and future indebtedness. This clause known as a dragnet clause or blanket mortgage clause has its origins in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruled that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts (Prudential Bank vs. Alviar, 464 SCRA 353).

 

Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale

(1)     If after the trial, the court finds that the matters set forth in the complaint are true, it shall render a judgment containing the following matters:

(a)     An ascertainment of the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, as well as costs;

(b)     A judgment of the sum found due;

(c)     An order that the amount found due be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee within the period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from the entry of judgment; and

(d)     An admonition that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment (Sec. 2).

(2)     The judgment of the court on the above matters is considered a final adjudication of the case and hence, is subject to challenge by the aggrieved party by appeal or by other post-judgment remedies.

(3)     The period granted to the mortgagor for the payment of the amount found due by the court is not just a procedural requirement but s substantive right given by law to the mortgagee as his first chance to save his property from final disposition at the foreclosure sale (De Leon vs. Ibañez, 95 Phil. 119).

 

Sale of mortgaged property; effect

(1)     The confirmation of the sale shall divest the rights in the property of all parties to the action and shall vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law (Sec. 3). The title vests in the purchaser upon a valid confirmation of the sale and retroacts to the date of sale (Grimalt vs. Vasquez, 36 Phil. 396).

(2)     The import of Sec. 3 includes one vital effect: The equity of redemption of the mortgagor or redemptioner is cut-off and there will be no further redemption, unless allowed by law (as in the case of banks as mortgagees). The equity of redemption starts from the ninety-day period set in the judgment of the court up to the time before the sale is confirmed by an order of the court. once confirmed, no equity of redemption may further be exercised.

(3)     The order of confirmation is appealable and if not appealed within the period for appeal becomes final. Upon the finality of the order of confirmation or upon the expiration of the period of redemption when allowed by law, the purchaser at the auction sale or last redemptioner, if any, shall be entitled to the possession of the property and he may secure a writ of possession, upon, motion, from the court which ordered the foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the same adversely to the judgment obligor (Sec. 3).

 

Disposition of proceeds of sale

(1)     The proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority. If there be any further balance after paying them or if there be no junior encumbrancers, the same shall be paid to the mortgagor or any person entitled thereto (Sec. 4).

 

Deficiency judgment

(1)     If there be a balance due to the plaintiff after applying the proceeds of the sale, the court, upon motion, shall render judgment against the defendant for any such balance. Execution may issue immediately if the balance is all due the plaintiff shall be entitled to execution at such time as the remaining balance shall become due and such due date shall be stated in the judgment (Sec. 6). Note that the deficiency judgment is in itself a judgment hence, also appealable.

(2)     No independent action need be filed to recover the deficiency from the mortgagor. The deficiency judgment shall be rendered upon motion of the mortgagee. The motion must be made only after the sale and after it is known that a deficiency exists. Before that, any court order to recover the deficiency is void (Govt. of PI vs. Torralba, 61 Phil. 689). It has been held that the mortgagor who is not the debtor and who merely executed the mortgage to secure the principal debtor’s obligation, is not liable for the deficiency unless he assumed liability for the same in the contract (Philippine Trust Co. vs. Echaus Tan Siua, 52 Phil. 852). Since a deficiency judgment cannot be obtained against the mortgagore who is not the debtor in the principal obligation, mortgagee may have to file a separate suit against the principal debtor.

 

Instances when court cannot render deficiency judgment

(1)     Where the debtor-mortgagor is a non-resident and who at the time of the filing of the action for foreclosure and during the pendency of the proceedings was outside the Philippines, it is believed that a deficiency judgment under Sec. 6 would not be procedurally feasible. A deficiency judgment is by nature in personam and jurisdiction over the person is mandatory. Having been outside the country, jurisdiction over his person could not have been acquired.

 

Judicial foreclosure versus extrajudicial foreclosure

Extra-judicial Foreclosure (Act 3135)

Judicial foreclosure (Rule 68)

No complaint is filed; Complaint is filed with the courts;
There is a right of redemption. Mortgagor has a right of redemption for 1 year from registration of the sale; No right of redemption except when mortgagee is a banking institution; equity of redemption only (90 to 120 days, and any time before confirmation of foreclosure sale);
Mortgagee has to file a separate action to recover any deficiency; Mortagagee can move for deficiency judgment in the same action
Buyer at public auction becomes absolute owner only after finality of an action for consolidation of ownership; Buyer at public auction becomes absolute owner only after confirmation of the sale;
Mortgagee is given a special power of attorney in the mortgage contract to foreclose the mortgaged property in case of default. Mortgagee need not be given a special power of attorney.

 

Equity of redemption versus right of redemption

Equity of Redemption

Right of Redemption

The right of defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the debt within 90 to 120 days after the entry of judgment or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to confirmation. A right granted to a debtor mortgagor, his successor in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold to repurchase the property within one year even after the confirmation of the sale and even after the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale.
May be exercised even after the foreclosure sale provided it is made before the sale is confirmed by order of the court. There is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68. This right of redemption exists only in extrajudicial foreclosures where there is always a right of redemption within one year from the date of sale (Sec. 3, Act 3135), but interpreted by the Court to mean one year from the registration of the sale.
May also exist in favor or other encumbrances. If subsequent lien holders are not impleaded as parties in the foreclosure suit, the judgment in favor of the foreclosing mortgagee does not bind the other lien holders. In this case, their equity of redemption remains unforeclosed. A separate foreclosure proceeding has to be brought against them to require them to redeem from the first mortgagee or from the party acquiring the title to the mortgaged property. General rule: In judicial foreclosures there is only an equity of redemption which can be exercised prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale. This means that after the foreclosure sale but before its confirmation, the mortgagor may exercise his right of pay the proceeds of the sale and prevent the confirmation of the sale.
If not by banks, the mortgagors merely have an equity of redemption, which is simply their right, as mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale. Exception: there is a right of redemption if the foreclosure is in favor of banks as mortgagees, whether the foreclosure be judicial or extrajudicial. This right of redemption is explicitly provided in Sec. 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000. While the law mentions the redemption period to be one year counted from the date of registration of the certificate in the Registry of Property

 

 

Partition (Rule 69)

(1)     Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong (Cruz vs. CA, 456 SCRA 165).  It presupposes the existence of a co-ownership over a property between two or more persons. The rule allowing partition originates from a well-known principle embodied in the Civil Code, that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain the co-ownership. Because of this rule, he may demand at any time the partition of the property owned in common (Art. 494).

(2)     Instances when a co-owner may not demand partition at any time:

(a)     There is an agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided for a certain period of time but not exceeding ten years (Arft. 494);

(b)     When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not exceeding 20 years (Art. 494);

(c)     When partition is prohibited by law (Art. 494);

(d)     When the property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended (Art. 495);

(e)     When the condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand partition has not yet been fulfilled (Art. 1084).

 

Who may file complaint; Who should be made defendants

(1)     The action shall be brought by the person who has a right to compel the partition of real estate (Sec. 1) or of an estate composed of personal property, or both real and personal property (Sec. 13). The plaintiff is a person who is supposed to be a co-owner of the property or estate sought to be partitioned. The defendants are all the co-owners. All the co-owners must be joined. Accordingly, an action will not lie without the joinder of all co-owners and other persons having interest in the property (Reyes vs. Cordero, 46 Phil. 658). All the co-owners, therefore, are indispensable parties.

Matters to allege in the complaint for partition

(1)     The plaintiff shall state in his complaint, the nature and extent of his title, an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and shall join as defendants all other persons interested in the property (Sec. 1). He must also include a demand for the accounting of the rents, profits and other income from the property which he may be entitled to (Sec. 8). These cannot be demanded in another action because they are parts of the cause of action for partition. They will be barred if not set up in the same action pursuant to the rule against splitting a single cause of action.

Two (2) stages in every action for partition

(1)     A reading of the Rules will reveal that there are actually three (3) stages in the action, each of which could be the subject of appeal: (a) the order of partition where the property of the partition is determined; (b) the judgment as to the accounting of the fruits and income of the property; and (c) the judgment of partition (Riano, Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar), 2007).

Order of partition and partition by agreement

(1)     During the trial, the court shall determine whether or not the plaintiff is truly a co-owner of the property, that there is indeed a co-ownership among the parties, and that a partition is not legally proscribed thus may be allowed. If the court so finds that the facts are such that a partition would be in order, and that the plaintiff has a right to demand partition, the court will issue an order of partition.

(2)     The court shall order the partition of the property among all the parties in interest, if after trial it finds that the plaintiff has the right to partition (Sec. 2). It was held that this order of partition including an order directing an accounting is final and not interlocutory and hence, appealable; thus, revoking previous contrary rulings on the matter. A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

(3)     Partition by agreement. The order of partition is one that directs the parties or co-owners to partition the property and the parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, if they agree among themselves. If they do agree, the court shall then confirm the partition so agreed upon by all of the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated (Sec. 2). There always exists the possibility that the co-owners are unable to agree on the partition. If they cannot partition the property among themselves, the next stage in the action will follow, the appointment of commissioners.

 

Partition by commissioners; Appointment of commissioners, Commissioner’s report; Court action upon commissioner’s report

Sec. 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. — If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.

Sec. 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. — Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and examination, and shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof.

Sec. 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. — When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine.

Sec. 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed. — The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall pass the title to the property or bind the parties until the court shall have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered judgment thereon.

Sec. 7. Action of the court upon commissioners’ report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in part; and may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as above provided, between the several owners thereof.

 

Judgment and its effects

(1)     The judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party, the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.

(2)     If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real estate to the party making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest on the part of the other parties to the action.

(3)     If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of any of the parties to the action.

(4)     A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action (Sec. 11).

 

Partition of personal property

(1)     The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property, in so far as the same may be applicable (Sec. 13).

 

Prescription of action

(1)     Prescription of action does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owner or co-heirs as long as there is a recognition of the co-ownership expressly or impliedly (Art. 494).

(2)     The action for partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as the co-ownership exists (Aguirre vs. CA, 421 SCRA 310).

(3)     But while the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

 

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70)

(1)     The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer belong to the class of actions known by the generic name accion interdictal (ejectment) where the issue is the right of physical or material possession of the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership by the parties involved (Mendoza vs. CA, 452 SCRA 117 [2005]).

(2)     Accion Interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action:

(a)     Forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats or stealth;

(b)     Unlawful Detainer (desahuico), where one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.

 

Definitions and Distinction

Forcible Entry

Unlawful Detainer

The possession of the defendant is unlawful from the beginning; issue is which party has prior de facto possession; The possession of the defendant is lawful from the beginning becomes illegal by reason of the expiration or termination of his right to the possession of the property;
The law does not require previous demand for the defendant to vacate; Plaintiff must first make such demand which is jurisdictional in nature;
The plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived by the defendant; and The plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession;
The one year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the property. The one-year period is counted from the date of last demand.

 

 

Distinguished from accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria

Accion Publiciana

Accion Reinvindicatoria

A plenary ordinary civil action for the recovery of the better right of possession (juridical possession), must be filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be not one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer but an accion publiciana (Valdez vs, CA, GR 132424, May 2, 2006). An action for the recovery of the exercise of ownership, particularly recovery of possession as an attribute or incident of ownership;
The basis of the recovery of possession is the plaintiff’s real right of possession or jus possessionis, which is the right to the possession of the real property independent of ownership. The basis for the recovery of possession is ownership itself.

 

 

How to determine jurisdiction in accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria

(1)     The actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the MTC, MeTC and MCTC (Sec. 33[2], BP 129; RA 7691) and shall be governed by the rules on summary procedure irrespective of the amount of damages or rental sought to be recovered (Sec. 3, Rule 70).

(2)     In actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the MTC to acquire jurisdiction: (a) plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property; and (b) he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the proper recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action to recover possession (Benguet Corp. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, GR 155343, Sept. 2, 2005).

(3)     Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer (Valdez vs. CA, GR 132424, May 2, 2006).

(4)     Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The mere raising of the issue of tenancy does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint and is not dependent upon the defenses set up by the defendant (Marino, Jr. vs. Alamis, 450 SCRA 198 [2005]).

 

Who may institute the action and when; against whom the action may be maintained

(1)     Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs (Sec. 1).

(2)     Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings (Sec. 2).

 

Pleadings allowed

(1)     The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified (Sec. 4).

 

Action on the complaint

(1)     The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons (Sec. 5).

 

When demand is necessary

(1)     Unless there exists a stipulation to the contrary, an unlawful detainer case shall be commenced only after the demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee (Sec. 2). The requirement for a demand implies that the mere failure of the occupant to pay rentals or his failure to comply with the conditions of the lease does not ipso facto render his possession of the premises unlawful. It is the failure to comply with the demand that vests upon the lessor a cause of action.

(2)     The demand may be in the form of a written notice served upon the person found in the premises. The demand may also be made by posting a written notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon (Sec. 2). It has been ruled, however, that the demand upon a tenant may be oral (Jakihaca vs. Aquino, 181 SCRA 67). Sufficient evidence must be adduced to show that there was indeed a demand like testimonies from disinterested and unbiased witnesses.

 

Preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction

(1)     The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof (Sec. 15).

 

Resolving defense of ownership

(1)     The assertion by the defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction. The defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved (Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia vs. Dimatulac, 401 SCRA 742; Perez vs. Cruz, 404 SCRA 487). If the defendant raises the question of ownership and the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession (Sec. 3, RA 7691).

(2)     When the defendant raises the issue of ownership, the court may resolve the issue of ownership only under the following conditions:

(a)     When the issue of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership; and

(b)     The issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession (Sec. 16).

Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with finality (Roberts vs. Papio, GR 166714, Feb. 9, 2007).

 

How to stay the immediate execution of judgment

(1)     Defendant must take the following steps to stay the execution of the judgment:

(a)     Perfect an appeal;

(b)     File a supersedeas bond to pay for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from; and

(c)     Deposit periodically with the RTC, during the pendency of the appeal, the adjudged amount of rent due under the contract or if there be no contract, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises (Sec. 19).

(2)     Exceptions to the rule:

(a)     Where delay in the deposit is due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence;

(b)     Where supervening events occur subsequent to the judgment bringing about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable; and

(c)     Where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the circumstances.

 

Summary procedure, prohibited pleadings

(1)     Forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions are summary in nature designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Tubiano vs. Riazo, 335 SCRA 531). These action shall both fall under the coverage of the Rules of Summary Procedure irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rental sought to be recovered (Sec. 3).

(2)     Prohibited pleadings and motions:

(a)     Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;

(b)     Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c)     Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

(d)     Petition for relief from judgment;

(e)     Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;

(f)      Memoranda;

(g)     Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;

(h)     Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i)       Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j)       Reply;

(k)     Third-party complaints;

(l)       Interventions

 

Contempt (Rule 71)

(1)     Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to the rules or orders of a judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language, in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair the respect due to such body (17 C.J.S. 4).

(2)     Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner to impede the due administration of justice (Siy vs. NLRC, GR 158971, Ausg. 25, 2005).

(3)     The reason for the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarantee, said institution would be resting on shaky foundation (Cornejo vs.Tan, 85 Phil. 772).

(4)     It is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts, and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271).

(5)     Contempt proceedings has dual function:

(a)     Vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; and

(b)     Coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the Court (Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007).

 

Kinds of contempt; Purpose and nature of each

(1)     Civil or Criminal, depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act.

(2)     Direct or indirect, according to the manner of commission.

Civil Contempt

Criminal Contempt

It is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore and offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made; It is a conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect;
The purpose is to compensate for the benefit of a party; The purpose is to punish, to vindicate the authority of the court and protect its outraged dignity;
The rules of procedure governing contempt proceedings or criminal prosecutions ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. Should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, insofar as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings.

 

Direct Contempt

Indirect Contempt

In general is committed in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it; It is not committed in the presence of the court, but done at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice;
Acts constituting direct contempt are:

a)    Misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before it;

b)    Disrespect toward the court;

c)    Offensive personalities towards others;

d)    Refusal to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness;

e)    Refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (Sec. 1);

f)     Acts of a party or a counsel which constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping (Sec. 1, Rule 7);

g)    Unfounded accusations or allegations or words in a pleading tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute (Re: Letter dated 21 Feb. 2005 of Atty. Noel Sorreda, 464 SCRA 32);

Acts constituting indirect contempt are:

(a)  Misbehavior an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

 (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e)   Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f)    Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him (Sec. 3);

 

 

Remedy against direct contempt; penalty

(1)     The penalty for direct contempt depends upon the court which the act was committed;

(a)     If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, the penalty is a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding 10 days, or both;

(b)     If the act constituting direct contempt was committed against a lower court, the penalty is a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both (Sec. 1)’;

(c)     If the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet within the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it (Sec. 8).

(2)     A person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal therefrom. His remedy is a petition for certiorari or prohibition directed against the court which adjudged him in direct contempt (Sec. 2). Pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment for direct contempt shall be suspended. The suspension however shall take place only if the person adjudged in contempt files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment. This bond is conditioned upon his performance of the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

 

Remedy against indirect contempt; penalty

(1)     The punishment for indirect contempt depends upon the level of the court against which the act was committed;

(a)     Where the act was committed against an RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding 30,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both;

(b)     Where the act was committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one month, or both. Aside from the applicable penalties, if the contempt consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, TRO or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved (Sec. 7);

(c)     Where the act was committed against a person or entity exercising quasi-judicial functions, the penalty imposed shall depend upon the provisions of the law which authorizes a penalty for contempt against such persons or entities.

(2)     The person adjudged in indirect contempt may appeal from the judgment or final order of the court in the same manner as in criminal cases. The appeal will not however have the effect of suspending the judgment if the person adjudged in contempt does not file a bond in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken. This bond is conditioned upon his performance of the judgment or final order if the appeal is decided against (Sec. 11).

 

How contempt proceedings are commenced

(1)     Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision (Sec. 4).

Acts deemed punishable as indirect contempt

(1)     After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(b)     Misbehavior an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

 (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e)   Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f)    Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him (Sec. 3).

(2) Failure by counsel to inform the court of the death of his client constitutes indirect contempt within the purview of Sec. 3, Rule 71, since it constitutes an improper conduct tending to impede the administration of justice.

When imprisonment shall be imposed

(1)     When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it (Sec. 8). Indefinite incarceration may be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power. When a person or party is legally and validly required by a court to appear before it for a certain purpose, and when that requirement is disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to bring the person or party before it.

(2)     The punishment is imposed for the benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit who has been injured aside from the need to compel performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey although able to do so. In effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt to set himself free.

 

Contempt against quasi-judicial bodies

 (1)     The rules on contempt apply to contempt committed against persons or entities exercising quasi-judicial functions or in case there are rules for contempt adopted for such bodies or entities pursuant to law, Rule 71 shall apply suppletorily (Sec. 12).

(2)     Quasi-judicial bodies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt can only do so by initiating them in the proper RTC. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. The RTC of the place where contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over the charges for indirect contempt that may be filed (Sec. 12).

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